HOPE: BEGINNING EXPLORATION OF DEVELOPMENT

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A dissertation submitted to The Institute For Clinical Social Work in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Clinical Social Work

By

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ABSTRACT

The capacity to hope is seen as a necessary, although insufficient, condition which must exist for the effective functioning of the ego. Yet, relatively few social scientists have devoted attention to the understanding of this aspect of the psyche.

This study begins with an examination of the intrinsic characteristics and qualities of hope, as well as its functions which leads to the formulation of a working definition. As an ego strength, hope is characterized by enduring, recognizable regulatory patterns which organize life experiences in such a way that the promise of selective future events are perceived as being more pleasurable than the present. It is a substratum of the ego, comprised of a particular organization of functions, which are necessary but not sufficient for the effective accomplishment of the ego's integrative tasks.

An exploration of development during the first two years of life is charted, suggesting the place and process of the ascendance of the hopeful capacity. The developmental model of Margaret Mahler is utilized as the principle theoretical structure for conceptual organization. Finally, some thoughts regarding implications for further study are proposed which derive from the findings.

CHAPTER I

Purpose and Methodology

He who does not hope for the unexpected
will not find it. - Heraclitus -

Introduction:

> As mood, attitude, and mode of perceiving life, optimism has been central to the process of human evolution; it determines to a degree not yet charted the way humans think, play, and respond to birth and death. It is a force which can be a lever in the hands of statesmen and a bludgeon in the hands of dictators; doctors carry it in their kits, and it ensures employment for priests as well as croupiers. It permitted our ancestors to attack intimidating wild animals when they hunted and, when they planted, to have confidence in seeds, soil, water, and sun. A hopeful recognition of the future's promise may be as important to a community's welfare as yeast to rising bread. When investors are confident, fortunes are made, and when they are not, the negotiable value of a community's wealth falls like a stone. Shrines, lotteries, strawberry desserts, and a movie's happy ending all share a benign sense of the future. (Tiger, 1979, p.18)

Historically, hope has, in the main, been the realm of the poet, philosopher and theologian. Mythologically born in the story of Pandora, the Greeks' opinion of hope was that it was an evil. Although hope has had few public defenders, the Jews as a group have been a significant exception. "For while the Jews were, to be sure, people of faith, they were also at all times and perhaps above all a people of hope who, despite tribulation, trial, exile, annihilation, isolation, dispersion, torture, and slaughter, clung to the expectation that the Messiah would come and the world get better." (Menninger, 1963, p.381)

The scientific community appears to have been heavily populated with "Greeks." There was the priest "who allegedly refused to look through Galileo's telescope lest, as he said,

it destroy his faith (and change his vocation!)" (Menninger, 1963, p.387) Or those who in their belief in absolute truth and honesty were sometimes misled: "And those physicians who take pleasure in slaughtering hope under the impression that they are being paragons of honesty may best be compared to those surgeons of an earlier day who bravely poured boiling oil into wounds to hasten healing." (Menninger, 1963, p.395)

The social scientists too, have been relatively silent on the subject of hope. The scant attention paid to the study of hope is illuminated by its conspicuous absence in the indices of such reference works as the Psychiatric Dictionary (Hinsie & Campbell, 1960) and the Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry (Freedman, Kaplan, Sodock, 1975). During the last half century there has been hardly a mention of the subject in Index Medicus and Psychological Abstracts.

Boris (1976, p.139) made a similar observation regarding the paucity of writings in the psychoanalytic literature regarding hope. "If one searches the standard psychoanalytic literature...one is apt to find little in the index between 'homosexuality' and 'hysteria', save 'hunger'. 'Hope" itself is nowhere to be seen." He understood that such an absence was not accidental since psychoanalytic theory deals with desires (drives) and their vicissitudes.

> In scientific circles there is a determined effort to exclude hope from conceptual thinking, first because of the general obloquy of admitting any psychological concepts into materialistic and

> fanatically empirical science; and second, because of a fear of corrupting objective judgment by wishful thinking. But all science is built on hope, so much so that science is for many moderns a substitute for religion....Man can't help hoping, even if he is a scientist; he can only hope more accurately. (Menninger, 1963, p.382)

Another way of explaining this gap in the psychoanalytic literature is through an understanding of the beginning history of psychoanalysis. The emphasis which Sigmund Freud placed upon the study of psychopathology inadvertently established a long standing precedent. As Hartman and later, Mahler, Erikson and others have demonstrated, the study of normative development is as important to our clinical understanding and applied work as Freud's focus has been upon psychopathology. This was a point which was amply recognized by Freud, himself.

Yet another reason for the paucity of scientific study of such "psychological phenomena" lies in a constricted view of what is, in fact, "scientific." Is one not being "scientific" unless one can specify that "hope" is a particular pattern of neural excitement which is triggered in a specific location in the brain and expressed in physical terms which are observable?

> An emphasis on the psychological explanation of psychological events in contrast to an explanation in terms of physical or neurophysiological processes has several important consequences. The scientist who works with the assumption that psychological phenomena are realities, even if they cannot be expressed in physical terms or located in physical space is more apt to investigate them. Recognizing that people in

> everyday affairs use such concepts as 'hope', 'desire', 'action', 'ability', 'ought', (and acknowledging that these phenomena have reality in their own right), he is more likely to feel that the concepts of this everyday psychology are legitimate and important objects for investigation by a scientific psychology. (Mowrer, 1960, p.312)

It should be acknowledged, however, that the literature of the behavioral sciences is not entirely bereft of writings which pertain to the subject at hand. Mowrer (1960) has written about hope from the point of view of a behaviorist. The social psychologists have been represented by Stotland (1969). Lewin (1951) has written on the subject, taking a cognitive approach. The foregoing have generally agreed that hope is a positive and necessary condition for emotional health. The existentialist Hammer assumes an opposing view, arguing that hope is destructive and is an impediment to growth and psychological health.

Among those who employ a psychodynamic frame of reference, Erikson (1963, 1964, 1968), Menninger (1942, 1968), Frank (1961, 1968), French (1952, 1958), Boris (1976), and Green (1977) are the most notable. Of the foregoing, French presents the most comprehensive treatment of the subject with a detailing of the functioning of hope. These authors are generally in agreement on the point that the subject of hope holds important clinical relevance and should be studied further.

The result of reviewing the literature has been the recognition that there is a relative paucity of published

thought regarding the subject of hope in the literature of the social sciences. This paucity is even more pronounced in the psychoanalytic literature, particularly in the area of psychological development.

Purpose of Study:

The purpose of this study is to examine the nature, functions, and early developmental antecedents of the capacity to hope.

As yet, no systematic theory exists in the literature regarding hope. To the contrary, as we have pointed out earlier, there seems to be some question as to whether this is a legitimate concern for serious, systematic study in the social sciences.

The spirit of this study supports the stance that there is a place in the social sciences for serious examination of what has been thought of as "normal," "everyday," "nonpathological" aspects of such human conditions as hope.

Significance of the Study:

We have, earlier, pointed out the gap in the psychoanalitcal literature regarding the subject of hope. In particular, very little is written on the developmental aspects of the hopeful capacity.

Hartmann (1939) emphasized the importance of studying the normal as well as the pathological in any serious approach to the understanding of mental development. One of his most

productive and talented successors was Margaret Mahler whose work reflects his influence.

> Hartmann drew attention to the many aspects of human psychology that involve or are based upon nonconflictual adaptive processes in development, emphasizing that the description and definition of mental phenomena must include its reality-oriented and adaptation--facilitating characertistics and regulations: 'Adaptation...involves both processes connected with conflict situations, and processes which pertain to the conflict-free sphere.' (Mahler, 1966, p.152)

Neither Hartmann nor Mahler, however, have dealty specifically with the subject of hope.

The significance of this study is to further understanding of the concept hope through an examination of its earliest development.

Delimitations:

It is recognized that there is always danger in appearing overly simplistic and reductionistic in focusing upon tne particular aspects of what in reality are very complex developmental phenomena. We are limited both by a lack of knowledge as well as economic constraints. Some factors which have a bearing upon psychological development per se, and therefore upon the development of the hopeful capacity include:

1. The strength and influence of the drives; (Boris, 1976; French, 1952)
2. The defensive function of the ego;
3. The overall integration of the psyche;
4. The qualitative and quantitative impact of trauma at specific points in development;

5. The timing and intensity of maturational factors;
6. The impact of environmental phenomena such as poverty, war, discrimination, persecution, etc.;
7. The impact of social institutions such as family, church, community, etc.

Any one of the foregoing areas could conceivably constitute an independent study organized around their influences upon the development of the hopeful capacity. We will, however, forego such exploration in the interest of a broader beginning effort which acknowledges the importance of these factors for fuller understanding.

Methodology:

Since there has yet to be a specific, unifying theory regarding hope, we are left with a number of diverse and fragmented bits of information which have arisen out of our own speculations and the writings of the relatively few social scientists who have ventured an inquiry into this subject. There is a need for gaining a greater sense of cohesion in order to proceed beyond a mere listing of ideas. The following is a brief discussion of some historical facts. They lead to the identification of several principles around which these diverse fragments can be organized.

Before Freud defined the concept ego, his work involved the recognition of some of its functions. Having some notion of its nature and functions, he proposed a definition: "a coherent organization of mental processes." He implied that

the organizational function of the ego gave meaning and purpose to the other functions, e.g., perception, motility, judgment, etc., and therefore had an overriding importance to the other functions (Blanck and Blanck, 1979).

The foregoing was followed by a second generation of work which focused upon the developmental aspects of the ego. These studies were facilitated by the synthesizing work of Hartmann, Kris, Lowenstein, Spitz, and others.

Beyond the acknowledgment of these historical facts, we came to recognize that this process, i.e., the examination of hope according to its nature and function, could be of particular value for this study. A principle of organization was recognized which could be utilized to further our understanding of the concept hope. That is to say that the various notions regarding this concept could be organized according to its nature and functions, culminating in a working definition.

Similarly, the preceding information can also contribute to more effective study of the development of an individual's hopeful capacity during the first two years of life. In this endeavor, yet another organizing principle can be employed in the examination of the early developmental phases wherein the hopeful capacity emerges.

Margaret Mahler's studies are organized according to her premise that major aspects of intrapsychic and behavioral life may be better understood when viewed within the context of the separation-individuation processes. Her work has particular

advantages for this study because it is contemporary, i.e., she has synthesized and integrated much of what has preceded her and further, she has extended theory beyond earlier work in this area. Mahler's model will therefore be used as an organizing principle to examine the early development of an individual's hopeful capacity.

CHAPTER II

HOPE: NATURE, FUNCTIONS, A DEFINITION

...where there is no hope there can be no endeavor

-Samuel Johnson-

Introduction:

To begin a study of our subject it would seem plain enough to simply state that we are interested in gaining an understanding of hope. After all, it must be a certainty that anyone who is capable of reading these words has surely experienced hope in a most intimate and personal way. But in science, life is not so simple. Upon closer examination, we must recognize that hope may mean many things and may be experienced in a diversity of ways.

> What is it to hope? Is it, as many think, to have desires and wishes? If this were so, those who desire more and better cars, houses, and gadgets would be people of hope. But they are not; they are people lusty for more consumption and not people of hope.
>
> Is it to hope if hope's object is not a thing but a fuller life, a state of greater aliveness, a liberation from eternal boredom; or, a political term, for revolution? Indeed, this kind of expectation could be hope; but it is non-hope if it has the quality of passiveness, and 'waiting for'--until the hope becomes, in fact, a cover for resignation, a mere ideology. (Fromm, 1968, p.6)

It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to explain more specifically what we mean by "hope." In order to accomplish this task, we will take a path similar to that taken by Freud in his classical studies of the ego as a means of organizing our thoughts. He began by exploring the nature and functions of the ego, which eventually led him to venture a first definition, which in turn, lead to further understanding and theory building.

We begin our exploration by asking ourselves about the nature and functions of hope in order to gain a more concise

understanding of that with which we are dealing. At the outset, we must define or operationalize our terminology. When we speak of the nature of hope, we are making references to its intrinsic characteristics and qualities. Function, on the other hand, relates to the actions or activities by which it is known.

It is through the observation of functioning that we become aware of mental concepts such as the ego. Since it occupies no physical space, we only know the ego by its activities and actions. This is similarly so with the concept hope.

Following our exploration of its nature and functions, we will attempt to formulate a definition of the concept hope. This, in turn, will lead us into an exploration of its early development.

It was noted earlier that Freud began to write about the nature and functions of the ego about 1909 but it was not until 14 years later that he ventured a definition (Blanck & Blanck, 1979, p.16). If this is any indication, if there is a semblance of parallel here, we may consider ourselves as being a bit hasty in our proposal to deal with the nature, functions, definition, and early development of this concept in a single beginning effort. We will proceed, however, while tempering our assertions with this bit of history and shall remain prudently tentative in our findings.

Hope: Its Nature:

Hope has been variously defined as: "a wish or desire supported by some confidence of its fulfillment" and "a ground for expectation or trust" (American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1976). "Desire accompanied by expectation of or belief in fulfillment" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary). Hope is "an attitude characterized by an expectation of the favorable outcome of an event. The accompanying emotional tone is often one of fear mixed with anticipated joy" (Dictionary of Psychology, 1975). Suggested synonyms include: expect, anticipate, await, foresee.

What, if anything, do these definitions reveal to us regarding the intrinsic characteristics and qualities of hope? If we look closely at the key words used to define this concept, i.e., wish, desire, expectation, longing, it is clear that hope resides in a dimension of time which looks to the future. Hope, by nature, does not relate primarily to the present nor the past but to outcomes which have not yet transpired. It is anticipatory, but anticipates things which are perceived as favorable.

The future is perceived as being brighter than the present. It speaks to a potential not yet realized. To quote Fromm (1968, p.9), "It is like the crouched tiger, which will jump only when the moment for jumping has come." Fromm's statement, however, conveys a sense of bristling tension, crying out for discharge. Yet, this does not seem to fully nor

accurately characterize hope in our mind. We do not see that being hopeful is only a state of tense anticipation. There is, rather, a sense of the ability to accept "now" because the future will be better. There is an attenuation of the need for immediate discharge of energy.

The anticipation of a future with a positive outcome would account for the accompanying emotional tone which we believe better characterized hope, that of tentative joy mixed with mild fear since the future is never in hand, nor is it ever fully satisfying.

This emotional tone, affect or felt experience is one which words cannot sufficiently describe. It is a "state of being," an "inner readiness" of "not-yet-spent activeness."

> As with every other human experience, words are insufficien to describe the experience. In fact, most of the time words do the opposite: they obscure it, dissect it, and kill it. Too often, they in the process of talking about love or hate or hope, one loses contact with what one was supposed to be talking about. Poetry, music, and other forms of art are by far the best-suited media for describing human experience because they are precise and avoid the abstraction and vagueness of worn-out coins which are taken for adequate representations of human experience. (Fromm, 1968, p.11)

Hope is characterized by a stable form of energy which, as in physical laws, is derived from position, rather than motion (kinetic theory). It relates to the possible rather than the actual. It lays latent, a holding pattern for something capable of being or becoming. This means that once that energy is put into motion, hope no longer retains the characteristics which made it so. Hope is lost to its realization.

Our dictionary definitions tell us that the anticipatory nature of hope is further qualified by confidence. The word confidence involves "trust in a person or thing, a history of confirming experiences and a feeling of assurance or certainty, expecially concerning oneself" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary). Now we find that hope has a past. More accurately, it seems to depend upon a particular history which enables an expectation of positively felt experiences in the future as they were in the past. Trust looks backward in time and experience in order to exist in the present. A history of confirming experience is necessary in order for trust to exist. It speaks to the integrity of past reliances, initially upon another and the capacity to remember, although not necessarily on a conscious or representational level (Erikson, 1963, 1964, 1968). Trust is a precursor to hope.

We do not mean that expectation and certainty enable one to predict the future in specific terms in the sense of an unquestionable predictability. We speak, rather, of a sense of certainty about the "reality of the possibility" (Fromm, 1968, p.14).

Hope may be conscious as well as unconscious in nature.

> Among the confusions about hope one of the major ones is the failure to distinguish between conscious and unconscious hope. This is an error, of course, which occurs with regard to many other emotional experiences, such as happiness, anxiety, depression, boredom, and hate. It is amazing that in spite of the popularity of Freud's theories his concept of the unconscious has been so little applied to such emotional phenomena. (Fromm, 1968, pp.9-10)

Another characteristic of hope is that is seem to thrive in ambiguity and movement. Boris (1976) has pointed out that hope is dynamic, flourishing in change, uncertainty and flux.

In order for hope to exist, so must other components which are more basic and are not exclusive to hope itself. These differentiate and take cognizance of stimuli. Basic also is the ability to recognize cause and effect relationships and time dimension. The capacity to store and recall the perceived experience, to retain and revive impressions is obviously necessary for the hopeful capacity. Necessary also, is the capacity to extrapolate these memories regarding future events. We are speaking here, in general, of those basic mental functions which go into the accepting, organizing, selecting, differentiating, feeling, storing, recalling and extrapolating of life events, and which have been referred to as "autonomous ego functions" by Hartmann (1958). They comprise part of the nature of hope. They are necessary, yet not sufficient for its existence.

Summary:

To this point, we have seen that the nature of hope involves a wish or longing accompanied by trust which is attained through a history of confirming experience that the wish or longing will be satisfied in the future. Hope does not involve an unquestionable predictability of the future, but rather, hoping carries with it a sense of certainty about the reality of the possibility. As mood or affect, hope is

characterized by a sense of tentative joy mixed with a mild sense of fear. The component of energy in hope is derived from position rather than motion and, as such, hope is lost to actualization and finality. Hope may be conscious or unconscious. The autonomous ego functions which include perception, memory, cognition, feeling, etc., comprise essential parts of the nature of hope.

Hope: Its Functions:

We have stated earlier that for our purposes, when we speak of its functions, we are referring to the actions and activities by which we believe we recognize the concept hope. The existing literature is most highly concentrated in the area of functions which is perhaps due to the greater visibility of a functioning apparatus. Here, we will examine some of those actions and activities as well as to demonstrate how the nature of hope impacts upon its functions.

> Hope holds desire from taking its any old course of least resistance and keeps desire from static satiety by calling it to 'finer' possibilities. (Boris, 1976, p.144)

The foregoing speaks to a number of functions which have been ascribed to hope. Hoping enables one to select courses of action and tolerate delay of gratification. Freud, Tiger (1979), Boris (1976), and others point to the evolutionary advantage of being capable of delaying immediate responses in the service of future goals. At this most general level, we can see hope functioning in the service of the survival of the

species. Boris elaborates this point in a rather poetic fashion. He speaks here of desire in the same way that others have spoken of Eros, the life instinct which adheres to the pleasure principle and seeks immediate gratification.

> Although desires will come to accept moderation to the reality principle in order that paid may be evaded or eased, its acceptance of delay and modification is reluctant and, at root, time is only a fair-weather friend to desire. Desire, moreover, wants a real object and real fulfillment. In its headlong coursing towards real fulfillment it will take the path of least resistance; if it's not near the girl it loves, it will love the girl it's near. When near, it will accommodate, going from active to passive or from one sensual modality to another, adventitiously. When still frustrated, desire will fissure from its aggressive component and dissolve into rage and frequently into jealousy. In the end, however, if desire continues to be thwarted, the object of that desire will be replaced with another object more available to it. (Boris, 1976, pp.140-141)

Hope, in its functioning, serves to attenuate fear, destruction and pain through the promise of a brighter future. It also has an important motivating function necessary for adaptation and survival. Stotland (1969) has written extensively in the area of hope's motivating function, elaborating six principle hypotheses which are confirmed in his research. He assumes that hopefulness is a necessary condition for action. In general, Stotland's research shows that as one's hopes approach that which is hoped for, the likelihood of actions to attain them will increase through greater attention, thought and overt goal-directed behaviors.

On the other hand, hopes which are false, i.e., unattainable, unrealistic, may be considered signs of pathology when

carried to an extreme through the continual investment of energies in non-productive ways. Winnicott spoke of hope invested in a false self as a crucial resistance to further growth. Such a view alerts us to the consideration of a possible defensive function which the concept hope may also serve. Green (1977) saw unrealistic hopes as creating bitter disappointments, desparate frustrations and tragic despair as a consequence. At times, however, the most "unrealistic," most fantastic of hopes may serve to carry one through the worst and most intolerable of times as evidenced by Bettleheim when we read his accounts of the survivors of Nazi concentration camps.

Boris disagrees with any differentiation of hopes, implying that such splits detract from a sense of wholeness.

> I do not split hope into good and bad hopes, normal hope or delusional hope, necessary hope or dispensable hope. To my mind, that would be like saying that hope is better than desire o desire better than hope or stars better than molecules. Stars are: hope is. (Boris, 1976, p.149)

This leads us to further consider hope from the point of view that it functions as a form of potential. Potential energy may be used in the service of construction as well as destruction.

In and of itself it is neither positive nor negative, e.g., nuclear energy, lazer or light energy, etc. Nuclear energy has been used for nuclear warfare as well as power for building. Similarly, hope has no intrinsic values such as

good or bad, right or wrong, plus or minus in and of itself. Viewed nonjudgmentally, we may consider energy to be channeled in one way or another in accordance with the structure and organization of the personality.

Turning to the psychoanalytic literature, the most extensive work on the subject of hope is that of French (1952, 1958) who focused primarily upon its functions and the implications for treatment. He postulated that hope is the basis of the "integrative capacity" which we presume to mean "of the ego," although he does not so state. In his model, pressures which are caused by the needs (drives) of the organism are assumed to seek motor discharge. In order for goal achievement to take place, this motor discharge must be channeled and effectively guided, instead of being discharged in a diffuse way. French uses the term, "integrative field" to mean that aspect of the psyche which channels and guides motivating pressure toward goal achievement.

> The pressure of a need first seeks diffuse discharge in motor activity. In order to achieve a goal, one must bring this motor discharge under the control of an integrative field. The difficulty of this task of channeling motor discharge into effective effort increases in proportion to the amount of pressure that must be controlled or bound. The amount of pressure that has to be bound by an integrative field is its 'integrative task.' To account for the fact that an integrative field sometimes cannot exert effective control over motor discharge, we must assume, next, that the integrative field itself at any given moment has a quantitatively limited capacity to bind motivational pressure. For effective goal-directed behavior, 'integrative capacity' must be adequate to the integrative task. Disintegration of the mechanisms of goal-directed behavior occurs whenever the integrative

> task exceeds the integrative capacity. (French, 1952, p.56)

He goes on to say that the "integrative capacity" is based on hope while the "integrative task" arises out of needs (drives).

Hope enables one to forego satisfactions and to withstand painful pressures of disturbing needs in the service of goals which go beyond immediate relief sought out through diffuse motor discharge. French poses that "confidence of success is the most important factor in maintaining the integrative capacity of a goal-directed striving" (1952, p.57).

Hopes function to focus the motor discharge on efforts which will achieve a positive goal. Positive goals, according to French, are those which entail a wish for something as opposed to a wish to escape. "Some motivating pressures have only negative goals; they are urges to get away from something, to escape from pain or from the object of one's fear, to put an end to the distressing physiological state of hunger" (French, 1952, p.50).

Needs (drives) and hopes are conceptualized as playing opposite and complimentary roles in the integration of goal-directed behavior. They are seen to be the negative and positive poles around which all behavior is oriented. French summarizes his view of the integrative process as follows:

> First, the motivating pressure of a need seeks discharge in diffuse motor activity. Next, hope of satisfaction, based on present opportunity and on memories of previous success, stimulates the

> integrative mechanism to form a plan for realizing this hope. Finally, hope of satisfaction activates this plan so that it exerts a guiding influence, concentrating so that it exerts a guiding influence, concentrating motor discharge on efforts to put the plan into execution. (French, 1952, p.53)

We can see from this model that hope functions to enable the integrative capacity in a number of ways. It may serve to absorb pressure (temporarily) for motor discharge of an unsatisfied need. This increases the amount of pressure which can be withstood and forestalls the disintegrating effect of excessive pressure. Hope may also serve as an incentive for goal-directed action and sustains energy, persistence and effectiveness of goal-directed efforts. The integrative field exerts two different kinds of effect:



1. By absorbing part of the pressure of the underlying need, the guiding integrative field reduces quantitatively the need for motor discharge. Such absorption of pressure makes it possible to dream of wish-fulfillment instead of waking up to do something, to fantasy or plan instead of yielding to the pressure to act immediately, or to execute delicate motor adjustments that would be made impossible by massive motor discharge.

2. By channeling pressure, the guiding integrative field may modify a diffuse pattern of discharge into a more sharply focused effort. For example, a skilled activity that requires energetic muscular effort, such as expert axmanship, would imply a mechanism of concentration of pressure on a highly specialized pattern of motor discharge. (French, 1952, p.61)

Summary:

In terms of the actions and activities by which we look at the concept hope, we see it as an intraphysic mechanism through which the ego contains and controls excitation. It serves adaptive, survival, motivational and revival functions as well as defensive functions. It also serves to guide behavior, delay impulses, bind tension and tolerate pain, frustration and destruction which would otherwise overwhelm the integrative capacity of the ego.

Hope Defined:

In searching for a way of defining hope we encounter problems which have to do with the similarities of hope with other terms. When we speak of optimism and expectation, are we not speaking of hope? Menninger (1963) writes that hope is to be differentiated from optimism in that optimism always implies some distance from reality. Hope is distinguished from expectation in that expectations tend to be conclusions based upon observed facts, negative or positive. Hope is positive and one does not hope for what is. Saint Paul wrote: "but hope that is seen is not hope: for who hopeth for that which he seeth?" (Menninger, 1963, p.385). Optimism is the

disposition or prevailing aspect of one's mind to look on the bright side of things. It is the doctrine that the existing world is the best of all possible worlds (American College Dictionary). In our view, the flavor imparted by optimism is more immediate than that of hope. It tends to interpret the present as bright, good, best. Hope is future oriented. That the future will be better makes the present more tolerable when it is difficult, more enjoyable when it is benign. Hope looks to the future for something better than the present with the expectation that it will come to pass. In this way, expectation is associated with hope but expectation is not hope.

Nor is hope the same as desire. Boris (1976) writes that there is a basic distinction between the two. Desire (Eros) seeks the immediate, the "now" for its satisfaction. Hope holds desire at bay and looks to the future and better things.

Since mental apparatuses have no real physical properties, we must deal with them as abstractions. We refer to them conceptually in order to explain their manifestations. With regard to the concept ego, we can only know that it exists as we see it functioning through an observation of its actions or activities which are accompanied by a specific constellation of characteristics. Similarly, when we see the actions, activities and characteristics of the concept hope, or more accurately, of hoping through its particular manifestations we take it as evidence of a functioning capacity.

It has been pointed out that often times we come to know hope through the loud conspicuousness of its absence..."he who has seen a hopeless child, knows what is not there." (Erikson, 1964, p.115). Hope's functioning presence in the phyche is akin to biological turgor which is the inner pressure exuded on the cell walls, characterizing all living things.

Hope may be best characterized as an ego strength. It serves to enable the effectiveness of ego functioning. As French (1952) has pointed out, hope is crucial in its functioning for the overall integration of behavior.

In viewing the hopeful capacity, or the activity of hoping as an ego strength, we add that it may be further understood as an organization of other functions ascribed to the ego. That organization, however, is subsumed under the larger organization of the ego as a totality. In particular, we have named such autonomous ego functions as perception, memory and extrapolative capacity as being necessary, although not sufficient components of the hopeful capacity which constitute part of the nature of hope. In order to attain sufficiency, the foregoing must somehow become organized in a particular way in order for it to coalesce and function as a whole.

We acknowledge that these functions are complexly interrelated and overlapping. Further, they are not exclusive to the function we are studying here. There is a reciprocal interaction between them. However, in the service of our

beginning attempts to understand our subject, we must forego any attempts to deal with this complex issue.

In accordance with the foregoing discussion and for purposes of this study, we now speak of the concept hope in the following way: The hopeful capacity evolves out of the development, organization and synthesis of autonomous ego functions into an enduring, recognizable apparatus of regulatory patterns. Hope is an ego strength characterized by a sense of confident longing, looking to or for something perceived as more pleasurable than the present, supported by a history of earlier experiences which confirm and enable some degree of trust in future events.

As an apparatus of regulatory patterns, experience, when "filtered through" this apparatus, is given shape and meaning that the future holds something better than "now." In this way, it may serve as a defense against overwhelming pain and anxiety which threaten the ego's capacity to deal with and sustain life. It serves to enable delay of gratification as well as to motivate, energize and focus goal-directed behavior.

Hope: An ego strength characterized by enduring, recognizable regulatory patterns which organize life experiences in such a way that the promise of selective future events are perceived as being more pleasurable than the

present. It is a substratum of the ego, comprised of a particular organization of functions, which are necessary but not sufficient for the effective accomplishment of the ego's integrative tasks.

CHAPTER III

Developmental Aspects

Nothing in human life...is secured in its origin unless it is verified in the intimate meeting of partners in favorable social settings.

-Erik Erikson-

Introduction:

The foregoing chapter has been addressed to the exploration of the nature of hope as well as some of its functions. It was concluded with the formulation of a definition which will assist us in further study.

This chapter will further explore and clarify our understanding by viewing hope from a developmental point of view. As with the previous chapters, it is written in a manner which demonstrates the process of exploration as it unfolded. We are, in essence, searching to understand the manner in which this ego strength develops during the earliest years of life.

Erikson speaks of faith and hope, particularly hope as the "evolving virtue" in the successful negotiation of the first stage of his epigenetic cycle. This, to Erikson, is the beginning phase of ego development, basic and necessary for the ego's integrating and synthesizing functions in its progression toward increasing structuralization. He spends relatively little time, however, providing an explanation of the ongoing developmental vicissitudes of hope in particular from this early beginning, although he recognizes its importance as being crucial.

Stotland (1969) has pointed out that there is yet to be a unifying psychological theory by which we can attempt to understand the capacity to hope in any systematic way. He warns against a premature formalization of theory in the absence of greater, more-in-depth study. In our view, French

(1952, 1958) is a notable exception to Stotland's statement, as we have highlighted in our previous chapter regarding functions. His theorizing does not, however, deal with development.

The primary focus of this chapter then, is to move a bit further into our subject in the spirit of exploration. We will be in search of those areas in which the capacity to hope emerges in the early years of human growth and development. This will largely be done through a synthesis of various studies which currently exist in the literature. These studies primarily highlight human growth and some of the developmental processes but most often do not address themselves to the subject of hope.

We fully acknowledge the necessity for remaining prudently tentative in our stance. Our thoughts must be labeled as speculations with the intention of provoking further thought which in turn may eventually lead to additional study in the future.

The Developmental Model:

An attempt at beginning to fill a perceived gap in our understanding of a hopeful capacity through the use of a developmental model has a number of advantages. It has afforded psychoanalytic psychology greater depth and dimension, since growth is more than an isomorphic, simple linear process in which the adult is just a larger version of the infant. Development involves a progression of growth through successive

stages in which one stage becomes a transformation into the next with something both related and different from the earlier stage. Increasing differentiation, integration and complexity is basic to the developmental process.

Some general features of the developmental models utilized by workers such as Erikson, Piaget, Mahler, et al., have been summarized as follows:

(1) There is an invariable order of the stages of development;

(2) No stage can be skipped;

(3) Each stage is more complex than the preceding one; it represents a transformation of what existed before in a new form; and

(4) Each stage is based on the preceding one and prepares for the succeeding one.

The developmental model assumes an inner logic, a built-in plan that gives direction to the sequence of development (Breger, 1974, p.9).

Earlier, we have made reference to Heinz Hartmann's concept of inborn ego apparatuses. Here, we will briefly summarize other aspects of his work which ae relevant to the further understanding of the development and maturation of a hopeful capability. Although Hartmann did not deal with the notion of hope, the application of various aspects of his thought is germane. Maturation will be used here to refer to those processes which are biological. Development will be used to describe those processes which combine both biological and psychological.

Hartmann's central theme was that the ego acquires an organizing function as it develops. He believed that a reciprocal relationship exists between the organism and its environment in the accomplishment of tasks related to the mastery of reality. To this concept, he ascribed the term "adaptation." Adaptation is a relative term which can only have meaning within the context of a unified whole, a gestalt.

> The observation underlying the concept 'adaptation' is that living organisms patently 'fit' into their environment. Thus, adaptation is primarily a reciprocal relationship between the organism and its environment. 'Where the real functions, determined jointly by the organism's whole mechanism and by its environment, are favorable for its survival, there a relationship of adaptation obtains between that organism and its environment.' (Hartmann, 1958, pp. 23-24)

Hartmann contended that man possesses inborn ego apparatuses which we have previously enumerated, e.g., perception, intention, comprehension, motility, memory. He termed the foregoing, "apparatuses of primary autonomy." He modified Freud's theory regarding the origin and development of the ego by proposing the existence of ego apparatuses and concludes that mental development includes more than the outcome of the struggles with instinctual drives. These apparatuses, he contended, are part of an "undifferentiated matrix"--potentials which further develop biologicaly and psychologically in the context of a reciprocity between the organism and its environment.

Also proposed by Hartmann (1950, pp.86-87) was the idea that all mental energy may not originate from the instinctual

drive alone. He indicated that the autonomous ego may be the source of mental energy as well.

Hartmann further proposed that the organism develops the capacity to act upon itself as well as to effect responses from its environment. The former, he termed "autoplastic activity" while the latter was called "alloplastic activity." This means that the organism plays an active rather than passive role in development.

Psychoanalysis became a normal developmental psychology in addition to a science of psychopathology when Hartmann posited that apparatuses of primary autonomy develop outside the sphere of conflict. He spoke of the "conflict-free ego sphere" which he defined as:

> ...that ensemble of functions which at any given time exert their effects outside the region of mental conflicts. (Hartmann, 1958, pp.8-9)

Subsequently, the developmental work of other psychoanalytically oriented social scientists such as Erikson, Mahler, et. al., was launched, being perceptably influenced by Hartmann's thinking. Erikson's work is of particular interest since he is one of the few psychoanalytic authors who has written on hope from a developmental point of view. He speaks of the developmental aspects of hope in the context of their importance and place in the entire life-cycle of the human organism. He also stresses the interplay between the psychological components of the individual and the components of successive and overlapping generations in organized society.

Erikson recognizes the interrelatedness of the psychosexual, psychosocial and cognitive aspects of development as critical factors which run concommitantly and in parallel fashion to the "evolving virtues" (ego strengths). The first and most indispensable of these is hope.

The earliest and most basic components of hoping, as we have already mentioned, rest in the constitutional givens. The biological growth of the organisms plays an integral part as well, e.g., the gradual myenalization of the brain results in an increase of cognitive capacity and the capability of more complex thought. Given that the biological constitution is intact and develops in parallel and interacting fashion with the psychological, our primary focus will be upon the latter.

Following birth, the quality and quantity of maternal nurturing becomes paramount, particularly during the earliest years of life. This has been amply demonstrated by the observations of Spitz (1945) and his studies of children who were reared in foundling homes. His classic studies revealed the severe deterioration, even death (30% died during the first year) of infants who were removed from their mothers at three months of age, even though they were given adequate physical and medical care.

> Hope relies for its beginnings on the new being's first encounter with trustworthy maternal persons, who respond to his need for intake and contact with warm and calming envelopment and provide food both pleasurable to ingest and easy to digest, and who prevent experience of the kind which may regularly bring too little too late. (Erikson, 1964, p.116)

Erikson is describing here, of course, in highly abbreviated form, some of what is meant by "good enough mothering" (Winnecott) or the characteristics of an "average expectable environment" (Hartmann) at the earliest phases of infancy. There are a multiplicity of factors in those concepts which are only implied here. They include, but are not limited to, protection, prevention, reliability, validation, effective nurturing, optimal frustration, etc. The maternal functions, as Erikson points out, are far from being merely instinctual. The maternal person's capacity for such provisions is also rooted in having lived, received and shared the selfsame provisions which are further impinged upon by contemporary environmental factors within which they live. And too, the mother's own capacity for hope enables the development of a similar capacity in her child.

In his efforts to explain the genesis of hope, Boris (1976) has proposed the use of a concept which has been termed a "metastructure." The early uses of this concept were not, however, used to explain the notion of hope.

> (Immanuel) Kant (1781) suggested that people have what he called 'empty thoughts' to which experiences with real events are more or less approximate. Bion (1963) holds that people have preconceptions for which experience more or less provides realizations. Such so-called 'structuralists' as Levi-Strauss, the anthropologist, and Chomsky, the linguist, also find it logically necessary to infer that people have inherent ideas about experience. These ideas they call 'deep' or 'metastructures' and they view these structures as giving a shape to experience prior to, sometimes independent of, the influences of actual private or cultural experienes.

> These metastructures, empty ideas, or preconceptions are like flexible containers into which experience, when poured, gives shape and substance. But they are not without their own shape. (Boris, 1976, p.142)

While Boris seems to be proposing that hopeful metastructures are innate, constitutional givens, we wonder whether such "ideas" can exist from the very beginning of life. Observational studies of the neonate tend to verify the existence of perceptual capacities for tension and tension reduction, (e.g., crying when hungry, calm when satisfied and comfortable) on a sensori-motor level. Reflexive capacities are in evidence as well, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify the existence of inherent ideas at this point in time. What seems more plausible is that while the hopeful capacity has its constitutional bases, it does not merit being called a given in the sense of a whole and functioning apparatus at birth. An organization and synthesis must take place. After all, a cake is not a cake, simply because its ingredients are all out on the baking table. Those ingredients must be measured and sifted, mixed and poured. The baker must be a part of the process which brings it to fruition. Then, the whole becomes something which is greater than the sum of its parts.

Erikson has proposed that basic trust is a groundwork for the ability to hope which develops through a confirming history of "good enough mothering" (Winnecott). A sense of basic trust is, itself, a developmental product which is

shaped and given substance through actual experiences in early life.

Piaget (1969) has taken a similar line of reasoning in his own work. Although Piaget's work deals predominantly with the development of cognition and intelligence, some of his thoughts may be useful in furthering our understanding of hope. Piaget, himself, does not deal with hope. He has utilized a concept which he calls a "scheme." A scheme is a mental structure, an internal plan which determines the direction of action, thought or fantasy. It is a system or organizing principle, according to Piaget, which is innate (ascribing to the beliefs of the structuralists).

Two related concepts which are central to Piaget's theories are those of assimilation and accommodation which relate to the synthetic and organizing functions of the ego. Assimilation is the incorporation of reality into existing schemes. For example, during the stage of development in which the infant sucks and grasps, he treats everything as if it were something to be sucked or grasped. One may say that the infant possesses a sucking and grasping scheme. Accommodation, according to Piaget, takes place when repeated experiences do not fit existing schemes. This incongruency produces an adaptive change of schemes which are more congruent with one's current experiences. Assimilation calls for no internal change while accommodation does.

Piaget points out that schemes have emotions or affects connected with them. Those connected with pleasure give them special value, making them especially driving or demanding; they have a special motivating force.

As development and maturation progress, so does the perceptual sphere. More and more aspects of the world become available to the child for assimilation and accommodation into schemes. Schemes become broader, going from the specific toward increasing generalization as they come to include more and more data.

Although Piaget's conceptualization deals with cognitive and intellectual development, it may also help to unify our thinking about hope. If we put aside our previously discussed disagreement with the structuralist's view of an innate, predetermined "metastructure," we find an area of greater agreement and utility in this concept for our own purposes.

Briefly, a hopeful scheme would have at its base the innate constitutional givens or autonomous ego functions as well as the drives (Hartmann). Through the consistent interchanges with the environment which are perceived as predominantly positive and need satisfying, the child begins to organize a particular view of his world. This view would influence the manner in which subsequent data would be perceived, tending to organize it and interpret it in a more or less congruent fashion (assimilation). Perceptions which were too incongruent would necessitate modifications or the generation of another scheme to fit the perception (accommodation).

We have said to this point that there are certain precursors which must exist in order that the capacity for hope may also exist. Those necessary elements include but may not be limited to:

1. Perception, memory an extrapolative capacity;
2. Instinctual drives;
3. A history of confirming experience which is weighted perceptually toward the fulfillment of desire rather than nonfulfillment; contentment and satiation as opposed to chronic tension; and
4. The developmental achievement of a basic sense of trust as opposed to mistrust.

The elements of the first two categories above; those of perception, memory, extrapolative capacity and instinctual drives are constitutional givens. Hartmann has termed those in the first category, "primary autonomous ego functions."

> The individual does not acquire all the apparatuses which are put into the service of the ego in the course of development: perception, motility, intelligence, etc., rest on the constitutional givens. (Hartmann, 1958, p.100)

Instinctual drives are differentiated from "ego constitution" but are considered givens as well, being termed "drive constitutions" (Hartmann, 1958, pp.101-2).

In general, development can only be understood within the context of the combined effects of the "ego" and "drive" constitutions. With specific reference to the development of a functioning capacity to hope, we are looking at the synthesis

and organization of those constitutions with the experiential world into a particular, recognizable and enduring mental apparatus.

Functioning and organization are emphasized here because, like other aspects of the ego, the capacity to hope can only be known through its functioning according to a particular manner of organization. Blanck and Blanck point out that the ego is better defined by its functioning as an organizer and that organization provides meaning and purpose for all other ego functions.

> ...this function (organization) is somehow of greater importance than other ego functions, that it stands apart, that the other functions are subordinate to it for the very reason that they are purposeless without it. Motility, perception, intentionality, reality testing, anticipation, judgment, and even synthesis itself require organizing to attain meaning and purpose. (Blanck & Blanck, 1979, p.18)

Additionally, organization can only take place in a manner which is consistent with the level of development to which the organism has progressed.

Hope, according to our definition, is seen as a <u>particular organization</u> of perception, memory, extrapolative capacity, etc., which leads to a cohesive mental structure through which experiences are filtered in such a way that the promise of future events are perceived as being more pleasurable than the present.

<u>Tracing Early Development</u>:

Recent and increasing knowledge of human development has added tremendously to theory building and associated treatment

techniques. Margaret Mahler and her associates, in their studies through direct observation of the early years of human development, present a most thorough and clearly conceptualized model. Her framework will be utilized here as the major tool in acquiring further understanding about the development of hope. As was mentioned earlier, we see Mahler's work as having particular advantages due to its recency and thoroughness in having integrated much of what has preceded her, as well as her having extended theory beyond earlier works.

Our main purpose here is to begin filling the gap which exists in the psychoanalytic literature regarding the early developmental aspects of the hopeful capacity. The use of Mahler's model provides a way of systematically integrating some of the fragments which currently exist in the literature.

Consistent with the developmental model, we are assuming that the early structuralization of a hopeful capacity is a necessary, although insufficient, factor which enables further psychic development. Mahler's contention is that the structuralization of the ego evolves out of the processes of separation-individuation as they encompass the impact of the instinctual drives. The qualitative and quantitative results of future growth and development are contingent upon that which pre-exists in combination with the vissisitued of life experiences and biological maturation.

It is important to understand that according to Mahler, the greater part of adaptation remains with the child, even

though the maternal contribution is of critical importance. Given that the newborn possesses adequate apparatuses of primary autonomy, and begins extrauterine life in an "average expectable environment," (Hartmann) we may examine subsequent development with regard to the emergence of a hopeful capability in the light of the interaction which takes place between those factors.

Normal Autistic Phase (0-2 mos):

The newborn spends the first few weeks of life with his mother in a condition where physiological processes are dominant and there is relative absence of cathexis to exernal stimuli. The stimulus barrier (Freud), here in evidence, diminishes the response of the child to outside stimuli and helps to protect against extremes of excitation to a psyche which is not yet equipped to handle it in any other way. A later elaboration of this function may be seen to be taken up by hope at a higher developmental level. As we discussed earlier, hope functions to protect against overwhelming pressures through the attenuation and channeling of psychic energy (French, 1952).

At this stage there are reflexes in evidence such as rooting, grasping, startle, and sucking. There is some response to light and sound and the baby will stop crying with novel stimuli such as holding and rocking. The most significant psychological achievement at this stage of development is said to be that of anticipatory behavior at feeding. Mahler

has called this a "quasi-coenesthetically acquired pattern of reception in the service of an important 'pleasure motivation'" (Mahler, et al., 1975, p.42). That is to say that the infant is capable of acknowledging sensory sensations which make its body aware of its condition of hunger as well as other tensions and reacts to their easing in an observable, anticipatory way. Although the infant may seem to be primarily passive, there are even at this early stage, signs of independent behaviors which serve to elicit interactions with the mothering person.

Anticipatory behavior at feeding speaks to signs of early perceptual capacity on the part of the infant albeit on a predominantly sensorimotor level. The baby is receptive, taking in through eyes, ears, skin, mouth and mind in limited ways. The infant also perceives and differentiates between what feels pleasurable and what does not. According to Freud, this perception, in the service of motivation to gain pleasure, brings about a "perceptual identity" of an external stimulus with a corresponding pleasurable memory (Mahler, et al., 1975, p.42). These events are taking place even though the infant, at this early age, is thought unable to specifically discern between internal and external stimuli. The development of the capacity to differentiate and perceive cause and effect relationships has important implications for hope. This point will be discussed shortly.

The child is very vulnerable and sensitive, dependent upon the maternal person for her timely ministrations to his needs.

> In order to insure that their first experiences in this world will not only keep them alive but will also help them to coordinate their sensitive breathing and their metabolic and circulatory rhythms, we must see to it that we deliver to their senses stimuli as well as food in the proper intensity and at the right time; otherwise their willingness to accept may change radically into diffuse defense or into lethargy. (Erikson, 1968, p.98)

Severe deprivation, physical damage, chronic upset or frustration during this time can lead to permanent structural damage. Of course, there are degrees in the foregoing, ranging from gross failure to insufficiency, to "good enough mothering" which, along with the constitutional givens of the child will determine his fate.

According to Mahler, the main task of this phase of development is the achievement of homeostasis by predominantly somatopsychic, physiological mechanisms. The necessary and sufficient nurturing by the mother, her protection of the infant from physical damage, chronic frustration, etc., in combination with the child's inborn constitutional givens, promote the first step in the development of a hopeful capacity and enable still further growth and development.

Sandler (1960) suggests that "all the functions of the ego which subserve adaptation, including those of the conflict-free ego sphere, can be considered as being directed toward the mastery of excitation." He focuses upon the process of perception as probably being the most important ego

function. It is through the process of perception that unorganized sensations become "transformed into organized and structured perceptions." This act of perception is an active, rather than a passive-receptive act of integrative ego-mastery.

It organizes sense data to protect against traumatically being overwhelmed. Sandler proposes a "safety-principle," a feeling of safety which accompanies the act of successful, integrative perception (Sandler, 1960, p.352).

Perception then, is an active ego-process which has an organizing and synthesizing function. Via this process, incoming excitation is modified and confined in ways which are determined both quantitatively and qualitatively through development. Incoming stimuli then begin to acquire a sense of "meaning" as they are filtered through the perceptual apparatus.

With regard to hope, we focus upon the developmental aspects of a basically "hopeful" meaning, which emerge as a result of stimuli processed through the gradually developing perceptual apparatus. We can see from this discussion that the neonate, even at this early level, begins to behave in ways which appear to be rudimentary signs of a hopeful capacity.

The infant has some dim notion of the feeling states in his body which may be pleasurable or not pleasurable which means that some discriminatory sense exists. Even at this

early stage, there are evidences of an organizing and synthesizing process. A relatively consistent experience which is characterized by the predominance of pleasurable feeling states and the relief of unpleasurable conditions through the timely ministrations of the mother to the infant's needs begin to shape the manner of organization within the perceptual apparatus which enables hoping. The functioning of the innate capacity to "remember" is necessary for this organization to take place.

> The memorial connections, the conceptual belongingness, and the anticipations which have once arisen in the interplay of motivations and the quest for the object which satisfies simultaneously several effective motives (overdetermination) are not lost with the progress of psychological development; rather, by again and again recurring in approximately similar situations, they become structuralized and available as fixed tools, quasi-stationary apparatuses, for use in the thought process (Rapaport, 1954).

Recollection of past pleasures, or the "pleasurable memory," as stated earlier, serves in the motivation to gain further pleasure. Evidence of the foregoing are observable in the infant's anticipatory behaviors at feeding. The presence of the capacity for anticipation implies some capacity for memory and time orientation, as well as an early recognition of causality. There begins to develop, a perceptual linkage, i.e., that one event causes another and that there is a relationship between the two.

Bettelheim (1967), in his studies on infantile autism, has written that the perception of time and causality implies hope. If one perceives that things can be different than the present, they can also be better (or worse). When confirming experience validates the latter, there may be a withdrawal inward. Bettelheim sees this as a defensive maneuver to stop time. For without time, there is no hope but also no disappointment, nor the fear that things might get worse. The perception of change can arouse hope as well as fear. The foregoing, we speculate, are indications of a beginning organization of mental functions, synthesized with encounters with the environment, which enable the rudiments of hoping. We speculate further that the existence of this early functioning capacity begins to be accompanied by a distinct sort of "ego-tone" (Sandler, 1960, p.353) which, in turn, is recognized in the form of a constant affective background for subsequent experiences which are perceived similarly. This, which we have spoken of as a sense of tentative or anticipatory joy mixed with a mild sense of fear and excitement, gains in its permanency with repeated, consistent and congruent experiences over a period of time. Of course, this is a gradual process which becomes generalized to the ever widening sphere of those aspects of the world which become increasingly more accessible to the growing

infant. And too, it is hoping, even in these rudimentary forms, which functions to enable the infant to apprehend and eventually comprehend greater and greater segments of the world.

Normal Symbiotic Phase (2-5 mos)

More or less successful passage through the first few weeks of life enables entry into the "symbiotic phase" which occurs toward the end of the second month of life and continues through appoximately the fifth month. The child becomes increasingly aware (yet a dim perception) of the mother as a need satisfying object which further solidifies the perception of causality, a factor which had its hand in enabling successful passage through the first stage. However, it is thought that there continues to be no real psychic differentiation between inner and outer, self and mother. The neonate remains sensitive and vulnerable to the ministrations, omissions, etc. of the mothering person and "behaves and functions as though he and his mother were an omnipotent system--a dual unity within one common boundary" (Mahler, et al., 1975, p.44). The cathexis of the mother is, according to Mahler, the principle psychological achievement of this phase of development. Since it is postulated that what is inside and outside remains vague to the infant at this phase, the mother remains a part-object. The slight libidinal shift from internal toward the "sensori-perceptive periphery" through positive interactions of a

need gratifying nature with the mother promotes the beginnings of cracks in the autistic shell.

"Memory islands" are hypothesized as beginning to become established (Mahler & Grosliner, 1955). Increasingly, their associations to pleasurable and unpleasurable emotional experiences are established. This, as yet, limited capacity for recall serves, in part, to enable the emergence of observable behaviors of "intentionality" (Hartmann), or actions which are goal directed, going beyond the anticipation of being fed. The infant progresses, increasingly in the direction of being a more active participant in the mother-child dyad.

> The infant's smile inspires hope in the adult and, in making him smile, makes him wish to give hope, but this is, of course, only one physiognomic detail which indicates that the infant by his trustful search for experience and assurance, awakens in the giver a strength which he, in turn, is ready and needful to have awakened and to have consolidated by the experience of mutuality. (Erikson, 1964, p.116)

There are signs of more purposive grasping and of increases in the range of perception. The memory traces of gratification increase perceptual awareness of the environment in terms of what is potentially gratifying (within the symbiotic orbit) and seems to promote feeling states of eagerness (Schmale, 1964). Unspecific smiling responses triggered by eye-to-eye contact with a vertically moving face marks the "beginning of perceptual emotional 'social' activity" and "entrance into the stage of a need-satisfying

object relationship." "The need gradually becomes a wish and later the specific 'object-bound' affect of longing" (Mahler, et al., 1975, p.46).

Thus, experiences continue to become organized within the psyche, so that a person's perception of the world begins to be shaped by those experiences. This occurs, initially, in a primitive fashion since the perceptual capacities are as yet immature. Nonetheless, these experiences shape the manner in which the world is globally perceived. It should be remembered here, that what we are saying is viewed in the context that the ego does not yet exist as a differentiated, functional structure (Mahler, et al., 1975).

> With an adequate symbiotic experience...ego building proceeds. The groundwork for formation of a body image is laid. A rudimentary capacity to mediate between inner and outer perception becomes operative. 'The ego is molded under the impact of reality on the one hand, and of the instinctual drives on the other.' Ego functions are acquired, especially the important function of delay. This comes about because, with gratification, needs become less imperative. Memory traces of pleasure are linked with perception of the mother's ministrations. (Blanck & Blanck, 1974, p.55)

At these, the earliest phases of development, the rudiments of a hopeful capacity are loosely organized around sensorimotor gratification. The provision of "good enough mothering" in necessary and sufficient dosages serves to strengthen this organization through the processes of assimilation of those experiences which are within the range of the infant's perceptual capacity. Further, it reinforces the feeling that the world is safe and secure and that

unpleasurable tensions will not persist. Repeated experiences of this nature serve to reinforce the now existent perceptual organization and lead toward further solidification and generalization. The shift to the sensoriperceptive periphery also means that there is an increase in the quantity of elements within the field of perception which become available for integration into the apparatus, expanding, modifying and further generalizing it through the processes of accommodation and assimilation in Piaget's sense.

Separation-Individuation Process (5-36 mos)

Mahler divides the phase of development from 5-36 months of age into four separate but overlapping subphases. To these subphases, she has given the descriptive names:

(1) Differentiating

(2) Practicing

(3) Rapprochement

(4) Consolidation of Individuality and the Beginnings of Emotional Object Constancy

She identifies two principle processes which are intertwined and interact with one another but do not always progress evenly or commensurately. These developmental tracks are described as follows:

> One is the track of individuation, the evolution of intrapsychic autonomy, perception, memory, cognition, reality testing; the other is the intrapsychic developmental track of separation that runs along differentiation, distancing, boundary formation, and disengagement from mother. All of these structuralization processes will eventually culminate in

> internalized self-respresentations, as distinct from internal object representations. (Mahler, et al., 1975, p.63)

Differentiation Subphase (5-9 mos)

During this period of life the infant begins to emerge from the symbiotic oneness with the mother. This process has been called "hatching" which is metaphorically akin to the young chick's emergence from the protective covering of its shell. More technically, it is seen as the gradual evolution of the perceptual-conscious system enabling a more permanently alert sensorium during the waking states of the child. The gradual development and strengthening of the hopeful capacity promotes the hatching process. The beginning need gratifying perceptions of causality and time, we speculate, are part of the process which functions to draw the infant out of its autistic shell. Perhaps it is more accurate, from our point of view, to say that rather than being drawn out of its shell, the growing capacity for hoping empowers the infant to reach out. It is an action which comes from within. The final stages of hatching take place in the rapprochement subphase.

During this period, preferential smiling as opposed to the earlier non-specific smiling response is seen as "the crucial sign that a specific bond between the infant and his mother has been established" (Bowlby, 1958). Perceptual and mnemonic capacities increase, enabling the infant to take in and explore more of the periphery, and to remember

pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences with greater richness than in previous months. The continuation of the "good enough" mothering experience fosters a basic sense of trust or "confident expectation" (Benedek, 1938) that unpleasure will be relieved by maternal ministrations.

The first tentative steps are taken toward breaking away from the mother (in a bodily sense) as soon as the motor apparatus allows. Sliding down the lap, crawling, but still remaining close to mother are manifestations of this subphase. These "transitional situations" are accompanied by "transitional objects" as substitutes for contact with the body of the mother (Winnicott, 1953). "We observed that the mother's preferred soothing or stimulating pattern is taken over (assimilated) by the infant in his own way and so becomes a transitional pattern, examples of which are the stroking of the face or certain repetitious movements".... (Mahler, et al., 1975, p.55).

Moving away behaviors facilitate the beginnings of a somatopsychic differentiation. "Checking back to mother" is thought to be "the most important normal pattern of cognitive and emotional development" (Mahler, et al., 1975, p.55). "Checking back" is described as a visual pattern of comparative scanning between "mother and "other," the familiar with the unfamiliar as well as differentiating what belongs and does not belong to the mother's body, feature by feature.

The more optimal the preceding symbiotic phase, the more easily the child seems to move toward including more of the external world into his perceptual field without that undue anxiety which promotes a defensive withdrawal into self and away from external stimuli. The growing sense of basic trust through the phase appropriate interactions between mother and child appear to form the nucleus of the hopeful capacity through which the child's perceptions of those aspects of the world within his experience are shaped.

> The infant's sense of trust or security derives from the predictability of the care he receives when his basic needs for food, warmth, stimulation, contact comfort and love are met in a consistent, meaningful way. Separation loss, or rejection which disrupt the predictable flow of care, create the opposite state in the infant--a state if distrust, insecurity, and anxiety. Severe disruptions in these early attachments may result in a basic anxiety or interpersonal insecurity in all later relations. (Harlow, et al., 1971, p.437)

Practicing Subphase (10 or 12-to 16-18 mos)

This subphase is further divided into two parts. The first part is distinguished by modes of locomotion which are primarily quadropedal while the second is the realm of upright, bipedal locomotion. The child's increasing maturational capacity for locomotion has the effect of broadening the world he encounters and enables a more active role in his own determination of his physical proximity to mother (with its developmental parallels). It is a time of great libidinal investment in autonomous functions and expanded

reality testing. The child increasingly ventures away from the mother and seems highly absorbed in his own activities, while often being seemingly oblivious to her presence. He needs to return to her from time to time, however, for what has been termed "emotional refueling," then quickly resumes his further explorations.

> With the spurt in autonomous functions, such as cognition, but especially upright, locomotion, the 'love affair with the world' begins. The toddler takes the greatest step in human individuation. He walks freely with upright posture. Thus, the plane of his vision changes; from an entirely new vantage point he finds unexpected and changing perspectives, pleasures, and frustrations. There is a new visual level that the upright, bipedal position affords. (Mahler, et al., 1975, pp.70-71)

The affective tone of this period of development is highly positive and is punctuated with exclamatory symbols in Mahler's descriptions: "a love affair with the world!"; "intoxication!"; "exhilaration!"; "the greatest step in human individuation!" (Mahler, et al., 1975, pp.65-75). There is an unmistakable sense of hope in these descriptions with grand cause for celebration.

In terms of the reciprocal nature of the mother-child dyad, these developments tend to inspire hope in the receptive mother which impacts upon the child in circular fashion.

The foregoing elation, accompanied by a relative imperviousness to knocks and falls, changes to one of being "lowkeyed" only when the mother is absent from the scanning view of the child as when she leaves the room. During these

times, gestural and performance motility are slowed with a diminuation of interest in surroundings. There seems to be a preoccupation with inwardly concentrated attention. It is thought that this is indicative of the child's efforts to maintain psychic equilibrium by concentrating his energies upon holding a mental image of his mother and shutting out his perceptions of the periphery (seeing her absence). It is during this period that sensorimotor intelligence "imperceptibly develops into representational intelligence" (Mahler, 1972, p.493).

Here we believe that we can see the functioning of hope in enabling the child to give up some of the omnipotence of the mother-child, dual unit. Under favorable conditions, hope serves to enable further growth and development by attentuating fears, enhancing the integrative capacity and motivating forward as opposed to defensively regressing or avoiding. The child shows signs of a quickly burgeoning autonomy. He is no longer tied so closely to his mother, venturing out "on his own," being pushed by his own biological growth. He enters into a "new world" of new things, of greater complexity which call for greater organization and integration of new stimuli which present the danger of becoming overwhelming. The continuity of experiences reinforce the child's perceptual world view as he moves forward in his development. Increasingly, more and more aspects of the world, in ever widening circles, must become integrated.

The integrative capacity of the child must also increase proportionately with each new step. The integrative capacity, at least in part, is based upon hope (French, 1952).

In order that hope be adequate to the task at hand, there must be a history of confirming experience. These confirmations or "verifications," as Erikson terms them eventually enable hope to become established as a basic quality of experience.

> Hope is verified by a combination of experience in the individual's 'prehistoric' era, the time before speech and verbal memory. Both psychoanalysis and genetic psychology consider central in that period of growth the secure apperception of an 'object.' The psychologists mean by this the ability to perceive the enduring quality of the thing world while psychoanalysts speak loosely of a first love-object, i.e., the experience of the care-taking person as a coherent being, who reciprocates one's physical and emotional needs in expectable ways and therefore deserves to be endowed with trust, and whose face is recognized as it recognizes. These two kinds of object are the first knowledge, the first verification and thus the basis of hope. (Erikson, 1964, pp.116-117)

The phase appropriate interactions of the mother with child continue to be of crucial importance. With these important and dramatic shifts in the child's growth and development, shifts must be made by the mother in matching fashion. The mother's capacity to make the shifts in libidinally supportive fashion, of course, is contingent upon her own developmental pluses and minuses. Can she provide the "optimal distance" and "optimal availability" in a manner which is consistent enough to promote a sense of safety and confident expectation on the part of the toddler?

Or is she conflicted, unpredictable, impulsive, overly engulfing and/or rejecting? What is the nature of her own hopeful capacity?

> The expectation and confidence that mother exudes when she feels that the child is now able to 'make it' out there seems to be an important trigger for the child's own feeling of safety and perhaps also the initial encouragement for his exchanging some of his magic omnipotence for pleasure in his own autonomy and his developing self-esteem. (Mahler, et al., 1975, p.74)

The experience of earlier confirmations, reconfirmed again at this point builds and strengthens further hope, enabling the toleration of changing events with the prospect of a benign future in a world more separate from mother. Organizationally and perceptually, these changes are not overwhelming when attenuated by the strength of hope. There is even "predictability" in the sense that outcomes will be rewarding. There are new and interesting things to be explored which bring pleasure when one is not preoccupied with fear and disorganization. Energy can be directed toward the many ascending functions of the developing ego.

We are reminded here of the importance in recognizing the societal and generational factors with regard to the development, transmission and sustinence of the capacity for hope through the generations. The qualitative and quantitative aspects of the maternal object's hope are viewed as critical for the nurturing of hope in the child. This is, of course, contingent upon the growth and development, which includes the societal and generational experiences of the

mothering person in addition to her own constitutional givens. The multiple complexities and manifestations of the foregoing have been observed and elucidated by Mahler and her associates in their works regarding the vississitudes of human growth and development with special emphasis upon the mother-child relationship. We can see, for example, the impact of unconscious meanings of having children in the first place. A child may be conceived out of the hopes of the parents for their own gratification, e.g., to cement a failing marriage or as desparate attempts to fill deficits within themselves.

Should confirmation or vertifications fail, especially at points of crisis in these early years, we would expect that the hopeful capacity could, as yet, be indelibly compromised. The impact of failures, however, would be, modulated in proportion to the strength of pre-existing hope.

Rapprochement Subphase (16-18 to 24 mos)

The rapprochement subphase is the final stage of the hatching process which began in the differentiating subphase. It is aptly named for the French word which means the restoration of harmony and friendly relations. It is descriptive of the contrast in behavior between the practicing toddler whose seeming need for closeness was held in abeyance. There is an increased tone of separation anxiety which appears with constant concerns for the mother's whereabouts and more active approach behavior by the child toward

his mother. The child wishes the mother to share actively with him in his experiences.

How are we to understand this behavior which appears to be a regression from the previously attained appearance of a great spurt of autonomy in the practicing subphase?

> At the very height of mastery, toward the end of the practicing period, it had already begun to dawn on the junior toddler that the world is not his oyster, that he must cope with it more or less 'on his own,' very often as a relatively hopeless, small, and separate individual, unable to command relief or assistance merely by feeling the need for it, or even by giving voice to that need. (Mahler, et al., 1975, p.78)

This behavior, then, is not as it first appeared, as a regression. Rather, it is a continuation of the normal growth process with definite qualitative and quantitative differences from the earlier phases of growth. It is the increased capacities of the maturational and developmental processes which accounts for the picture we now see. The toddler guards his previously won sense of increasing autonomy with his "no" saying, typical of this aged child. There is evidence of an increased level of aggression as well as more advance cognitive capacities.

The context provided by Mahler for understanding the foregoing behavior is clear. As individuation proceeds at a rapid pace, the separateness of mother and child enters awareness at every turn. They are no longer a dual unit. The child must now find a way of integrating this dramatic, new task without being overwhelmed. For these reasons, the

child experiences a greater sense of vulnerability, impotent rage and helplessness. The "crisis" is that of moving ahead with increased autonomy and growth versus fixation or a regression to earlier, more helpless, dependent states. An earlier "ambitendency," which is more an external behavioral phenomenon now becomes a gradually internalized sense of ambivalence. This also hints at the developing capacity for hope to be maintained more autonomously.

The great spurt of seeming autonomy during the practicing subphase has now led the toddler to the poignant realization of his separateness and vulnerability. He has thrust himself out into the world with trust and confidence, which in the rapprochement subphase begins to wane appreciably. He is ambivalent now, with inner conflict as to which direction he should proceed; forward toward greater autonomy or backward to try and recapture the safety of the dual unit.

> No matter how insistently the toddler tries to coerce the mother, however, she and he no longer function effectively as a dual unit; that is to say, he can no longer get her to participate with him in his still maintained delusion of parental omnipotence. Likewise, at the other pole of the erstwhile dual unity, the mother must recognize a separate individual, her child, in his own autonomous right. (Mahler, 1972, p.495)

It is hope which enables the choice toward forward movement at this developmental "crisis." As in other life crises, confidence and trust often become shaky and the child must come to rely upon hope to carry him through via its attenuation of a traumatic now through the promise of a

brighter future. Reconfirmations at points of perceived crises are particularly strengthening.

> Hope is both the earliest and the most indispensable virtue inherent in the state of being alive. Others have called this deepest quality confidence, and I have referred to trust as the earliest positive psychosocial attitude, but if life is to be sustained hope must remain, even where confidence is wounded, trust impaired. (Erikson, 1964, p.115)

The role of the mother, again, has crucial relevance for development of the child during rapprochement; and, again, the hope of the mother for the continuation of growth in her child through her expressions of optimal emotional availability fosters hope within the child.

> One cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of the optimal emotional availability of the mother during this subphase. 'It is the mother's love of the toddler and the acceptance of his ambivalence that enable the toddler to cathect his self-representation with neutralized energy.' (Mashler, et al., 1975, p.77)

Mother's continued libidinal availability is essential for the child's ego to develop further and attain to its optimal capacity. She must be supportive and willing to let the toddler become more independent, encouraging, sometimes gently pushing. Mahler has observed that children whose mothers are unable to be emotionally available during rapprochement can become very insistent and even desparate in their attempts to woo her, leaving little energy left for ascending ego development. The mother may be consistently providing nurturance for regressive, clinging, overly complying behaviors from her child while withdrawing her

support, even being rejecting of his further separation--individuation which may become the basis for fixation and borderline personality organization.

The literature on borderline personality organization highlights the consequences of maternal behaviors which may undermine the growing autonomy of the child due to their own needs for keeping the child dependent, helpless and without hope, except in the dual unity of the mother-child. She is, therefore, unwilling and unable to nurture and nourish the child's moves away from her. She may consciously or unconsciously withdraw her libidinal availability from him or become blatantly rejecting, accentuating the child's vulnerability. On the other hand, she may become excessively smothering as an overcompensaton for her unconscious hostility.

> To the human infant, his mother <u>is</u> nature. She must be the original verification, which later will come from other and wider segments of reality. All the self-verifications, therefore, begin in that inner light of the mother-child-world, which Madonna images have conveyed as so exclusive and so secure: and, indeed, such light must continue to shine through the chaos of many crises, maturational and accidental. (Erikson, 1964, p.117)

Although developmental failures at this stage have been isolated as central to borderline personality organization, it would seem more accurate to point to the cumulative effects of earlier failures which culminate here. The strength of the child's preceding hope is an important factor which may enable the attenuation or transcendance of

such a fate even though environmental conditions here, may be less than optimal.

Toward the end of the second year of life, the complexity of development in children has evolved to a point that Mahler and her associates (1975, pp.101-102) wrote: "The vicissitudes of their individuation process were changing so rapidly that they were no longer mainly phase specific, but individually very distinct, and different from one child to the other."

Once established as a coherent organization, the basic hopeful capacity continues as an integral part of further developmental achievements. It provides a background or "perceptual window" which filters ongoing experiences, helping to enable further "reaching out" into an ever broadening world. As an integral part of the unique character structure of each individual, the ultimate fate of hope depends upon the extent to which it is integrated with the remainder of the personality. Its manifestations will vary in accord with the developmental achievements of the individual and the vicissitudes of the world in which he finds himself. Those very developmental achievements, of course, will be partially a product of the simultaneously existing and developing hope he possesses. New hopes are based upon those which precede them and prepare the way for successive hopes.

> Hope, once established as a basic quality of experience, remains independent of the verifiability of 'hopes,' for it is in the nature of man's maturation that concrete hopes will, at a time when a hoped-for event or state comes to pass, prove to have been quietly superseded by a more advanced set of hopes. The gradual widening of the infant's horizon of active experience provides, at each step, verifications so rewarding that they inspire new hopefulness. At the same time, the infant develops greater capacity for renunciation, together with the ability to transfer disappointed hopes to better prospects; and he learns to dream what is imaginable and to train his expectations on what promises to prove possible. All in all, then, maturing hope not only maintains itself in the fact of changed facts--it proves itself able to change facts, even as faith is said to move mountains. (Erikson, 1964, p.117)

CHAPTER IV

Summary and Conclusions

The dearth in the literature of the social sciences regarding the subject of hope has been amply documented. The current study has been devoted to the exploration of the concept hope with particular emphasis upon some early developmental aspects which lead to the formation of the hopeful capacity.

Preparatory to the study of its psychological development, the nature and functions of hope were delineated. The nature of hope refers to its intrinsic characteristics and qualities. Function relates to the actions or activities by which it is known. It is hope that enables the necessary and effective delay of gratification through the perception that future experiences will be "better" in some way than the present. It is hope that helps guide behavior in goal directed ways. It is hope that plays an important part in the development of the capacity to tolerate discomfort in the present through the promise it holds in the future. It is hope which serves the psyche in the adaptive attenuation of fear, destruction and pain. And it is hope that sometimes motivates, often revives, and in the darkest, most desperate of times is essential for survival itself.

Hope is thus, a vital and indispensable organ of the human psyche. Through an examination of its nature and functions, the following definition was posited: An ego strength characterized by enduring, recognizable regulatory patterns which organize life experiences in such a way that the

promise of selective future events are perceived as being more pleasurable than the present. It is a substratum lying beneath and supporting the ego. It is comprised of a particular organization of functions which are necessary but not sufficient for the effective accomplishment of the ego's integrative tasks.

The scheme of Margaret Mahler was utilized as the vehicle for organizing and integrating further and with greater precision, data which pertains to the evolution of the hopeful capacity during the initial two years of life. In general, the developmental model assumes an invariable order of stages; one building upon the foregoing stage, becoming more complex and taking on new form through its gradual progression. Development implies the synthesis of biological and psychological processes.

The most important developmental achievement of the first two months of life, in so far as the hopeful capacity is concerned, is seen behaviorally in the new born as anticipation at feeding. This behavior indicates that the neonate is developing the capacity to receive, recognize and differentiate between varied sensations. Further, it means that the new born is acting upon those sensations by organizing them, "remembering them" and reacting to them in an observable, anticipatory way. Such an achievement also implies the emergence of a primitive time orientation which differentiates present from future and a recollection of the past.

Unorganized sensations begin to become transformed into organized and structured perceptions. Such organization functions to enable a certain homeostasis through the ordering of sense data which helps to protect the infant against becoming traumatically overwhelmed. Affectively, a feeling of "safety" accompanies these achievements and serves as part of the basic structure for further development.

Roughly, during the second to fifth month of life, the infant becomes more and more able to perceive and "remember" the maternal person as a need satisfying object. This further solidifies the perception of causality. Behaviors which go beyond anticipation at feeding begin to emerge. The gradual achievement of the important function of delay also begins to become possible. Acts of "intentionality" or goal directed actions, including more active "social" interaction with the mother are seen here. These landmarks indicate the gradual cathexis of the mother and the beginnings of cracks in the "autistic shell."

During the fifth through the ninth month of life, the infant emerges from the symbiotic oneness with the mother. The fundamental organization which enables hoping is an integral factor in this, the preceding and subsequent developmental stages. The specific elements within the organization which enables hoping continue to increase in their capacities as well, e.g., the capacity to comprehend mentally

through the attachment of meaning, the capacity to remember, to anticipate, to differentiate, to recall, etc.

The most outwardly dramatic evidence of the coalescence of the hopeful capacity appears between the first year or year and six months of normal development. It is a time of great libidinal investment in autonomous functions and expanded reality testing. The child's ability to walk enables him to move further and more quickly away from his mother and to explore the world in ways which were not heretofore possible. Affectively, there is a sense of elation; "a love affair with world"; "intoxication"; "exhileration". The child enters into a "new world" of new things with greater complexity which call for further integration and organization. A relatively cohesive (although not fully formed) hopeful capacity which is accompanied by an affective background of safety is necessary, not only for the movement away from mother, but for the manner in which the "new world" becomes assimilated into the already existent perceptual organization.

It is during this period that sensorimotor intelligence makes its transition to representational intelligence. This transition presents yet another developmental crisis for the child of eighteen to twenty-four months. His advanced cognitive capacities enable the comprehension that he and his mother are no longer a dual unit. The psychic conflict becomes that of moving forward toward still greater autonomy or

backward in an effort to recapture the safety of the dual unit. Hope enables the choice toward forward movement, especially if it has been firmed and nurtured in the subsequent months through the phase appropriate ministrations of the maternal person. New hopes are based upon those which precede them and prepare the way for successive hopes. Gradually, a firm and durable organization evolves whereby disappointed hopes can be transferred to new hopes, the impossible to the possible, and life can be sustained sometimes in the face of the impossible.

To recapitulate briefly then, the basic processeds of the growth and development of the hopeful capacity during the initial two years of life are as follows: Perception, memory, extrapolative capacity, instinctual drives and a basic sense of trust are necessary precursors of the hopeful capacity. Through the functioning of the innate perceptual apparatus, stimuli are apprehended, then come to be gradually comprehended in terms of difference in feeling states, pleasurable and unpleasurable. Such experiences imply a beginning psychological organization and lead further toward a recognition of cause and effect relationships. When synthesized with an increasing ability for recall, anticipatory behaviors and a primitive time orientation become evident as part of this organization of functions.

These precursors are synthesized through their interaction with the individual's surround. We have emphasized, in

particular, the actions and activities of the maternal person (whose own ability for phase appropriate nurturing is greatly contingent upon her own development) with the developing child as a critical variable in the development of hope. Consistent validations which come in the form of "phase appropriate," "good enough mothering" over a period of time strengthens and gives greater permanency to this organization while it is, simultaneously, including and synthesizing the ever broadening experiences of ongoing development.

Through a relatively non-traumatic and consistently evolving history of confirming experiences which are weighted perceptually toward the fulfillment of desire rather than nonfulfillment; contentment and satiation as opposed to chronic tension, ego functions become organized in such a way that the ability to hope is born. This coherent organization then, may be seen as a "perceptual window" of sorts, through which, experiences are filtered and ascribed a hopeful meaning. Through the continuation of relatively benign and reinforcing experiences (part of which are enabled by earlier evolving hope), this organization comes to attain relative autonomy from its dependency upon external verifications.

Throughout the first twenty-four months of the separation-individuation process, evolving hope, through its protecting, motivating, goal directing, and attenuating functions enable growth and development to effectively proceed. The emphasis is placed upon the <u>evolving</u> aspect of the

hopeful capacity since it is, as yet, in the process of becoming and maturing further. The manner in which the ability to hope is integrated with the rest of the psyche will determine its manifestations at the various stages in the life cycle, i.e., what one hopes for becomes a measure of one's maturity (Menninger, 1963).

Serious failure in earliest development through the lack of nurturing of the hopeful capacity or grave constitutional weakness or overwhelming trauma may result in the death of the infant or in less extreme instances, have a profound and lasting effect upon the psychological growth of the individual in subsequent life.

There is always danger in appearing too simplistic and reductionistic in focusing upon particular aspects of what in reality are very complex developmental phenomena. Only a few of the principle psychological achievements relative to the early emergence and growth of the hopeful capacity have been explored here. And too, as Erikson has said, "In a discussion of development, it is unavoidable that one must begin with the beginning. This is unfortunate because we know so little of the earliest and deepest strata of the human mind." (Erikson, 1968, p. 104)

CHAPTER V

Implications For Further Study

The need for hope among people is crucial. Among therapists the need is critical. A philosophy of hope, an understanding of how growth and change process works in humans, techniques and approaches to make it happen, and an absolute "bone" conviction that people can change, can transform the threat of "burn-out" in therapists to a feeling of hope and conviction that they can really help.

- Virginia Satir -

Beyond the First Two Years

The current explorations have been centered upon the first two years of life. Mahler's developmental scheme, of course, continues to examine beyond that point. One would wonder what further inquiry into subsequent development might reveal about the evolution of hope.

The fourth subphase of the separation-individuation process is termed: "consolidation of individuality and the beginnings of emotional object constancy" (22 or 24-36 months). It is not considered a subphase in the same sense as those of differentiating, practicing and rapprochement. The achievements herein are open-ended at the older end and the developments reach no well defined terminal point. During this time, the attainment of a certain degree of object constancy is achieved through the gradual internalization of a constant, positively cathected, inner image of the mothering person. Thus, the child can tolerate longer absences from his mother in familiar surroundings. The level of comfort the child is capable of sustaining while being at a distance from its mother is also contingent upon and implies the unification of "good" and "bad" into an internalized whole representation. This achievement also enables increased tolerance of disappointment and frustration.

Verbal communication (which began earlier) develops rapidly, slowly replacing gesturing and the earlier modes. Play is more constructive and purposeful which includes role

playing and the use of fantasy. A more highly developed sense of time and spatial relations begins to be in evidence. There is understanding and use of words such as "later" or "tomorrow" with increased capacity to delay gratification.

In all probability the developmental achievements beyond the second year also make their contributions to the further consolidation and refinement of the hopeful capacity. Put in Mahler's terms; as the maternal image becomes internalized and thus becomes intrapsychically available to the child as the actual mother was for sustenance, comfort, love, etc., a hopeful capacity is further consolidated and refined as part of that structuralization, and a state of greater permanence exists. "Greater permanence" is used here since object constancy yet remains a matter of degree and is thought to be a rather fluid and reversible achievement (Mahler, p.112). One would wonder whether or not the hopeful capacity is similarly fluid and reversible at this point. This view seems to contradict Erikson's position that hope attains autonomy earlier in life.

The position taken in this paper is that hoping is the process of ordering selective stimuli in a particular, cohesive manner. This organization is subordinate to the larger, more general organizing functions of the ego. The more highly developed ego enables the discrimination between fantastic hoping and hoping for events which are closer to present reality. The effectiveness of the ego depends in part

upon the perception of the desireability of goals and the accurate assessment of those goals. Since many of these achievements obviously go beyond the second year of development, much may be learned from an exploration of that segment of life with regard to hope and hoping.

There are many questions which remain and beg to be answered, e.g., one may be characteristically very hopeful while others seem barely hopeful. What are the critical factors which account for these differences? What impact does the increase in the ability to utilize fantasy, verbal communication and greater cognitive sophistication have upon the capacity to hope and the objectives toward which hope is directed? If the quantitive and qualitative aspects of hope and hoping are directly related to ego development, does this mean that schizophrenics are necessarily more impaired in their hopeful capacity than neurotics? What correlations are there between hoping and the attainment of object constancy? Perhaps some answers to these and other questions may be answered eventually through studies of development beyond the second year.

The Question of Autonomy

Hartmann has indicated that ego autonomy is relative. The ego may lose its autonomy through the disproportionate increase of drive influences, illness, organic injuries, toxic effects, decompensation of defenses and/or other regulating functions. Autonomy in Hartmann's writing referred to

the autonomy of the ego from the influences of the id and Rapaport added, autonomy of the ego from external reality, meaning relative independence from external stimulation so that the ego was not stimulus-bound. In order to explain how some of the ego's energies derive from non-drive sources, Hartmann proposed that some of the ego's energies derive from sources which are exclusive of the drives. In addition, he proposed the concept of neutralization which involves the desexualization and deaggressivization of libidinal and aggressive drives.

> Although the appreciation of the autonomy in function and structure of the ego from drive and reality influences was a major contribution of the systematic ego school, there remain significant difficulties that need to be resolved. One of the important areas for thinking and investigation in psychoanalysis has to do with the influences and determining factors of the development of ego autonomy. One of the major areas of theoretical tension has to do with the emergence of autonomous functions and autonomous ego structures, along with the understanding of both their removal from and their involvement in instinctual sources of energy. There is a tendency in this area to follow Hartmann's lead in the direction of postulating independent sources of ego energy-independent, that is, of instinctual sources. This, however, raises the further problem of resolving and integrating the instinctual and the independent ego energies in the course of development of an integrated psychic apparatus (Meissner, Mack & Semrad, 1975, p. 537).

We believe that the hopeful capacity enables the maintenance of ego autonomy through its attenuation of drives and other such assaults to the integrity of the ego. There is also a sense of energy which exists with hope which does not

seem to be derived from instinctual sources but, rather, from a particular organization and synthesis of autonomous ego functions. Further study along these lines may contribute to the understanding of the problems which exist in this area.

Hope and Depression

The author's interest in the subject matter of this study began, not with hope, but with hopelessness. The voluminous literature regarding depression points to the consensually agreed upon observation that hopelessness and clinically significant depressive states are integrally linked. They are, in fact, so closely akin to one another that they seem almost synonomous.

Clinically significant depression, of course, is differentiated from transitory, normal mood fluctuations as well as sadness and grief responses. In normal sadness and grief there is no pervasive sense of hopelessness with regard to one's self. There is no lowered self esteem and no self destructive preoccupation. A sense of hope is clearly maintained.

While the literature in this area highlights hopelessness in depressive states, the "other side of the coin" which we assume to be hope remains a neglected area of study. Perhaps this is due to the undue emphasis upon psychopathology, as mentioned earlier.

Freud actually launched some of his studies of pathology from a position of making comparisons between "normalcy" and

illness. This is exemplified in his work on depression which he began as follows:

> Now that dreams have proved of service to us as the normal prototypes of narcissistic mental disorders, we propose to try whether a comparison with the normal emotion of grief, and its expression in mourning, will not throw some light on the nature of melancholia. (Freud, 1917)

The foregoing point of departure was earlier posited by Abraham (1911) as he compared normal grief with melancholia, as well.

The study of hope in this connection may well provide interesting and important illumination to the understanding of clinical depression. It appears, at least at first glance, that they are mutually exclusive states. "Masked depressions" (Lesse, 1974) or "depressive equivalents," perhaps may be better understood as unconscious defensive maneuvers to sustain hope and guard against hopelessness. Further study along these lines may yield crucial information in this much written about, yet poorly understood area.

Hope and Psychotherapy

In this beginning study, we have proceeded with a series of successive approximations regarding our subject, hoping that they may lead us to more concise formulations and may eventually enable verification or renunciation. Through the juxtaposition of our ideas about hoping with the theory of Mahler, we may come to regard some of the implications for treatment which our findings highlight. Since Mahler regards ego construction to take place around the issues of

separation-individuation, it would follow that psychotherapy of the issues which revolve around problems of hoping would be facilitated through an understanding of development in that sense and may have diagnostic value. One may think of this process as that of enabling hope at a particular level of fixation or regression sufficiently that it eventually could be relinquished and reinvested at a higher level of development. This could be thought of as a series of attachments and separations, moving toward ever higher achievements in ego construction and functioning.

A word should be said about that part of therapy which is not readily describable or speakable. Since the early bases of hope are only felt experiences which emerge at pre-verbal levels and remain a part of the basic scheme of hope, such feelings need to be considered in the therapeutic process. This is a part of the "art" of therapy in which the therapist must meet and communicate with the patient on a level which transcends words but most poignantly reveals a deeper understanding which goes beyond description. This deep, visceral connection not only facilitates the sense of being understood on the part of the patient but also connects the patient to the hopefulness of the therapist. At certain points in time, the therapist may temporarily serve as a "container" of hope for the patient whose own hope is at its lowest ebb.

A study by Wilkens (1973), suggests that therapeutic improvements are more attributable to the therapist and his confidence that the patient will improve, rather than through the efforts of the patient himself. This implies that the level and capacity of hope that the therapist holds is a particularly important variable, even more important, perhaps than the hope which the patient has. Or is it that, as we would tend to assume, that the therapist's hope activates the patient's hope? And what about the therapist who has little hope himself? Or what about the therapist who needs to use the patient to bolster his own hope?

In psychotherapy, the hope of the therapist may inadvertently become problematic to effective treatment. The hope of the therapist can bias and perpetuate the patient's resistance to experiencing the loss of hope in some things which may be necessary in order that he may progress and regain hope in things which are possible. Viewed in this way, we begin to acknowledge the importance of understanding the unconscious and defensive aspects as they relate to the hopes of the therapist and the patient.

We assume that those who presents themselves for treatment voluntarily and probably many of those who come to be treated in seemingly involuntary fashion, do so with some modicum of hope which ranges from very little to the fantastic. The hope is that as a result of this action, their lot will be improved in the future. There is also the

concommitent state which probably exists. That is to say that these individuals have often given up hope in themselves in an effort to regain hope through the therapist. This basic modality of having and letting go in order to have again (perhaps something better), has important implications for growth, adaptation, and therefore, psychotherapy. Man may be told in his religion to renounce hope in himself and to leave his fate to God. In so doing, he reclaims the very thing he has renounced.

> Thus, 'to hold' can become a destructive and cruel retaining or restraining, and it can become a pattern of care: 'to have and to hold'. To 'let go', too, can turn into an inimical letting loose of destructive forces, or it can become a relaxed 'to let pass' and 'to let be'. Culturally speaking, these modalities are neither good nor bad; their value depends on how they are built into the patterns of affirmation and rejection demanded in the culture. (Erikson, 1968, p. 109)

And so it is with hope, that the way in which we deal with this modality has an important impact in our treatment of individuals.

Thus far, we have spoken of hope in a positive sense, implying that it is an important and necessary component of successful treatment. There are those, however, that object to such a stance, renouncing the offering of hope in therapy as being detrimental and pathological.

> ...the offering of hope as a therapeutic device is not only a hopeless means of ever freeing anyone from his misery and suffering, but is actually detrimental and serves only to enhance delusion and psychopathology. (Hammer)

Hammer's contention is that hope is the pursuit of what "ought to be" and therefore detracts from dealing with what "is." He states further that "The healthy pattern of living which patients should learn is the pattern of living in the reality of what is and never the avoidance and denial of reality." (Underlining mine)

We would agree that there is something to be said for the costs of denying reality but also add that denial and reality are not as absolute as Hammer makes them sound. Defenses are sometimes necessary to maintain the integrity of the psychic economy, fantasy is necessary for invention and creativity to name only two products which veer away, initially from absolute reality. Paradoxically, there is a sense of hope which seems to be implied here by Hammer through his absolutism. He seems to be saying that "the only real hope for the patient is through its renunciation".

This raises the question, however, as to how we may best utilize our current understanding of hope within the context of psychotherapy. It seems that there would be differences in our approach according to the place of hope in our patients. That is to say, that our task would differ between a patient who comes in with little hope or one who comes in with fantastic, unrealistic hopes, or one who has just relinquished hope in something to which he has clung tenaciously for years.

Undoubtedly, we deal with these and other phenomena regarding our own hope and the hope of our patients on a daily basis. Perhaps we call them something else, or we just "feel" what is happening and deal with it intuitively. Our own hope in expending the efforts required of this study are that a closer, more concise look at this subject which has gone neglected will provide us with some bits of helpful understanding today and lead us in the direction of becoming a more effective therapist tomorrow.

> And often it would seem to be this element of hope--hope in the doctor, hope in the patient, and hope in others concerned in the matter--which plays not a passive but an active role in the developments. Perhaps this is only to say that our present scientific knowledge is not sufficient to recognize or identify or properly credit all the forces working for recovery any more than we know in any case all the forces against which we are working. And this we know: Sometimes hope fails, and death ensues, while sometimes hope endures, and the impossible happens. (Menninger, 1963, p. 386)

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