INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF DRIVE AND AFFECT THEORY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE

LOUIS C. MONE

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by

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Abstract

This is an exploratory study, specifically a two-fold survey of how some psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists view the ego psychological perspective put forth by the Blanks on the origin, nature, function and development of drive and affect and how they relate to each other. More specifically the area of investigation centered around: (1) aggression, in undoing connections does not necessarily destroy; (2) aggression serves growth and development as does libido; (3) libido and aggression work together in an upward spiraling movement of connecting at one level, disconnecting and reconnecting at a higher level of separation-individuation; (4) drive is not affect and affect is not drive and it is important to maintain a clear distinction between them; (5) drive and affect, once developmentally differentiated from one and another, pursue their own separate lines of development; and (6) the need for the drive-taming concept of fusion, neutralization and sublimation is challenged.

The second area of investigation focused how these psychotherapists perceived, employed applied, adapted or rejected the concepts of drive and affect in their clinical practice, as

it relates to diagnosis, treatment goals, therapeutic alliance, support of ego functions, interpretation, transference, resistance and termination.

In short, this is a study of how some psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists view the issues proposed by the Blancks; whether they find it essential to distinguish drive from affect theoretically and clinically; and how their perception influences how they intervene clinically.

The results were that the majority of the respondents largely agreed with the views held by the Blancks, with one exception. Point number six indicated above was the most controversial issue. This point had to do with the nature of drive and affect. Only three subjects agreed with the Blancks view, while the remaining four subjects held to the more traditional notion that drive and affect are basically primitive and need to undergo a secondary process of taming, fusion, neutralization or sublimation in order to support growth and development.

With respect to the use of drive and affect in the actual process of psychotherapy, all of the respondents employed the use of these concepts to some degree. However, they are not always conscious of the conceptualization process unless they are asked to think about it. Thus, they were often nebulous in their conceptualizations. Furthermore, they are more apt to be cognizant of drive than of affect in the process of therapy, particularly as drives operate in relation to the separation-individuation process.

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We hereby approve the dissertation

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DRIVE AND AFFECT
THEORY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE

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DEDICATION

To my wife Elinor, I dedicate this dissertation for her unwaivering support and encouragement, and for the many sacrafices she has endured over the years so that I could pursue my academic goals. This dedication is but a small token of my appreciation for what Elinor has provided for me during times of special need.

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The inspiration for this dissertation came from the writings of Gertrude and Rubin Blanck, who are my mentors and close friends. I thank them for what I have learned from their teachings and for their thought provoking ideas on drive and affect which gave impetus to this dissertation.

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time to consider and answer the questions posed during the interview.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Some ninety years have passed since Freud in 1894 recorded his early thoughts on instincts (widely known and accepted today as drives) and anxiety (affect). Freud struggled then and throughout his forty-five years of voluminous contribution to understand the origin, nature, function and development of drive and affect and their relationship to one another. On numerous occasions he (1905, 1908D, 1915C, 1920G, 1921C, & 1931) would use drive and affect interchangeably, as in reference to libido (drive) as love (affect) and aggression (drive) as hostility (affect). Giovacchini (1982), in his review of some of Freud's works, noted, "Freud emphasized that the ego hates, but then referred to sadism as an instinct. This is confusing because an affect is equated with an instinct" (p. 112).

Through his writings, Freud acknowledged that his theories were far from complete and that continuous clinical research was indicated to better understand drive, affect and their seeming inseparable

relationship. In Freud's (1930A) own words, "This is how things appear to us now, in the present state of our knowledge, future research and reflection will no doubt bring further light which will decide" (p.122). While Freud first proposed an affect theory, his emphasis shifted to drive theory. In a final paper on drives Freud (1940) had refined drive theory as a dual theory of primitive drives, libido and aggression, needing to be tamed, sublimated and under control of the ego. Libido was defined as the force which connects, bringing about ever-greater unities and aggression as the force which undoes the connections and thereby destroys. Lastly, while he seems to distinguish drive from affect conceptually, he seldom did so operationally. Therefore, Freud left theory development with a legacy of drive-affect ambiguity.

From 1937 to 1984 much of the significant psychoanalytic literature on this subject makes some reference to drive-affect confusion and the need for a greater clarity in understanding the nature and function of drive and affect (Brierley, 1937; Bibring, 1941; Rapaport, 1953; Parens, 1972; Lussier, 1972; Sandler & Sandler, 1978; Blanck & Blanck, 1977, 1979; Kernberg, 1982; Lester, 1982; and G. Blanck, 1984). In the past

two decades there has been an increasing interest in the area of aggression. In fact the 27th International Psychoanalytic Congress, which met in Vienna, July 1971 devoted its meeting to study and debate the nature and function of aggression. Lussier (1972), a reporter for the panel on aggression, noted that Sandler (a member of the panel) said, "...in regard to the psychoanalytic literature, there is the unfortunate fact that we use the term 'aggression' when we also mean many other things " (p. 14). This statement sheds some light on why even today there is so much confusion about what is meant by the concept of aggression. In the opinion of Blanck and Blanck (1979), the Vienna Congress largely viewed aggression as an affect of hostility or rage and in the behavioral sense as destructive. It should also be noted that there was agreement among many of the participants that at least some aspect of the aggressive drive is non-destructive. Lussier, continuing with his summary of Sandler's presentation, further noted Sandler's call for greater clarity of constructs. Regarding the importance of the need to refine and distinguish terms, Sandler pointed out, "Quite often, suicide is not aggression turned against the self, except descriptively, but a magical way to blot everything out to get a fantasied blissful and peaceful

state" (p. 14). In a further bid to differentiate drive from affect, Blanck and Blanck (1979) argue, "To refer to aggression as drive and aggression as rage, to libido as drive and libido as love blurs an important distinction" (p.33). It is important to know if a particular action is motivated by drive, affect or a combination of both (Blanck & Blanck 1977, 1979 & G. Blanck 1984). They believe that this is extremely important in deciding whether or not the behavior in question advances or retards development. Blanck and Blanck (1977) illustrate this point in a case vignette of a patient, whose symbiotic phase of development was less than adequate. In the early phase of treatment, the patient was largely non-verbal. When the patient broke the silence it was with an outburst of anger. The silence was not responded to as resistance, but understood as the patient's libidinal need (drive connecting with the therapist) and the burst of anger (affect) was recognized as the patient's defense against the wish to become one with the therapist, which threatened the loss of the patient's identity. Blanck and Blanck are of the opinion that the therapist's "Recognition of the need engages the patient in a therapeutic alliance which is viewed, in and of itself, as an identificatory process. An observing ego is born

as the patient begins to grasp that the analyst is not the primary ungratifying object" (p. 41).

While Blanck and Blanck emphasize the need for drive and affect distinction, Kernberg (as reported by Lester 1982) takes a somewhat different position. Noting that drives and affects have distinctive qualities, Kernberg believes that affects serve as building blocks for drive development of libido and aggression, but he adds that affects "...become integrated as overall drives" (Lester, 1982, p. 202).

As the reader will note, from Freud to current times, the nature of the relationship between drive and affect is still very much open to question.

Statement of the Problem

The problem, as indicated in the introduction, is that there continues to be a lack of agreement as to the origin, nature, function and development of drive and affect, which further beclouds the nature of the relationship between drive and affect. As already noted previously, this has serious implications for treatment. Furthermore, if in the course of therapy,

hostility (affect) is referred to as aggression (drive) or love (affect) as libido (drive) it is not only confusing for the patient, but therapeutic interventions tend to be less precise, which can only burden the therapeutic process at best and retard it at worst.

Why does this ambiguity still linger on in theory and practice today? What is indicated to promote a clear distinction between drive and affect and how may the relationship between the two be better understood? Is a paradigm shift or a new theory altogether indicated? Blanck and Blanck (1979) posit a paradigm shift. They hold to Freud's (1940) view of libido being the force that connects and aggression the force that disconnects, but propose that: (1) aggression, in undoing connections does not necessarily destroy; (2) aggression serves growth and development as does libido; (3) libido and aggression work together in an upward spiraling movement of connecting at one level, disconnecting and reconnecting at a higher level of separation-individuation; (4) drive is not affect and affect is not drive and it is important to maintain a clear distinction between them; (5) drive and affect, once developmentally differentiated from one and another, pursue their own separate lines of development;

(6) this view challenges the need for the drive-taming concept of fusion, neutralization and sublimation. These proposed theoretical revisions are addressed in the exploratory interviews with clinicians who are currently engaged in the practice of psychoanalytic therapy or analysis.

These issues are at the heart of the controversy that exists today in understanding the origin, nature, function, development and the relationship of drive and affect. Furthermore, confusion regarding the above impedes the formation of an adequate drive and affect theory.

Purpose of the Research

The psychoanalytic literature reviewed began with the theoretical contributions of Freud and ended with present day ego psychologists on the subject of drive and affect and the way in which these two apparatuses relate to one another in the ongoing process of human development. This dissertation is a study of how some psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists view the issues proposed by the Blancks; whether they find it essential to distinguish drive from affect theoretically

and clinically; and how their perception influences how they intervene clinically. Furthermore, this study addresses these issues from an ego psychological perspective. Thus, the literature review was narrowed to Freud and major post Freudian ego psychologists, such as A.Freud, Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein, Spitz, Jacobson, Mahler, the Blancks and others. My reason for focusing the literature review primarily on these authors is due to the belief that they are the major contributors to ego psychology. Margaret Mahler's remark, as noted in the Foreward of Blanck and Blanck's (1979) book Ego Psychology II, is offered in support of this rationale.

> Thus, contemporary Freudian theory - from Freud's structural theory, through Anna Freud's elaboration of the defensive function of the ego, Hartmann's elaboration of theory in his collaborative work with Kris and Loewenstein, Jacobson's description of the process of differentiation of self and object representations and Spitz's and my work on direct observation of children - become a body of knowledge known as "ego psychology." p. ix

Further, my inclusion of the Blancks' along with the "notable ego psychologists" has to do with their synthesis of ego psychology as a theory and a practice (1968, 1974, and 1979) which is illuminated in their three books. Moreover, they have made some noteworthy

contributions to ego psychology which are significant to this dissertation. In support of this, I once again call upon Mahler's Foreward to Ego Psychology II. Mahler remarks:

> On the theoretical side, the Blancks challenge the traditional interpretation of drive theory, using Freud's last statement on the drives to elaborate their own position. ...Even though many readers will find the chapter on drive theory and affect theory highly controversial, it is my opinion that the Blancks have highlighted a much needed revision of the dual drive theory. The direction in which they propose to take us promises to relieve our science of the **terminological babel** into which it has fallen with regard to these theories. It is necessary, as the Blancks point out, that the bipolar drive theory and the multifaceted affect theory be pried loose from each other. p. x

The Blanck's summary of current ego psychological perspectives was used as a guide in a survey of psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists. The specific objectives were: 1) to examine the theoretical perspectives of some psychotherapists' views of the origin, nature, function, and development of drives and affects and their relationship; and 2) how these clinicians employ these perspectives in the process of their therapeutic interventions with patients.

Research Question

The research questions that this dissertation investigated is how some psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists view the ego psychological perspective put forth by the Blanks on the origin, nature, function and development of drive and affect and how they relate to each other. How these psychotherapists employ the concepts of drive and affect in their clinical practice, as it relates to diagnosis, treatment goals, therapeutic alliance, interpretation, transference, resistance and termination?

Relevance to Clinical Social Work Practice

An investigation of the understanding and application of tenets and concepts suggested by the Blancks and the origin, nature, function and development of drive and affect, as well as the relationship that exists between drive and affect, presents an opportunity to add to the expanding knowledge of psychoanalytic theory. For example, Blanck and Blanck (1977 & 1979) have proposed (in part) that it is the affective coloring of self and object representations, rather

than, the drive cathexis of these representations which stimulate narcissistic development. This proposition has grown out of the Blancks' observation of their patients, and refinement of the concepts drive, affect and the nature of the relationship between drive and affect. Furthermore, the broadening of the theory which serves as a foundation for clinical practice, potentially offers a greater precision in technique, which can only further enhance the practice of clinical social work. Using the Blancks proposition of affective coloring of self and object representations, allows the clinician to focus on supporting the affective qualities (instead of drive cathexis) of self and object representations in order to further normal narcissism. Thus, the technical approach to a patient in need of this kind of support would help the individual to recognize and savor the good feelings about him/herself. Moreover, this study can also stimulate further ideas and hunches for the clinical social work practitioner which may result in a broadening of social work contribution to the practice of psychotherapy.

The fact that Gertrude and Rubin Blanck are clinical social workers, who also practice psychoanalysis, lends further credence to the testing of

their ideas, for it provides another opportunity to enhance the profession of social work.

CHAPTER II

Literature Review

Since the focus of this dissertation is the psychoanalytic study of the relationship between affect and drive, the literature review will begin with the father of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud. The review of Freud will begin with the evolution of drive theory. Starting with the libido theory, I will show how Freud's ideas evolved from a sexual drive theory to a dual theory of drives. In this journey I will attempt to clarify Freud's own struggles in this evolution of theory and I will elucidate Freud's notions on the viscissitudes of the drives. Along the way, references will be made to affect and I shall give my interpretation of Freud's ideas on this subject. Finally, I will present the relationship of affect and drive as far as Freud was able to develop this aspect of theory construction. However, before proceeding with this endeavor, it is necessary that I clarify certain terms as used in Freud's writings.

Definition of Terms

The James Strachey edition is considered the more technically correct and accurate edition of Freud's complete works than the A. A. Brill edition. It is for this reason that I have chosen Strachey's translation over Brills for the review of Freud's writings. Strachey, (1966) in "Notes On Some Technical Terms Whose Translation Calls For Comment", admits his translation of the German word "trieb" to the English "instinct" is controversial. In his words, "My choice of this rendering has been attacked in some quarters with considerable, but I think, mistaken severity. The term almost invariably proposed by critics as an alternative is 'drive'" (p. xxiv). It appears as though the critics have won out, for modern day psychoanalytic writers have adopted the word 'drive'. To a lesser extent, some authors use the phrase "instinctive drive" in referring to Freud's "trieb". Therefore, wherever possible, I will use the more widely accepted translation of trieb-"drive". The term instinct will only be used in a direct quote.

Also noteworthy is Strachey's comments on the German "Affekt", "Empfindung" and "Gefuhl" which are translated as affect, sensation and feeling (or emotion)

respectively. He says, "The trouble here is that all these words in both languages cover very uncertain ground, and that the meaning of the German and English words do not coincide but overlap" (p. xxiii). In the editor's Appendix Strachey states, "...he (Freud) meant by 'affect' much the same as what we mean by 'feeling' or 'emotion'" (p. 66). Furthermore, Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the American Language defines "affect" as "feeling, emotion." In light of these factors and in the interest of simplification the term affect in this dissertation will represent feelings and emotions. This definition then will be consistent with what Freud had in mind and with Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the American Language.

Since the term cathexis often accompanies drive, as in libidinal cathexis or aggressive cathexis, it is necessary that there be some understanding of its origin and meaning. The word Freud used was "Besetzung". According to Strachey (1966), "The German word is one in ordinary use, and, among many other senses, might have some such meaning as 'occupation', or 'filling'" (p. 63). Strachey points out Freud used 'Besetzung' to refer to "a quota of affect or sum of excitation" (p. 63). In an attempt to further clarify the German "Besetzung",

Strachey, in 1922, introduced the English word "cathexis" taken from the Greek "catechein" meaning to occupy. He admits that Freud was not happy with this translation. However, it appears as though Freud must have accepted it for Strachey further indicated that Freud used "cathexis" in the original manuscript of his 1926 Encyclopedia Britannica article. Thus it could be said that if an object is cathected with libido it is occupied with libido or if there is an aggressive cathexis of the object, the object is occupied with aggression.

Further meaning of these terms will come to light as I now address Freud's evolution of the theory of drives and affect.

Freud's Evolving Theory of Drives

Drive theory developed out of Freud's treatment and study of his patients. Freud (1895) observed that his patients' sexual strivings played an important role in the etiology of their neuroses. His ideas on this subject began to coalesce in 1894 and are evident in DRAFT E ("How Anxiety Originates"), which was believed to be written in June 1894. The first publication of the

term libido is noted in Freud's 1895 Paper entitled. "On The Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome From Neurasthenia Under the Description Anxiety Neurosis", which was actually written in 1894. In this paper he distinguishes between "somatic sexual excitation" and "sexual libido" or "psychical desire". Freud distinguished the somatic from the psyche in that the sexual urge or excitation was somatic and sexual libido was the physical representation or desire.

In the "Three Essays On Sexuality", Freud (1905D) refines his thinking a little further regarding the issue of "sexual excitation" and "psychical desire" in that he unites them under the heading of drive. He says:

> By an instinct (drive) is provisionally to be understood the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation, as contrasted with a 'Stimulus', which is set up by single excitation coming from without. The concept of instinct is thus one of those lying on the frontier between the mental and physical. (p.168)

Freud continued to clarify his definition of drive and in his 1915 work on instincts and their vicissitudes he more clearly articulates the concept. In his words:

> ...an 'instinct' appears to us as a concept on the frontier between mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body. (p. 122)

A more succinct view of drive (Freud 1920G) makes its appearance in the paper "Beyond The Pleasure Principle" in which he stated:

> The most abundant sources of this internal excitation are what are described as the organism's 'instincts'-- the representatives of all the forces originating in the interior of the body and transmitted to the mental apparatus... (p. 34)

Also, Freud (1905D) introduced sexual aim and object as technical terms significant to the understanding of drive. He later (1915C) added "pressure" to the list and the term "source", already indicated in the definition of the drive, is called out and affixed to the list. Thus a drive has a "source", "pressure", "aim" and an "object". The source is the somatic excitation which occurs within the physical body whose stimulus is represented in the mind by the drive (libido). Pressure on the other hand, relates to motor activity and the quantity of the force of the drive. The aim is gratification of the drive which is achieved

in its relationship to an object (a person or self). An object may also be a part of the object or subjects body.

It was Freud's (1905D) belief that everyone is born with a sexual drive and that the drive had a source, pressure, aim and an object. Accordingly a new born sucking on a breast is gratifying the need to suck (the aim) and taking nourishment via the breast (the object). As the child grows, the sexual needs advance to varying levels of development. It is not within the scope of this dissertation to address the various stages of psychosexual maturation. As we can see, Freud originally referred to sexuality as sexual drive, but ultimately opted to refer to it in its expressive form as (the psychical representation) "libido" for reasons which are unclear. Furthermore, he (1930A) believed that libido could be found in every drive representation but not all of what was manifest could be considered libido, for it may also contain aggressive energy. To illustrate this idea, Freud refers to sadism as a manifestation of aggressive (destructive) and libidinal (erotic) energy.

As Freud (1905D) further attemtped to delineate the concept of libido he postulated that libido was a

quantitative variable force having an identifiable quality. He distinguished libido from all other energy forces in general. This quantitative variable force was identified as ego-libido and had the ability to increase and decrease as it withdrew or invested in objects. When it cathects an object the quality of libido alters and becomes object-libido. When libido is withdrawn and recathects the ego, it is known as narcissistic libido. Thus ego-libido and narcissistic libido have the same character. When libido recathects the ego it is narcissistic and it returns to "the original state of things" (p.218). In short, ego-libido and narcissistic libido are one and the same energy force. Freud's reference to the "quantitative variable force" is based upon the principle of energic conservation, which essentially states that energy (in this case libido) is never consumed it only changes form. (This principle eventually became the basis for his dual drive theory.) Thus, according to Freud, when the ego cathects the object-world, there is a shift in the quality of libido from ego libido (self-love) to object-libido (love of another person or persons). To put it another way, the subject is connected to the people and the outside world. Conversely, when libido is withdrawn from the object-world and it recathects the ego, the quality of

libido changes from object-libido to ego-libido.

Freud felt it was important to distinguish between libido and other energy forces within the ego. In fact, his position on this was so strong he (1905D, 1916X, 1920G, 1930A) repeatedly criticized Jung for positing a generalized theory of libido, combining sexual and non-sexual drives. To agree with Jung, Freud would have had to abandon the conservation principle (to which he was so strongly committed) and adopted the principle of equivalence. In fact, he held onto this principle throughout his writings. In his pursuit, Freud (1915C) proposed two groups of primal drives, the "ego" or "self preservation drives" and "sexual drives". He indicated that at first appearance they are undifferentiated and come from the same source of energy but later separate and serve their own functions, self preservation and sex respectively. As his thinking progressed, the "ego instincts" were replaced by the death drive, Thanatos, making it the drive of self preservation and sexual drive became the life drive, Eros, but this notion was withdrawn. The reason Freud (1920) altered his position of the death drive serving the function of self preservation was due to the fact that he realized that "self preservation instincts/ego instincts" were

libidinal in nature and really part of Eros, "the preserver of all things" (p. 52). In a footnote in the paper "Beyond The Pleasure Principle", Freud (1920) summarizes the evolution of dual drive theory:

> We came to know what the 'sexual instincts' were from their relation to the sexes and to the reproductive function. We retained this name after we had been obliged by the findings of psycho-analysis to connect them less closely with reproduction. With the hypothesis of narcissistic libido and the extension of the concept of libido to the individual cells, the sexual instinct was transformed for us into Eros, which seeks to force together and hold together the portions of living substance. What are commonly called the sexual instincts are looked upon by us as a part of Eros which is directed towards objects. Our speculations have suggested that Eros operates from the beginning of life and appears as a 'life instinct' in opposition to the death instinct which was brought into being by the coming to life of inorganic substance. These speculations seek to solve the riddle of life by supposing that these two instincts were struggling with each other from the very first. [added 1921] It is not so easy, perhaps, to follow the transformations through which the concept of the 'ego-instincts' has passed. To begin with we applied that name to all the instinctual trends (of which we had no closer knowledge) which could be distinguished from the sexual instincts directed towards an object; and we opposed the ego-instincts to the sexual instincts of which the libido is the manifestation. Subsequently we came to closer grips with the analysis of the ego and recognized that a portion of the 'ego-instincts' is also of a libidinal character and has taken the subject's own ego as its object. These narcissistic self-preservative instincts had thenceforward to be counted among the libidinal sexual instincts. The opposition between the

> ego-instincts was transformed into one between the ego instincts and the object-instincts, both of a libidinal nature. But in its place a fresh opposition appeared between the libidinal (ego and object) instincts and others, which must be presumed to be present in the ego and which may perhaps actually be observed in the destructive instincts. Our speculations have transformed this opposition into one between the life instincts (Eros) and the death instincts. (pp. 60-61)

His final thoughts on drives were expressed in his paper "An Outline of Psychoanalysis" which was written in 1938 and published posthumously in 1940. He said in part:

> After long hesitancies and vacillations we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, Eros and the destructive instinct. (The contrast between the instincts of self preservation and the preservation of the species, as well as the contrast between ego-love and object-love fall within Eros.) The aim of the first of these basic instincts is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus - in short, to bind together; the aim of the second is, on the contrary, to undo connections and so to destroy things. In the case of the destructive instinct we may suppose that its final aim is to lead what is living into an inorganic state. For this reason we also call it the death instinct. (p. 148)

Later in this paper Freud indicates that henceforth eros will be referred to as libido. He could not find a word analogous to libido which identified the energy of

the destructive drive, but referred to it, both implicitly and explicitly as the aggressive drive, which is the more accepted term today.

Freud (1937C) drew upon the writings of the Greek philospher Empedocles of Acragas to support his theory of the two basic drives. Empedocles, who was born in 495 BC., theorized that two basic principles governed the life of the universe and the mind. They were known as "love and strife". Love was the force that united the four elements (air, fire, water and earth) and strife served as the power to undo and separate the elements from one another. These forces had ceaseless alternations of dominance in which love would be the prevailing force of the universe for a time defeating the opposition, strife and vice versa.

These two fundamental principles of Empedocles, Freud asserted, were fundamentally the same as the two basic drives only that Empedocles ' theory was anchored in the biophysical and his was grounded in the biological.

Freud also struggled with the location of the source of libido. In his paper on narcissism, Freud (1914) designated the ego as the great reservoir of

libido, but in the "Ego and the Id" he (1923) shifts his position to the id and ascribes to it the source of origination and reservoir of libido. Two years later, as noted in "An Autobiographical Study", Freud (1925) seemingly reversed his thinking back to the ego being the reservoir of libido. He remarked, "All through the subject's life his ego remains the great reservoir of his libido,..." (p. 56). In "Civilization and its Discontents", Freud (1930A) reaffirms his position on the original source of libido but alters his stand on the great reservoir issue. He said "...the ego, indeed, is the libido's original home, and remains to some extent its headquarters" (p. 118).

In one of his final papers Freud (1940) remarked:

> We may picture an initial state as one in which the total available energy of Eros, which henceforward we shall speak of as 'libido', is present in the still undifferentiated ego-id and serves to neutralize the destructive tendencies which are simultaneously present. (pp. 149-150)

This suggest that the probable reason for his vacilation between ego or id being the origin of drives. He seemingly reasoned that the origin of the drives were both within id and ego and thus resolved this issue by postulating an "ego-id" matrix. Yet in

the same paper, a couple of paragraphs later, Freud expresses uncertainty as to the behavior of libido in id and superego.

> It is hard to say anything of the behavior of the libido in the id and in the super-ego. All that we know about it relates to the ego, in which at first the whole available quota of libido is stored up. We call this state absolute, primary narcissism. It lasts till the ego begins to cathect the ideas of objects with libido, to transfer narcissistic libido in object-libido. Throughout the whole of life the ego remains the great reservoir from which libido cathexes are sent out to objects and into which they are also once more withdrawn, just as an amoeba behaves with pseudopodia. It is only when a person is completely in love that the main quota of libido is transferred onto the object and the object to some extent takes the place of the ego. (pp. 150-151)

In this, one of his final works before his death in 1939, Freud reaffirms that the ego is the storehouse of the first "available quota of libido" and that it serves as the "great reservoir of libido" throughout the life of the individual. This leaves the following unanswered question: After id and ego differentiate, what function, if any, does the id play in so far as the drives are concerned? Upon separation, is id devoid of the energy serving the drives or does it remain as the somatic source of energy to be developed and utilized by the ego

or might it be that id, from its internal stimulus (somatic source), generates energy which is stored and available for use by the ego?

Freud (1920G, 1925, 1933A, and 1940) believed that the drives opposed one another and operated on a conservation principle. As mentioned earlier, this principle is one in which matter does not increase or decrease, it only changes in form. Freud further asserted that drives under the phenomenon of the "compulsion to repeat" had a conservative nature. It was Freud's (1933A) contention that since inorganic matter existed before organic matter, that, under the "compulsion to repeat", organic matter (life) would be compelled to seek its original state of inorganic matter (death). Thus he believed that the aim of life was death and he applied the same character to the drives. Therefore, libido (the life drive) would serve to combine and bring about ever greater unities and aggression (the destructive drive) would aim to undo these connections and thereby destroy. Freud (1923A) believed that both drives are in operation and opposing one another from the beginning of life.

Freud realized that this did not explain how humanity was able to survive if the drives were only

oppositional so he theorized that they must come together in some way. Freud (1923B) assumed that the drives became fused, blended and alloyed with one another. When fusion of the drives was achieved, the aggressive drive became neutralized and its destructive impulses were displaced onto the external world, but only in part. The implication is that aggressive drive would be under the dominance of libido and libido would have a taming effect on aggression. Freud (1923B) also postulated that if there is fusion of the drives there must be defusion. He added that when defusion occurs pathology ensues. However, with regard to sadism, which is clearly a pathological condition, Freud appears to view sadism as an example of defusion, but a later time indicates sadism is the result of drive fusion. To illustrate, in the "Ego and the Id" he said, "...sadism which has made itself independent as a perversion would be typical of a defusion,..." (p. 41). Yet in "An Outline of Psychoanalysis" he stated:

> Our justification for including aggressive urges under the libido is based on the view that sadism is an instinctual fusion of purely libidinal and purely destructive urges, a fusion which thenceforward persist uninterruptedly. (p. 154)

Perhaps the answer to the confusion lies in this statement of Freud's (1923B):

> ...we might conjecture that the essence of a regression of libido (e.g. from the genital to the sadistic-anal phase) lies in a defusion of instincts, just as conversely, the advance from the earlier phase to the definitive genital one would be conditioned by an accession of erotic components. (p. 42)

The implication is, or so it seems, that the drives were once fused, but for the reason of regression or accession they have become incongruous with its appropriate stage of development, resulting in defusion. When this occurs the drives are said to be in their "pure form" and aggression is no longer subservient to libido. He (1940A) further contended a surplus of sexual aggressiveness would transform a lover into a sex-murderer, while on the other hand, a diminution of aggression would result in bashfulness or impotency. The strength of aggression and its relationship to libido, accordingly, determine the health or pathology of the subject. Freud (1940A) also indicated that, in general, defense against aggression is unhealthy. He supported this contention with the example of an individual who in a fit of rage turns the aggression against the self by pulling one's own hair or

hitting one's face with one's own fists.

Freud (1923B) also explained ambivalence in terms of the vicissitude of drives. He explained ambivalence as a phenomenon of unfusion as opposed to defusion. Essentially he believed that ambivalence is the result of an incomplete fusion of drives. Interestingly, in his paper on "Female Sexuality", Freud (1931B) also spoke of ambivalence in an "affective" context. He said:

> We cannot go so far to assert that "ambivalence of emotional cathexes" is a universally valid law, and that it is absolutely impossible to feel great love for a person without its being accompanied by a hatred that is perhaps equally great, or vice versa. (p. 235)

In this text he is definitely referring to love as an affect, yet love, as previously noted has been also identified as a drive. Returning to Freud's thought on emotional ambivalence; he stated that in early development, ambivalence is the rule and that if it is retained it is indicative of pathology, for normal adults are able to separate love from hate.

Up to now I have only mentioned that Freud's notion of affect, according to Strachey, corresponded to what

is generally meant by feeling or emotion, but I have not presented Freud's dynamic definition, which is appropriate at this time. Freud (1916X) said:

> An affect includes in the first place particular motor innervations or discharges and secondly certain feelings: the latter are of two kinds--perceptions of the motor actions that have occurred and the direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which,...,give the affect its keynote. (p. 395)

It is apparent that on a conceptual level Freud differentiates affect from drive but yet on a working mode he seemingly uses them interchangeably, as noted from the above example, aggression (drive) is employed synonymously with rage (affect). From his writings in 1894 to final papers written shortly before his death, Freud (1894 & 1895) used the "sexual affect" to refer to "psychical libido" or "libido" (drive) in reference to "love" (affect). On more than one occassion (1921C and 1940A) he refers to "love" as drive. In some of the other writings he (1909D and 1915C) would speak of love and hate as drives or as ambivalent feelings.

Perhaps this blurring of distinction between affect and drive comes from the derivation of libido and the definition of the concept drive. Freud (1921C) declared that the term libido was "taken from the theory of

emotions". He added, "We call by that name the energy,...of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word 'love'" (p. 90). He elaborates on the idea of love (an affect) being inherent in the concept of libido with this definitive statement. "In its orgin, function, and relation to sexual love, the 'Eros' of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force, the libido of psychoanalysis" (p. 91). Thus libido is, in part, described as a "love-force". In his explanation of dynamic process of repression, Freud (1915D) further defines drive as having "a quota of affect". In his words,

> For this other element of the psychical representative the term "quota of affect" has been generally adopted. It corresponds to the instinct in so far as the latter has become detached from the idea and finds expression, proportionate to its quantity, in processes which are sensed as affects. (p. 152)

I understand this to mean that in repression of drive, the "idea" is detached from the "quota of affect" and that the "quota of affect" finds expression as a psychical representative (which he had earlier designated as libido). His addition of the expression being "sensed as affects" can be taken one of two ways.

One, that the affects are experienced (felt) or, two, that they are sensed as affects but in fact are not affects at all. I am inclined to believe it is the former rather than the latter. I support this belief with Freud's (1933A) remarks in his introductory lectures on "Anxiety and Instinctual Life".

> It is the idea which is subjected to repression and which may be distorted to the point of being unrecognizable; but its quota of affect is regularly transformed into anxiety--and this is so whatever the nature of the affect may be, whether it is aggressiveness or love. (p. 83)

It is apparent from this passage that Freud viewed affects as an inherent component of drive which could be transformed into a less specific affect, anxiety. From his earlier to his later writings (1894-1933) he asserted that when libido was blocked (be it of the child or adult) it creates anxiety. He gave some of the following situations which illustrated his position. The child's anxiety might stem from the experience of loss of another, while the adult anxiety might come from the frustration of sexual intercourse. If the loss of a libidinal object is permanent, as in death, mourning occurs. (For a time he believed that it was repression which caused anxiety, but in his introductory lectures

Freud (1933A) reversed his position and posited that anxiety causes repression).

Conversely, Freud indicated that when libido is gratified it stirs pleasure. The early gratification of the infant's libido, according to Freud (1905), becomes "the prototype of every relation of love" (p. 222).

Freud's theory of drives is more highly developed than his theory of affects. In fact, his contributions did not result in a theory of affects primarily because he was more intrigued by drives and their vicissitudes. It might also be said that Freud's contribution raised more questions about affect theory in relation to drive theory than it answered.

Summary

Freud initially developed libido theory and later conceived of a dual theory of drives which eventually became known as libido and aggression. To the interior forces originating in the body which make their demands known upon the mind, Freud ascribed the term drive. He added that drive had a source, pressure, aim and object. Although originally developing the notion of a

single drive theory, he was convinced there existed a dual theory of drive and disputed Jung's general notion of libido theory. Freud's opposition was probably due to his conviction that the "conservation principle" (as indicated previously) is an inherent aspect of a dual drive theory of opposing forces, which was incompatible with Jung's general theory of libido which did not embrace a destructive drive. A discussion of this will follow in the next section. As mentioned earlier, Freud's dual theory of drives ultimately became known as libido and aggression. Libido was described as the drive which served to connect and pull together, bringing about ever greater unities. Aggression was defined as the force that tends to undo these connections and thereby destroy. The drives were viewed as oppositional. necessitating libido's domination to sustain life. On the issue of the reservoir of drives, Freud vascilated between ego and id. What does seem to be clear is that libido and aggression are a part of the undifferentiated id-ego and eventually the ego becomes the great storehouse of the drives.

Although Freud conceptually separated drive from affect, operationally he did not. The relationship between affect and drive is an intermingled one which

blurs their distinction and confuses their relationship.

Contributions - 1929 through 1953

During this period of time, drive and affect theory construction was still struggling with what Freud meant by affect as well as its relationship to the nature and character of drive. Nonetheless, what began to evolve was a broader and deeper understanding of the dual drive theory and a more complex yet discerning relationship between drive and affect.

In an attempt to illustrate this development, I will first focus on the nature and function of drive; second, on the nature and function of affect; third, on the relationship of drive to affect; and fourth, on ego and superego (psychic structures) as it relates to drive and affect, as seen by some psychoanalysts identified in the introduction.

Nature and function of drive. In his paper "The Development and Problems of the Theory of Instincts", Bibring (1941) succinctly outlines Freud's theory of drive into four stages of development. In stage one the

sexual drive was established and there was a developing notion of ego drive. Thus, there were two groupings of drive. Stage two was marked by the complication of the ego becoming libidinalized and making it impossible for Freud to maintain the classification of ego drives and sex drives. Therefore it was necessary to designate the grouping of drives into libidinal and non-libidinal. Thus as Bibring points out, there is a shift in emphasis from the "source" (libido vs ego) to "object" (ego vs object). The third stage is a period in drive development that, according to Bibring, is often overlooked in the psychoanalytic literature. In this stage aggressive functions were designated as the primary constituents of the ego drive. The fourth and final stage is the period in which the ego drive is replaced by the aggressive drive and joins libido as a primary drive. Libido and aggression are clearly part of the mental apparatus and become the psychological drives while the life and death drives are established as the biological drives.

In addition to his contribution of succinctly outlining Freud's four stages of drive development, Bibring (1941) makes two cogent observations. One being that there was a definite shift in emphasis on drive

development from the "source" to "object", but ultimately to "aim", the qualitative direction of the energy libido and aggression. In my opinion this lends greater credence to the drives and their function as being capable of higher levels of development and not just as primitive drives needing to be deflected. Bibring (1941) also points out that the strict contrast between the mental apparatus (regulated by principles) and the drives impinging upon it was not longer possible, since the drives themselves were now ascribed as the fundamental principles of life. In his summary remarks, Bibring synthesizes it in the following statement.

> On the one hand, the biological life instincts which create tension, the sexual instincts, the ego instincts, with their aim of maintaining life, and the pleasure principle - all these are somehow related to one another; on the other hand, the death instincts which seek to cancel out tensions, the instincts of direction at work within, aggressiveness directed outwards, the trend towards a state of rest (the Nirvana principle) and the inclination to suffer - these, also, form a related group. (pp. 129-130)

In his final concluding remarks, Bibring admits that the concepts of what has been formulated are often vague and ambiguous, but defends this limitation with

the statement that in psychology it is not always possible to develop more defined and precise ideas.

Anna Freud (1949) held to the tradition of her father, S. Freud, with regard to the purpose and function of drive theory. In her words, libido served..."the purpose of preservation, propagation, and unification of life" while aggression served "the opposite aim of undoing connections and destroying life" (p. 38). However, with regard to the concept of fusion, Anna Freud (1949) suggests developmental aspect to drive fusion and identifies a child's maltreatment of a cherished object, such as a favored toy or pet animal, during the pregenital stages not as hate but as "aggressive love". As her father before her, she too is referring to love (an affect) as drive. Perhaps it would be more accurately stated had she used the term "aggressive libido", which might be less confusing.

Interestingly enough, Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949), independent of Anna Freud (1949) had similiar thoughts about drive fusion as a line of development. They too believed that fusion, during oral and phallic phases of development, was only partially completed and that further integration of drives continued through latency and prepuberty. Further, that optimal

integration of drives culminated during the genital period, which "leads to a diminished proclivity toward ambivalance" (p.34).

Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein (1949) developed some slightly different thoughts on neutralization and particularly with regard to aggression. As mentioned earlier, Freud (1923B) indicated that libido was capable of being desexualized and therefore neutralized. Denoting further that the neutralization of drive comes about as a result of drive fusion, with aggression being tamed by the domination of libido. Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein add that not only does libido have the capacity for neutralization, but aggression too has such capacity. They further suggest that before fusion can take place partial neutralization of drive energy must develop.

Continuing with the modification of theory construction, Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) suggest that internalized aggression is not necessarily pathological and even offer the idea that it serves the function of ego and superego, which I will return to later. While they concede that there are studies to support the notion that internalized aggression is a contributing factor in psychosomatic illness, they argue

that not all internalized aggression is destructive any more than all internalized libido becomes self-infatuating. They add that internalized aggression does not threaten the integrity of the person, not even if there is a shift, in the balance of the drives, favoring aggression. Clearly Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) lend greater credibility to the agressive drive and elevated it to a level of favorable importance that heretofor only libido enjoyed. This is further evident in their contention that, in addition to libido, neutralized aggression is also necessary for sustaining object relations and without it the converse is true.

Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein (1949) took Freud's (1915) notion of drive impetus (a force which may be discharged) and extended it to the aggressive drive. Thus motor activity becomes a vehicle of expression for libidinal and aggressive tensions. In this regard, they make a rather significant statement regarding the developing character of aggression.

> Musculature and motility, apparatuses for the discharge of aggression, contribute decisively to the differentiation between self and environment and, through action, to the differentiation of the environment itself. (p. 23)

This remark clearly suggests that aggression takes on a different and more growth promoting character then had been indicated previously. Here we see that differentiation is a function of aggression.

Regarding the genetic aspect drive, Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) postulate "an undifferentiated phase of psychic structure", that exists at birth, in which drives are relatively undistinguishable. They continue with the statement that pleasurable and unpleasurable neonatal reactions are observable and become linked with the self and non-self, respectively. Freud's, (1915) remarks of the tendency for unpleasure being associated to outside the self and pleasure connected to the self, were used in support of this position. Developing this idea further Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) add "...it seems likely that the localization of unpleasure outside the body itself invites the cathexes of the source of unpleasure with aggression" (p. 26). They continue, "Such cathexis then chanellize aggression away from the self and protect the self", but added that this exists only during this early phase of drive undifferentiation and unneutralization.

Nature and function of affect. The controversy regarding the nature and function of affects continued and was debated during this early period of theory construction. Neither was there complete agreement on what was meant by affect. Thus, there was no viable theory of affects, only some coalescing thoughts about it. As Fenichel (1941) pointed out, most textbooks did not differentiate between "affect and emotion". However it was his contention that "emotion" was more tied to "feeling sensations" and that "affect" was a discharge phenomena. Yet, some four years before, Brierley (1937) argued against the idea of affect being a discharge phenomena and favored Freud's early notion of affect as a (mounting) tension phenomena which necessitates discharge either outwardly or inwardly. Rapaport (1953) on the other hand felt justified in referring to affect as both "feeling and emotion" since he found no clear separation of these terms in the literature. Moreover, he offered a nine point, somewhat systematized yet incomplete theory of affects, which I will return to later. Glover (1939) preferred to classify affects on the basis of tension and discharge. Affect tension is affect that is mounting to an explosive level, while affect discharge is an overt expression of the affect

either as the result of direct discharge or mounting tension that is released. As clinical examples, Glover (1939) offers the depressive patient as illustrative of affect tension and the hysteric patient as demonstrative of affect discharge. Glover's affect tension and affect discharge are seen closely related to Fenichel's (1941) ideas about emotion and affect, respectively. Glover (1939) also extended Freud's concept of drive fusion to affect and identifies the ambivalence of love and hate as affect fusion. In so doing he more clearly differentiates drive from affect than did Freud. Glover (1939) further distinguished affect fusion from a cluster of feelings such as anxiety, guilt and remorse as an "affect matrix".

In agreement with Freud on the issue of anxiety serving as an "affect signal", Fenichel (1941) offers that "shame", "disgust", and "pain" too serve as signals, which are employed by the ego in defense of drives. He adds that "affect signals" in turn lend themselves to reality testing. In the section to follow, on ego, superego as it relates to drive and affect, more attention will be devoted to the ego's relationship to drive and affect.

It seems timely to conclude this section with Rapaport's (1953) synthesis of the developing theory of affects and his contribution to this process. He had broken down the psychoanalytic theory of affect development up to this point in time into three phases. The first phase on theory of affects he called "drive cathexes" in which drive (libido) and affect were used interchangably. Drive was largely an id phenomena which was repressed and transformed into anxiety. In the second phase of theory construction, affect was construed as "drive representation". In this phase of development affects (as well as ideas) served a "representation of drive cathexes" which sought discharge. As the drive tension mounts affect becomes known as "affect-charge" and when discharged it identifies as "affect-expression". Affect expression then functions as a safety valve and can be channeled to the intended object or the interior of the body. As in the first phase it is an id-theory of affects. Affects in the third phase appear as signals and are employed by the ego in its functioning. Affect charge is no longer a potential for discharge (affect expression) but functions as a signal alerting the ego into action, rather than being passively endured by the ego with

affect-discharge commencing.

In the final conclusion of his paper, Rapaport (1953) offered a nine point outline theory of affects, which he admits is far from complete. He drew upon the phases of affect theory he deliniated earlier in his article. Integrating phases two and three and drawing upon some developments in phase one, Rapaport presents the following developmental scheme:

(1) Affects are declared to have inborn channels and thresholds for discharge which are part of the apparatuses in the undifferentiated matrix. As previously referred to by Hartman, Kris, and Lowenstein (1949), this becomes increasingly important. First as the source of drives, Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein (1949) and now also the place of origin of affect, channels and thresholds of discharge, Rapaport (1953). This designation of inborn channels and thresholds existing in the undifferentiated matrix seems to imply that affects or the capacity for affect development are also inborn and part of the undifferentiated matrix.

(2) Under pressure from the pleasure principle drive cathexes seek immediate discharge. When this is not possible, due to drive object absence, affects arise

and seek discharge. The affects then serve the function of a safety valve. Rapaport points out the drives tensions have thresholds too and that there is no discharge until the limit of the thresholds are reached. The thresholds levels are determined by the nature of the inborn affect-discharge channels.

(3) Affect and idea, specifically "affect-charge" are representations of drive under the influence of the pleasure- principle. Affect-discharges, in essence "affect storms", are expressed or discharged somatically via secretory and motor innervations, in lieu of it being directed as an action toward the drive-object.

Points four through nine relate to developing levels of regulation of both affect and drive via structuralization of ego and superego.

(4) In this phase the function of delay is fostered by delays of drive gratification to reality conditions and defenses employed against drive discharge. As the "function of delay" becomes internalized it delays discharge and creates "affect-charge". This results in modifying "...the thresholds of the existing discharge channels". (p. 194) Rapaport suggests the modification that takes place is synonomous to the process of

neutralization. He indicates that "idea" (one of the drive- representatives) goes through a modification in which primary thoughts develop into secondary ones. In this process an action takes the form of thought (instead of direct discharge) in preparation for action. The delay of discharge creates the affect-charge which is now discharged not through the inborn (primative) discharge channels mentioned earlier, but via modified channels of discharge. Thus affect-charge becomes more tolerable and affect-discharge less automatic and massive. Structuralization matures enough to encouarge the function of delay.

(5) Affects run the gamut of expression from massive attacks to signals. The range of affect experience is largely determined by the level of ego functioning: When the ego is in control, affects are felt as signals, but if the ego is weak or regresses it may passively endure massive affect attacks, which in essence overwhelm the ego.

(6) The signaling function of affects further develops and predominates this phase. Affects serve as motives for defense, which Rapaport credits to Fenichel's (1945) contribution noted in his book, The

Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis.

(7) As development proceeds, id, ego, and superego differentiate and they become an ascending hierarchical order of structure. With each structure there are inborn affect channels of discharge which may become conflictual, counter cathected, or discharged and is exemplary of the dynamic point of view of affect formation. Also from an "economic" point of view affect-formation moves toward increasing neutralization and the "adapative aspect" as well as the "structural" point of view affect development become more complex. The complexity of the "dynamic" "structural", "economical" and "adaptive" aspects of affect-6formation are not spelled out in this particular article, but Rapaport has done so in some of his other writings. Due to the limitations of this dissertation further elaboration of the complexity is not possible.(For a more detailed explanation of the "dynamic", "structural", "economic" and "adaptive" aspects of affect-formation see Rapaport and Gill's (1959) paper, "The Points of View and Assumptions of Metapsychology".)

(8) The motivational systems of affect and drive become integrated with the structures of id, ego, and superego which become the controlling systems of

organization and conflict which in turn create tension and relief seeking discharge.

(9) Affects development achieves a level of adaptiveness in which affect signals serve reality testing.

Rapaport's (1953) summary of his nine point theory is worth noting because of the brievity and clarity of it.

> The theory of affects, the bare outlines of which seem to emerge, integrates three components: inborn affect discharge-channels and discharge-thresholds of drive cathexes; the use of these inborn channels as safety-valves and indicators of drive-tension, the modification of their thresholds by drives and derivative motivations prevented from drive-action, and the formation thereby of the drive-representation termed affect-charge; and the progressive 'taming' and advancing ego control, in the course of psychic structure-formation, of the affects which are thereby turned into affect signal released by ego. (p. 196)

Relationship between drive and affect. Up to now I have attempted to separate drive from affect to give each the focus it deserves, but as the reader can see from the immediate preceeding sections it is difficult if not impossible at times to discuss drive without mentioning its relationship to affect and vice versa.

Therefore, with what is to follow, the reader may find some repetition. Nonetheless, exclusive emphasis will be given to the relation between affect and drive as seen by the thinkers of this period.

Brierley (1937) comments in her paper "Affects In Theory and Practice" (which was originally presented before the 14th International Psychoanalytical Congress on August 6th 1936) that the relationship between drive and affect was neither definitive nor clear. She continued her critical remarks by adding that understanding of the relationship between drive and affect varies according to whether drive impulses are held to be conscious or unconscious. She postulated that answers to understanding affects relationship to drive lie in learning about their "ego-connections", adding that the most fruitful approach would most probably be a developmental one. I will come back to this subject in the next section.

Fenichel (1941), as mentioned previously, focused on affect's relation to drive as a signal function which serves as a defense against drive.

Drive frustration as motivation of affect was suggested by Jones (1929). More specifically, he

postulated that "primary hate" was the result of libidinal drive frustration which manifested in the form of rage. In fact it was his conclusion that fear, guilt and hate are related to the "primal situation" which later becomes connected to the oedipal complex and that these affects are employed as coping mechanisms. He adds that should these affects become libidinalized the following can be expected.

> With fear there is the masochistic aspect of paralytic inhibition and the somatic discharge in the fear reaction itself, with guilt there is moral masochism, and with hate the development of sadism. (p. 398)

Glover (1939) too indicates that drive tends to motivate or stimulate affect. According to Glover, characteristic affective experiences are determined by the nature of drive, libido or aggression. As an example he offers the hysteric's "panic attacks" as illustrative of being created by libidinal drive stress and the depressive's "explosive feelings" as being motivated by aggressive drive tension. Glover's ideas appear to differ somewhat with Jone's in that he connects explosive/hate feelings with the aggressive drive and Jones seems to rely more on Freud's earlier notions of "sexualized hate/sadism", connecting it with the drive libido.

In another paper, Glover (1947) expresses the view that affects are developmental. (In fact it is his position that during the first two years of life all basic mental functioning is embryonic and therefore developmental.) He makes a distinction between primary affect (anxiety) and secondary affect (guilt). He defines "primary" as being rudimentary and "secondary" as a more advanced or refined level of development. Moreover, he seems to relegate "guilt" as an affect signal, which is implicit in this statement: "For although the primary function of guilt is to preserve the ego from endopsychic danger, guilt also serves to preserve some object relations at the cost of sacrificing others."(p.498)

Psychic structures' relationship to drive and affect. Before moving into discussing ego and superego as it relates to either drive or affect it is perhaps noteworthy to mention Brierley's (1937) comment on the id and one aspect of its relationship to the drives. She posits the id as the "unorganized" home of drives. This to me implies, since ego is often associated with organization, that ego is the "organized" reservoir of drives.

Brierley (1937) argued that there is a reciprocal relationship between affect and ego in which affect has an effect upon the progressive organization of ego and ego modifies affects. In an example that followed, Brierley sugggested that the gratification of drive-wishes somehow tames affects which in turn fosters positive ego growth. As previously noted, Fenichel (1941) and Rapaport (1953) indicate that the ego plays an important role in affect development, as it serves the function of signal. Furthermore, after this level of affect formation is achieved, the maintenance of the function is determined by the ego strength. As the ego weakens or regresses so does the signal function. With regard to drive, particularly aggression, Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) posit that ego and superego modify the aims of drives. This leads to further development of neutralization. As the aggressive drive becomes neutralized and internalized, it provides ego and superego with "motor power". This is especially true for the ego's motor function. Contrary to Freud's view (as noted on pp. 27 and 28 of this dissertation), Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) argue that undischarged aggressive energy may become internalized and be employed by both ego and superego. The superego uses the internalized aggression in relation to the ego

and is the source of guilt.

As a final comment of this section, it should be noted that Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) take issue with the view of self preservation as a drive and declare it as a function of the ego.

Theory Construction Highlights - 1929 through 1953

The term "affect-charge" has been referred to by other authors as "feeling sensation", "affect tension", and "emotion", while the construct "affect-discharge" has been used synonymously with "affect expression". Affect-charge and affect-discharge seems predominated and been more widely accepted as concepts denoting affect in either a charged or discharged state.

Life and death drives are clearly delineated as biological drives, while libido and aggression designated the psychological drives. These psychological drives are seen as the fundamental principles of life, which emerge, as do affects, out of an undifferentiated matrix. The idea that neutralization of drive energy is necessary to development of drive fusion is introduced, which in my

view eliminates the necessity of aggression needing to be dominated by libido in order to insure its tameness. In fact, aggression is looked upon as vital a force of human development as libido. Both libido and aggression are identified as having the capacity for motor activity which in their own unique ways contribute to development of object relations. Thus the role of aggression is modified and viewed not just as a destructive force, but as having some capacity to differentiate and enhance object relations. The relationship of drive and affect becomes clearer, as not only do they develop out of an undifferentiated state, but they both have inborn channels and thresholds of discharge that are capable of higher levels of development and each have the capacity for fusion. Furthermore, drive and affect are designated as motivational systems which have, as yet not too well defined, reciprocal relationship with ego and superego.

Contributions - 1954 through 1972

The previous period culminated with Rapaport's (1953) major paper "On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects". Thus in this time frame I'll begin with the

contributions made from 1954 and ending with the writing published through 1972. The reason I chose 1972 as a nodal point has to do with the fact that some of the papers presented at the 27th International Psychoanalytical Congress, Vienna, July 1971, (which focused on the aggressive drive) were not published until 1972. This particular Congress highlighted many of the significant developments of this period, with regard to drive and affect theory construction.

Nature and function of drive. Ideas about drive development coalesced and there were some refinements in the understanding of its process, but it is far from complete. Hartmann (1964) clarifies that the process of deinstinctualization (neutralization) is inherent in the concept of sublimation and reiterates, as he did with Kris and Lowenstein in a previously mentioned paper, that drive neutralization is extended to aggression as well as libido. The idea that aggression has a neutralizing capability of its own would suggest the elimination of libido needing to dominate aggression in the drive fusion state. In short then, as the drives move in the direction of neutralization and fusion develops, domination of aggression by libido is not necessary to the maintenance of drive taming.

Also noteworthy is Hartmann's (1964) distinction between "deinstinctual" and "noninstinctual" energy. The former relates to drive energy that is neutralized or sublimated and the latter meaning ego energy with its point of origin being the ego. He called this ego energy "primary ego energy". Thus the implication is that unneutralized (instinctualized) energy comes from the id and as the energy becomes neutralized it is available to serve some ego functions and other ego functions are supported by the ego's own "primary energy".

Returning to the concept of fusion, Anna Freud (1965) continued to hold onto the idea established by her father of libidinal domination in the drive fusion process as a vehicle of neutralizing aggression. In her words:

> ... the indiscriminate aggression and destructiveness of the infant are bound, tamed, and made controllable not by either environmental or internal management but by the spontaneous process of being fused with and brought into the service of the child's libido. (pp. 175-176)

She extended this idea to adolesence and adulthood, believing that unfusion or defusion was a major cause of delinquency and criminality. Thus according to Anna

Freud's view, drive taming is only possible when there is drive fusion with libidinal domination.

Spitz (1965) agreeing with Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) as well as Jacobson (1964) also believed that drives were undifferentiated at birth but preferred the term non- differentiated. From his studies with infants, Spitz (1965) concluded, among other things, that drive differentiation was related to the dyadic exchange between mother and child. This is also shared by Jacobson (1964). Furthermore, Spitz posited that the drives are differentiated at the end of three months, culminating in the smiling response (the first organizer). However, the process of differentiation is far from complete and peaks at 8 months of age coinciding with the 2nd organizer, 8th month anxiety. According to Spitz the period of the 8th month anxiety is also when drive fusion occurs.

Brenner (1971) raises doubt on the issue of the nature of drives at birth. While he assumes, along with most analysts, that drives become operative after the first few days of life, he contends that there is not enough data to conclude either that drives are separate at birth and fuse during the normal course of development or that they develop out of an

undifferentiated matrix and gradually separate into two distinct drives. He does believe that both drives operate under the pleasure principal, discharge yielding to pleasure and frustration creating displeasure.

Loewald (1971-1972) seemingly disagrees with Brenner for he favors the notion of drives being undifferentiated. In fact Loewald favors Spitz's conclusions and himself believes that drives are unorganized at birth. He contends that the neonate's uncoordinated urges and thrashings are nothing more than somatic representations of stimulation and organic need. These manifestations only later become organized as a result of the dyadic interaction between mother and infant. As psychic representations become organized they serve as motivational forces. In Loewald's (1972) own words:

> In this view instinctual drives in their original form are not forces immanent in an autonomous, separate primitive psyche, but are resultants of tensions within the mother-child psychic matrix and later between the immature infantile psyche and the mother. Instincts...are to be seen as relational phenomena from the beginning and not as autonomous forces seeking discharge, which discharge is understood as some kind of emptying of energy potential, in a closed system or out of it. Instinctual drives, their qualities and intensities, their fusions and defusions and their proportional strength are

> codetermined by the "environmental factors" which enter into their organization as motivational forces. (p. 242)

Thus Loewald's position is at issue with Freud's original idea of drive as an internal stimulus impinging upon the mind, seeking discharge for the sake of relief only. On the contrary, Loewald posits that drive tensions stimulate drive organization which then achieves a level of a motivational system. This view, along with Spitz and others, places considerably more weight on the influence of environmental factors than Anna Freud.

On the subject of drive neutralization, Spitz (1965) also indicates that it is fostered by the "emotion security" provided by the libidinal object in the dyadic relation in which the mother gratifies the infant's need sufficiently enough to allow the ego to employ its developing function of delay to deal with the frustrations of reality.

Borrowing the construct "organizer" from Spitz, Rangell (1972) declares the Oedipus complex to be another major organizer of human development. He adds that not only is the Oedipus complex the nodal point of development for libido but also for aggression and drive fusion. This would seem to be an extention of Spitz's

idea that fusion begins at the second organizer and peaks, as Rangell suggests, at resolution of the Oedipus complex.

As he had in his (1949) co-authored paper with Kris and Lowenstein, Hartmann (1958) once again espoused the idea that differentiation is connected to the aggressive drive. In fact, if I understood him correctly, he put forth the notion that aggression is related to the ego's function of differentiation in a similar way that libido is connected to ego's synthetic functions. Hartmann, however, was not sure of how these drives and ego functions were related and was merely making a proposal for consideration.

Some of Spitz's (1965) thoughts on aggression seemed to move in a similar direction. For one thing, Spitz did not believe that the aggressive drive was necessarily destructive, nor did Brenner (1971), Anna Freud (1972) and others who view aggression as either constructive or destructive. Spitz believed that the aggressive drive served the motor functions of every human activity and of life itself. Regarding the semantic expression of the abstraction "No", Spitz believed that this abstraction involved a two step process. The first step is the employment of aggressive

energy to differentiate certain perceived elements, which in the second step are pulled together by the synthetic function of the ego. This synthetic end product becomes a symbol or a concept and the child's first such concept is "No". Perhaps this is the connection that Hartmann was alluding to in his remarks of aggression serving the ego's function to differentiate and libido rendering fuel to the ego's synthetic capacity. To follow this line of thought further, Jacobson (1971) remarked that drives, even though they might oppose one another...."they normally appear to have complimentary functions in the service of life..." (p. 30). This statement of Jacobson's certainly seems to fit in with Spitz's two step process described above.

The 27th International Psychoanalytic Congress on Aggression in some ways raised more problems then it resolved. What it did accomplish was to lend a greater clarity to the issues and there seemed to be a large measure of aggreement that aggression is not necessarily destructive.

Heimann's and Valenstein's (1972) paper, "The Psychoanalytic concept of Aggression: An Integrated Summary", presented at the Congress mentioned above,

listed a number of problems that contributed to confusion in understanding the nature and function of aggression. They are: (1) that the dictionary definitions of aggression are such that they fail to give a clear consistent definition; (2) in the psychoanalytic literature there is a semantic ambiguity between the conceptual and behavioral aspects of aggression; (3) there is the problem of author ambiguity with regard to what is meant by aggression; (4) the early meaning of aggression changed with the development of the structure ego, from a destructive construct to an adaptive function; (5) early followers of Freud such as Klein took the beginning definition of aggression in the literal sense of destruction and ignored other developments in theory formation; and (6) that libido has had a longer history of development than aggression affording libido greater opportunity for study, which has resulted in a better understanding of the libido over aggression. These are some of the reasons that have interfered with a clearer understanding of the psychoanlytic construct of aggression.

It seems timely at this point to look at Lussier's (1972) reporting of the panel on aggression, which adds to and further clarifies the problems in theory

construction of the psychoanalytic development of the dual drive theory and particularly aggression. He summarized panelist Martin H. Stein's presentation, having to do with Stein's observation that psychoanalysts could be broken into four groupings: (1) Those that follow Freud's original formulation of the death drive, namely Klein and her followers; (2) Analysts, such as Hartmann, Kris, Lowenstein, Brenner and others, view libido and aggression with equal importance in the human development; (3) The group of analysts, Fenichel, Gillespie, Stone, to name a few, who did not accept aggression as a primary drive, but as a form of behavior which is extrinsically motivated; (4) Those who reject the energic model altogether.

Thus it is clear that while there is some agreement on the nature and function of drive, there is also a number of differing opinions. While this is a natural process of theory construction it means that many issues remain in flux.

Nature and function of affect. In this period of theory formation Jacobson (1971) attempts to lay to rest the issue of whether affects are either tension or discharge phenomena. She says, "It would be preferable to distinguish either affects, expressive of discharge

at the stage of mounting and falling tension, or, in the case of conscious affective experiences, simply and descriptively, feelings of emotional tension, excitement and relief" (p. 22). Jacobson's position thusly is in opposition to those theorists who hold to the notion that affect is a "tension phenomenon" and to those who believe affect to be a "discharge phenomenon", as well as those, such as Glover, who identify affects as capable of being charged in its "tension state" and discharged in its "expressive state". The difference is that Jacobson is saying that affects are expressive of discharge whether in the state of tension mounting or diminution. It would suggest that the discharge phenomenon is a continuous process of rising and falling tension.

Jacobson (1971) also classifies affects, simple or complex, according to tensions arising either out of or within a psychic structure (id, ego) or between structures (id and ego or ego and superego), respectively known as intrasystemic and intersystemic tension. In essence Jacobson's position is that affects, although induced by outside stimuli, arise out of tension that exists either within a psychic system or between systems. She recognizes that affects may be an

expression of conflict, but adds that not all tensions are conflicts and that "...affects and feelings as such, are normal psychic manifestations" (p. 13).

Also, Jacobson (1971) makes a very important qualifying statement regarding her position on affect development, she believes affects are induced by energetic tensions within and/or between psychic structures, but holds to the idea that "...all affects are ego experiences and develop in the ego..." (p. 11). This indicates, to my way of thinking, that the ego is the reservoir or site of all induced affects and is thus under ego control. The system ego then takes on an increasingly significant role in human development. I will devote more discussion to the ego's role in affect development in the subsequent section dealing with drive, affect and their relationship to the systems ego and superego.

On the subject of the earliest neonatal affects of negative excitement and its opposite quiescence, Spitz (1965) identifies these as affect precursors. This indicates that true affects do not exist at birth, and that the early manifestations of excitement and quiescence are only formations of what later will be identified as affects.

The concept affect signal takes on a new dimension during this historical period, Jacobson (1971) contends that the pleasurable "affect components" that are stirred up in anticipation of gratification, deserve to be referred to as an affect signal. Previously affect signals were designated as those signals which alerted the ego to mobilize defenses and test reality, which was construed more as a signal for emergency. Thus Jacobson's contribution expands this construct to include affects of a more pleasant nature.

Before moving on to the next section, it is noteworthy to mention another developmental nodal point with regard to affect. As previously indicated, affects in the earliest period of expression are normally discharged through the body. Anna Freud (1971) indicates somatically discharged affects are only considered normal within the first year of life and that beyond this point, with the use of thought, speech and action, new discharge channels develop which shift the expression of affect away from the original somatic channel to the newer channels of expression.

Relationship between drive and affect. For the most part the relationship of drive to affect continues

to be nebulous. Kernberg (1968), in his paper "The Treatment of Patients With Borderline Personality Organization", on more than one occsion refers to affect and drive in such a manner that they appear to be utilized in an interchangeable fashion. Alluding to a case vignette he offers the following, "It gradually became clear that her angry outbursts toward her physician reflected a gratification of her aggressive needs..." (p. 608). In reference to still another patient Kernberg says, "The therapist concluded that the patient's oral aggression was being gratified in a direct way through these angry outbursts..." (p. 608). This blurring of distinction of yet related concepts is fairly typical of the ambiguity that exists in the literature.

Nonetheless, there does seem to be fairly wide agreement among analysts that affect and drive relate to one another in very significant ways. Anna Freud (1965), for example, defines a child's temper tantrum as a combined expression of drive and affect. She offers one of two possibilities: (1) "...the direct motor-affective outlet for chaotic drive derivation..." (p. iii); and (2) as "...an aggressive destructive outburst in which the hostile tendencies are, in part,

deflected from the object world and lived out in a violent manner on the child's own body and his immediate surroundings..." (p. iii). In each of these temper tantrums drive is intimately connected to affect, drive serving the motor function which is accompanied by an impulsive display of affect. Perhaps this is what Anna Freud (1972), in another context had in mind when she referred to drive and "its coordinated affects." This statement clearly identifies drive as a separate construct from affect. Thus far this is the clearest presentation of drive and affect denoted as unique concepts, yet having a close associative relationship.

Although Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein (1949) indicated that affect of unpleasure invites aggresion there has been more emphasis upon drive stimulating affect than affect promoting drive. Anna Freud (1972) passingly alludes to studies of maternal privation and deprivation supporting the assumption that affects of pleasure and unpleasure induce libidinal and aggressive responses respectively. This suggests the possibility of a reciprocal capacity between drive and affect, drive being capable of inducing affect and an affect capable of promoting drive development.

This concludes noteworthy developments of the relationship between drive and affect during this period of theory construction.

Psychic structures' relationship to drive and affect. In one of Brenner's (1971) summary points, in his paper "The Psychoanalytic Concepts of Aggression", he notes that there is a very close and complex relationship between ego and drive. On this point many analysts of this period are in agreement. Jacobson (1965), for example, offers the following perspective as a way of understanding the energic and structural development of the process of differentiation. She outlines five infantile developmental stages.

1. In an embryonal stage diffuse discharge of undifferentiated drive energy via the psychophysiology of the unstructured self. The discharge process is primarily a silent physiological process.

2. In stage two there is a postnatal formation of perception and memory systems of the motor and pregenital apparatuses, along with a beginning distinction of pleasurable and unpleasurable sensations, which connect to outside perceptions. Also during this stage, libido and aggression start to differentiate.

Reactive discharge to stimuli are biologically determined and directed to the outside. Affect expression is channelled through the soma otherwise known as affective organ language.

3a. Commencement of id-ego differentiation and ego formation. Pleasure principle, primary process, and affective organ language prevail. Formation of part images, both with regard to self and object become associated with pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences forming many traces which further become cathected with libido and aggression. Corresponding affects develop, which have a tendency to seek immediate discharge, but begin to develop as signals.

3b. Expansion of self and object awareness, including further development of perception and memory which foster language, motility and reality testing are characteristic of this stage. Object constancy is another feature of this stage, along with defined affect qualities of sustaining affective states.

4. Infantile sexuality is said to climax in this stage of development, accompanied by drive neutraliztion and fusion, along with affect taming and fusion. Accordingly, drive and affect become more controllable.

Affects connect to ego functions and the self experiences a greater awareness of its thought and affect processes, affirming its boundaries. The reality principal predominates.

5. Superego development further fuels neutraliztion of libido and aggression. The latency period commences. Ego control of drive heightens. Self representations are largely influenced by the superego. Fear of superego becomes the prevailing affect signal. Ego and superego reign in the organization of drives, affects and feeling states.

In considering drive and affect development and how they are related to one another, Jacobson (1965) not only places great emphasis on ego and superego formation; but also upon the representations of self and object. In her view for example, the superego employs libido, aggression and neutralized energies, which are available to it from the ego, to cathect the self and object representations. Thus the affect of guilt is the result of the superego's employment of the aggressive drive energy which cathects the self representation. This represents a significant shift in theory.

Formerly, it was widely accepted that guilt resulted from the superego cathecting the ego or self (as opposed to self-representations) with aggression. It would follow then that self-esteem is fueled by the superego's libidinal cathexis of the self-representation.

As human development proceeds, the ego's role becomes increasingly important and strives for its own autonomy. Hartmann (1964) believed that autonomy of the ego, particularly secondary autonomy was largely dependent on drive neutralization. He posited that as the ego accumulates neutralized drive energy of its own it may employ it to gratify id's wishes, oppose them or seek aims of its own thereby promoting secondary autonomy. Anna Freud (1972) added that with further development in the ego and the secondary process functioning as well as verbal skills, the channels for agressive discharge become modified and verbalization takes the place of physical action. On the issue of modified channels of discharge, Jacobson (1971) seemingly agreed and stated that with the ego's progressive development, execution of its autonomous functions and sublimation, there is partial diminution of signal anxiety and the increasing development of a

number of pleasurable discharge channels for functional motor and affect expression. In short, she credits the ego, in large part, with the taming of both drive and affect and the development of new modified discharge channels of expression.

Theory Construction Highlights 1954 through 1972

The controversy over whether affects are in a "charged" or "discharged" state was called into question again and an alternative hypothesis was offered. This alternative hypothesis was that affects are expressive of discharge whether in the state of mounting or diminishing tension. Another new development was the offering of "anticipation" as another affect signal.

Concepts of taming and fusion came into greater usage and were applied to both drive and affect. In regard to fusion of drives, libidinal dominance did not receive the attention as it had in the past, suggesting perhaps a belief that it wasn't necessary for drive development (movement from a primative to a higher more sophisticated state of development). Aggression got significantly more focus and it became more widely accepted as not necessarily destructive. Also there was

increasing support for the idea that aggression has the capacity to serve the function of differentiation.

The notion of undifferentiated and unorganized apparatuses was expanded to include not only drives and the psychic systems of id-ego, but also affects and representations of self and object. This seems to suggest that the capacity for the development of these mental apparatuses exist at birth in a germinal state of undifferentiation and not yet organized. A number of analysts were of the opinion that the differentiation and organization of these apparatuses were stimulated from birth on, by the mother's ministrations to the child and the child's responses to the mother. Object relations came into prominence as a significant organizer of human development.

Lastly, the reciprocal influence among the triparite systems, drives and affects received considerably more attention and recognition in an effort to better understand the process of human development. There was also a focus on the developing self and object images and its relationship to the other psychic apparatuses.

Contributions 1973 to 1984

The controversy of an acceptable psychoanalytic affect theory continues to be very much an issue even up to the present day. Blanck & Blanck (1979) are of the opinion that a better understanding of drive theory will enhance the development of an adequate theory of affects. I would add that analyzing the relationship between affect and drive is still another avenue toward the development of an agreeable theory of both affect and drive. As in the previous sections of this dissertation, I shall now proceed to present the theoretical contributions as they relate to the nature and function of drive.

Nature and function of drive. Agreeing with Hartmann, Jacobson, and Spitz, Blanck and Blanck (1977) also assert that drives develop out of the undifferentiated matrix. This position is in opposition to Loewald (1972) who espoused the idea that drives develop out of the dyadic relationship between mother and infant. In his own words,

> Anything we can call instinctual drives, as psychic forces, arise and are being organized first: within the matrix of the mother-child unitary psychic field from which, through manifold interactional pro-

> cesses within that field, the infantile psyche gradually segregates out as a relatively more autonomous center of psychic activity. In this view instinctual drives in their original form are not forces immanent in an autonomous, separate primitive psyche, but are resultants of tensions within the mother-child psychic matrix and later between the immature infantile psyche and the mother. Instincts, in other words, are to be seen as relational phenomena from the beginning and not as autochthonous forces seeking discharge. p.242

Loewald restated this position in his 1978 paper, "Instinct Theory, Object Relations and Psychic-Structure Formation". It is perhaps a subtle point of distinction but an important one for the implication of Loewald's position is that (1) he does not accept the notion of the undifferentiated matrix and (2) that without the outside stimulation of the mothering object, drives would not develop. To continue along this line of thought Blanck and Blanck (1974, 1977, & 1979) recognize the significance of the infant-mother relationship. In fact they (1977 & 1979) assert that it is the mother's ministrations to the infant that "order" drives, which in turn motivate the drives to seek its aims through developing pathways of expression. They also credit object relation with fostering ego development.

Giovacchini, (1982) in his guidebook to understanding Freud, reviews several of Freud's major

writings which deal with drive and affect. There are some issues which Giovacchini addresses which are germane to this study. For example, he takes issue with the principle of constancy, also known as conservatism, as stated by Freud, in which drive excitation causes tension. This tension then seeks a state of reduction. Thus the constancy principle proports to eliminate or minimize the state of tension and avoids stimulation. Giovacchini contends, in light of current knowledge on the subject of neurophysiology, that the notion of the organism being stimulus avoiding is no longer acceptable for, "Sensory deprivation is an unpleasant state in which interval percepts become disruptive" (p. 102). Continuing, he asserts, "that we might restate the principle of constancy by asserting the organism seeks a state of equilibrium..." (p. 102). (This view of equilibrium appears somewhat similar to Jung's idea of equivalency noted in an earlier section of the literature review.) A further conclusion by Giovacchini was "...Freud did not believe there is an instinct for higher development. Primitive life strives to remain primitive." (p. 164). The implication clearly is that Giovacchini does not hold to the same view as Freud, but believes in the concept of drives serving life. In fact, several pages later, Giovacchini makes his

position very clear on this issue. He says that if Freud's view of constancy is taken to its ultimate conclusion, libido (the life drive) would seek death and this Giovacchini finds contradictory. He continues that libido seeks to bring man and woman together, re-establishing an earlier state. (The earlier state he is referring to is Freud's mention of Plato's notion that primeval human being of eight limbs and two opposite sex organs, who were divided to become man and woman.) While this re-establishes an earlier state, Giovacchini continues, it also joins and in so doing "...is an attribute to life, not death which separates" (p. 169).

Implicit in this line of thinking is the notion of separation and unity or that life is a process of connecting, disconnecting and reconnecting. Several years earlier Blanck and Blanck (1977 & 1979) accepting Freud's final explanation of libido serving to unite and aggression seeking to disconnect; added that disconnecting does not necessarily bring about destruction. Drawing upon Jacobson's contribution of "selective identification", Spitz's "three organizers" and Mahler's "separation-individuation process", they propose that these developmental processes are

indicative of how libido and aggression operate in "concert", fostering higher levels of growth within the various lines of development. With regard to the studies on separation-individuation (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman 1975), Blanck and Blanck posit that during early life libido is dominant (actively prevailing), seeking connection as a means of survival. Thus according to this view, libido is dominant until such time as there is further drive differentiation and further growth of the physical apparatuses. Dominance of either libido or aggression tends to be temporary, serving either the need for connection or disconnection. During the symbiotic phase libido would tend to be dominant, suggesting that during differentiation subphase of separation-individuation aggression would be more dominant. It would further seem that while one drive may be more dominant than another, both drives are active to some extent during each phase of development. As a child moves along the ladder of development, there is a continuous process of unconnecting (aggressive drive action) at one level and (libidinal drive action) reconnecting at the next highest level of growth. In this model the "need gratifying object" (mother) meets the needs of both drives at the various stages of development, enhancing both processes of

structuralization and internalization.

As I have indicated elsewhere (Mone, 1983), this expansive idea of drive function provides an alternative way of viewing Freud's psychosexual stages of development. In the words of Blanck and Blanck (1979):

> It would be far more accurate to refer not to infantile sexuality, nor even to maturation as proceeding through psychosexual phases, but rather to infantile need organized around the particular erotogenic zone when many needs, such as need for object connection and for separation, exist simultaneously. (p. 34)

In his paper on the reconsideration of the aggressive drive, Parens (1973) agrees with Spitz and others in ascribing an inherent non-destructive trend of the aggressive drive. He proposes that the aggressive drive has two currents; destructive and non-destructive in nature. To support his hypothesis of the non-destructive current he offered the observation of baby Jane, age 15 weeks, attempting to put the nipple of her bottle in her mouth as an illustration of the non-destructive aggressive current. However, he rejects the idea put forth by Storr (1968) in this example as demonstrating separation because in Parens own words, "...the aggressive drive also serves to bring the object close, hence, to reunion with the object" (pp. 56 - 57).

Blanck and Blanck (1977) take issue with Paren's interpretation of baby Jane's action and they agree with Storr's that it represents separation and independence. Blanck and Blanck add that it is another exemplification of libido and aggression operating in concert. The baby's introjection of the mother's function of putting the bottle in her mouth is fueled by libido (connecting) which is one step in the two part process of separation-individuation. Stated another way, internalizing the "function" (a libidinal process) allows the infant to move in the direction of separation (an aggressive process). The basic area of disagreement here seems to be in how it is viewed. Blanck and Blanck are obviously looking at it as an intrapsychic process while Parens scans it as an interactional process between the infant and the world.

As a final noteworthy development of this period regarding the nature and function of drive, Giovacchini (1982) disputes the notion of drive fusion creating a higher level integration. He insists that the primary process of two drives coming together cannot develop into a secondary process structure. The notion that the drives become tame via neutralization is a formulation that is incomplete and therefore open to scrutiny.

Giovacchini believes that psychic development is too complex to be understood in terms of two drives interacting with one another and that other structures such as internalization, object relations, soothing mechanisms and ego systems are necessary to comprehend personality development.

Nature and function of affect. Just six years ago, Sandler and Sandler (1978) described the theory of affects as "at best, in a state of healthy and constructive chaos" (p.285). While there have been some illuminating contributions during this period of theory construction, a theory of affects is far from complete and there are still many unresolved issues. I shall now present some of the controversial issues as well as some areas of agreement. In regard to the latter, Blanck and Blanck (1979) take a position on the origin of affects which is congruent with Rapaport's (1953) idea that affects emerge out of the undifferentiated matrix and that affects are therefore undifferentiated themselves. They identify neonatal affects, referred to by Spitz (1965) as "affect precursors," and as non-differentiated alternating states of "dosing" and "organismic distress," depending upon whether the infant is gratified or ungratified. The notion of "organismic

distress" seems to be what Rapaport (1953) called "affect storms." According to the Blancks' formulation, in the next phase of affect development, as gratification relieves the infant's organismic distress shadings of pleasure begins to develop and separate from feelings of displeasure. I would offer that the differentiating shading of pleasure and unpleasure are fueled by the energic force of the aggressive drive in a similar way that I illustrated previously (Mone, 1983). In the third phase of affect formation, affects of pleasure and displeasure are said to eventually develop into a broad spectrum of affects, ranging from love to hate, with various affective shading in between.

According to Ross (1975) psychoanalysis began as an affect theory, but he adds it shifted to drives. Furthermore, he contends that drive tension and discharge have been indissolubly connected to affects pleasure and unpleasure. He added that during this early period of affect theory, affects and ideas were inextricably bound together. From this he develops a thesis that these early neonatal affects function as cognition in enabling the infant to identify his mother from strangers. He uses the term "affect as cognition" to label this process. Ross hypothesizes that affect

and cognition exist at birth and are in a state of undifferentiation, which functions as a unit. Eventually, via the relationship between mother and infant, the unit divides and affect and cognition become separate, but only to become fused in later development. Ross says, "With regard to their relationship (affect and cognition) there must be optimal separation together with optimal fusion" (p.92). In short, the infant gradually comes to recognize mother through this affective experience. With regard to the relationship between affect and cognition; Kernberg (1976) seems to share a somewhat similar view, with some differing aspects. Kernberg believes that primitive affects (pleasure and unpleasure) are continuously integrated with what he refers to as primitive cognitive structures which form the primary intrapsychic units (the earliest self-object affective development). This integrative process experience is stored as an "affective memory." However, Kernberg does not seem to subscribe to the idea that affect and cognition are originally one and develop out of the undifferentiated matrix. Nor does he use the term "fusion," but instead prefers the word "integration." I am not sure why he makes this distinction or even if he deliberately chose not to use the term fusion. I do know that he did not

refer to Ross (1975) paper in addressing the subject of affect and cognition. Kernberg conceives of the construct "affect disposition" which he contends are:

> "...the primary motivational systems which integrate the perception of (1) central (pleasurable or unpleasurable) states (2) physiological discharge phenomena (3) inborn perceptive and behavior patterns, and (4) environmental responses as they impinge on specialized and general extroceptive and introceptive perceptions. (p. 87)

In short, Kernberg is proposing that affects are major organizers of human development. Lastly, he conceives of affect dispositions as inborn and as being located in the ego-id matrix. This view of affect as the earliest primary motivational systems which organizes intrapsychic self and object representations and thus object relations, was once again restated in his 1982 paper, "Self, Ego, Affects and Drives." Sandler and Sandler (1978) also place a great emphasis on the role of affects. They aver that it is central to object relations and refer to affects as "psychic regulators." A shift in emphasis is offered by Blanck and Blanck (1979) who posit that object relations order affects, instead of affects organizing object relations.

The affect of love was another area during this period which received some noteworthy attention. Love

referred to by Blanck and Blanck (1979) as one of the "graded affects", as distinguished from the primary affects of pleasure and unpleasure, is believed to be commensurate with the development of normal narcissism and object constancy. Normal narcissism, as I have indicated elsewhere (Mone, 1983), is not only the capacity to love oneself (the subject) but also the object. Implicit in the concept of object constancy is the ability to value the object independent of the state of need as opposed to valuing the object only when it gratifies. Thus a "love object" in the true sense of the word does not exist before the development of self and object constancy, which is normal narcissism (Blanck and Blanck 1979).

While Kernberg (1977) does not refer to object constancy by name I believe he infers it when he says that the capacity for love requires having accomplished the integration of self and object representations, fosters identity formation and the capacity of intimate object relations. He adds another component of love is the successful resolution of Oedipal complex, allowing full genital enjoyment. This definition of love is later qualified as "sexual love", which probably is the reason he includes the capacity for genital enjoyment.

However, this definition does not offer an explanation for love that exists between two people which does not include genital sexuality, such as the love between a mother and her child, two friends and so on. Kernberg (1977) also says that there is no such thing as post-ambivalence, but indicates that there is instead a combined feeling of love and hate, with love predominating. This implies to me the concept fusion, as was originally stated by Freud in reference to drive fusion whereupon libido tames aggression through its domination, is being extended and applied in the same way to affect of love and hate in that hate is tamed by loves' predominance.

In his attempt to shed some light on the subject of love, Altman (1977) identifies drives, ego, superego and the object as basic to the vicissitudes of love, but then seems to nullify his paper with this final remark:

> In any event the vicissitudes of love are so interrelated with every aspect of human development, its ambiguities so numerous and pervassive, that we may still be obliged to ask,...What is this thing called love? (pp. 50-51)

This concludes this section on the nature and function of affect.

Relationship between drive and affect. The literature reviewed for this time period reflects a continuous struggle in trying to understand the nature of the relationship between affect and drive. Some of the efforts to distinguish affect from drive and to identify how one relates to the other have just added to the controversy of what is affect, what is drive and how do they operate in the ongoing process of human development. Kernberg (1977) in his paper on love relations indicates that "mature love relations encourage...the neutraliztion of aggression in the relationship" (p. 113). This implies that aggression is hostility, rage, hate, or some other negative destructive affect. This exemplifies the confusion of terms which are so common in the literature even in current times. On the other hand, Blanck and Blanck (1977 & 1979) and G. Blanck (1984) have consistently distinguished and attempted to maintain clarity between drive and affect. They asssert that libidinal drive and libidinal affect are not one and the same, anymore than aggressive drive and aggressive affect are synonymous with one another. Perhaps this is a clue as to why there has been and still is so much confusion in the literature. Meaning that theorists have referred to libido or aggression without specifically identifying

whether or not they mean affect or drive. In other words, authors who have used the noun form of aggression without qualifying it as affect or drive have added to the problem at hand. Using aggression and libido in an adjective form as in aggressive drive or aggressive affect would help to sustain some clarity.

Added to the problem in differentiating affect from drive, for example as in aggression from rage, is viewing both the drive and the affect as destructive. Blanck and Blanck (1977 & 1979) in their proposal of considering aggression as a drive whose goal is to undo connections and not to destroy, helps to identify the source of destruction. They espouse that it is the affect of hostility not the aggressive drive that causes destruction. Furthermore, they agree with the position that as ego and id, aggression and libido are undifferentiated at birth so are affects and drives. Adding that early affective reactions such as identified by Mahler as "affectomotor storm-rage reactions" are indicative of undifferentiated drive-affect expressions. This is a very interesting observation and if true may, in part, also account for the problem of drive-affect ambiguity. Following this idea that drives and affects are undifferentiated at birth, Blanck and

Blanck also take the position that graded affects of love, hate, envy, etc. before differentiation do not exist. They also make clear that while they make a sharp distinciton between drive and affect, it does not alter the fact that affects pursue drive aims. The Blancks offer the examples of love (affect) seeking union (drive) and rage (affect) pursuing separation (drive). They also add, "Hostility with rage may reflect the failure of orderly growth processes toward individuation" (p. 34). Thus it becomes clear that it is important to distinguish drive from affect to determine the nature of the motivation behind a particular behavior. To further support this I offer the following (G. Blanck, 1984):

> With regard to all developmental thrusts, including the oedipal one, we have to distinguish between those that represent object directed hostility and those that emanate from the growth-promoting aspect of the aggressive drive. The oedipal child who wishes to supplant the parent of the same sex is expressing wishes of the same nature and quality as the younger child at an earlier developmental level who wishes to take over a parental function. A developmental thrust is taking place that can be mistakenly interpreted as destructively objective directed. (pp. 336-337)

Continuing along this line of thinking, Blanck and Blanck (1977-1979) indicate that when phase-specific

development is burdened with excessive or overly sparse gratification of drive need there is an increased tendency toward direct affective discharge (impulsivity) which can impede, if not cause malformation to the early developmental process. For example, excessive gratification of libidinal drive need impedes the separation-individuation, while deprivation of libidinal drive need (without sufficient cathexsis of object representation) prematurely thrusts the child into separation, causing damage to phase-specific development. I would add that in either case it would simultaneously retard drive-affect differentiation.

Altman (1977) in agreement with Blanck and Blanck (1977 - 1979) on the issue of distinguishing drive from affect, says that if love (affect) and libido (drive) were one and the same, love would be nothing more than an expression of sexual drive. Nonetheless, he believes that love "...is definitely more than libido" (p. 39).

Returning to Blanck and Blanck's (1979) position that drive and affect are at first undifferentiated and later differentiate pursuing their own line of development, they further suggest that this model of drive and affect eliminates the need for such theoretical constructs as fusion, neutralization and

sublimation. The concept of fusion was presented as a way in which drives become tame (neutralized) so that they could become available to the ego and directed toward socially accepted aims (sublimation). Since this view takes a position of affects and drives having the capacity for "ascending development" and not as "primitive forces" to be tamed, constrained and deflected for the "social good", the question that naturally follows is: are the concepts of fusion, neutralization and sublimation still useful to current theory in light of the hypothesis put forth by the Blancks?

This model of drives and affects being undifferentiated at birth, later to separate and differentiate, pursuing independent lines, of development, according to Blanck and Blanck (1979) does not alter the position that affects accompany drives, but it also allows for positive affects to pursue aggressive drive aims. They indicate that aggressive drive thrusts may be accompanied with love or hostility. This notion offers an opportuinty for a broader understanding of the relationship between drive and affect, as well as expanding its complexity.

As mentioned in the previous section on the nature and function of affect, Kernberg holds to the idea that affect dispositions are inborn. He (1976 & 1982) argues that primitive affect dispositions of pleasure and unpleasure, which are imbedded in the intrapsychic self-object units, are the building blocks or overall organizers of drives. He also sees affects developing to a level of signal, which serve to activate drives. Kernberg continues on to say:

> ...I hasten to add that drives are manifest not simply by affects, but by the activation of a specific object relation, which includes an affect and wherein the drive is represented by a specific desire or wish. (p. 909)

This statement suggests that Kernberg may be giving equal weight to object relations ordering drives as he is affect, yet he (1976 & 1982) continually espouses "affect" as having the major influence in drive organization. Blanck and Blanck (1979) take what seems to be a slightly different position. It is their contention that object relations order drives and that drive tensions and gratifications activate affective reactions. They add that since object relations are basically a function of the ego, it is the "ego" which ultimately organizes drives. This appropriately leads

to the final section of this literature review.

Psychic structures' relationship to drive and affect. The interaction of drive and affect with the psychic structures, although not clearly understood as yet, adds to the complexity of understanding personality development, but also expands the opportunity for further comprehension of drive relationship to affect. Parens (1973) in reconsideration of the aggressive drive contributed his thinking on the matter at hand. He makes the point that even though drives and the psychic structures id and ego are in an undifferentiated state, the state of undifferentiation is not "absolute", but an "insufficient" state of differentiation and that early infant behavior is purposeful and motivated. In essence he states that purposeful behavior of the infant (directed action) is due in part to the drive energy utilized by the ego. He connects this idea to unpleasure to the extent that unpleasure activates a purposeful destructive rage reaction motivated by the aggressive drive. He proposes there must be a primary destructive drive which is activated by unpleasure to cause this purposeful destructive rage reaction. In his final analysis he formulated an aggressive drive with currents of destruction and non-destruction. He also

believes that this non-destructive current "...inherently serves the ego, fuels ego function even in pre-ego times, and represents in part the innate reservoir of ego energies" (p. 55). In a footnote to this proposal, Parens suggests that libidinal energy also fuels ego functions of the pre-ego, establishing the notion that libido and aggression "...form the innate reservoir of ego energies" (p. 55).

Loewald (1978) takes issue with Hartman on the matter of ego apparatuses having primary autonomy. While he seemingly accepts the notion of an undifferentiated phase of development in which id-ego and libido-aggression differentiate, he contends that it is the differentiating energies of libido and aggression which fuel the ego functions of perception and memory. This position of Loewald is seemingly in agreement with Parens in that the drives serve ego functions very early in life. Loewald also says that libido and aggression "...bifurcate into what we can eventually distinguish as instinctual-affective life and cognitive functions" (p. 496). His use of the phrase "instinctual-affective life" implies that he conceives drive-affect as a unitary concept. It is not clear if he is saying that drive-affect are undifferentiated and that they too

bifurcate (as the Blancks have proposed) or if he holds to a notion of drive-affect as an inseparable unit of one.

As I have indicated earlier, Blanck and Blanck conceive of drive and affect in a state of undifferentiation, which eventually differentiate and pursue their respective lines of development. This process is dependent upon the level of ego organization (Blanck & Blanck, 1977-1979) which they contend is in agreement with Fenichel's (1941) position. Additionally, excessive drive and affect tensions, before adequate ego organization, often result in impulse discharge of a destructive quality. Nonetheless, it is posited that affect and drive begin to differentiate at around the time that the neonate cracks its autistic shell (at about one month of age) and ascends into the symbiotic phase of development. It is conjectured that the process of drive differentiation and affect differentiation also commence at this time. Spitz's first organizer (the smiling response) signals the establishment of one level of affect differentiation. They add that it is not until Spitz's second organizer (8th month anxiety) that there is clear evidence of drives being separate from affects.

Implicit in this view is the notion that while drive and affect are in a relative state of undifferentiation, drives and affects are themselves differentiating and seeking their respective lines of development.

It is perhaps noteworthy at this time to mention, as I have previously illustrated (Mone, 1983), how the Blancks' view of drive, affect, and the organizing process of the ego are intertwined in the development of normal narcissism. They have proposed a tri-level development of normal narcissism which closely relates to Mahler, Pine and Bergman's (1975) symbiosis and separation-individuation phases of development. Grade one level of narcissism coincides with the symbiotic phase in which the self-object representaton is cathected by libido with positive affective value. In the next grade, the all good self and the all good object representation are cathected with libido which is accompanied by positive affect while the corresponding all bad self and object representations are cathected with aggression and negative affect. The differentiating aspect of aggression in grade level two maintains the separateness that exists between all good self and object representation from the all bad self and object representation. Grade two commences with the

subphase of differentiation and terminates with practicing. In grade three, which begins with rapproachment and ends at the completion of separation-individuation, all good and all bad fuse into relatively stable self and object representations of positive affect. Representations of good and bad are united by libido while the separateness of the self and object representations are maintained by the aggressive drive. This illustration also serves to demonstrate how drive and affect relate to one another under the orchestration of ego organization.

I shall conclude this section of the literature review with some of Kernberg's ideas of how drive, affect, psychic structure and the internalized object relations connect to one another. Kernberg (1977) cogently synthesizes his thinking on this subject in the following statement.

> Intrapsychic life starts out as a primary psychophysiological self with which ego and id are not yet differentiated, and with which aggressive and libidinal drives are undifferentiated as well. The first intrapsychic structure is a fused self-object representation which evolves gradually under the impact of the relationship between mother and infant. The first few weeks of life, before such primary self-object representation is consolidated, constitutes the earliest, presymbiotic or, to use Mahler's term,

> autistic phase of development. Pleasurable affects are the first emerging manifestations of the differentiating libidinal drive and their investment in fused self-object representation represents the first intrapsychic libidinal investment. In so far as that fused structure represents the origin of both self and object representations, libidinal investment in the self and in objects are orginally one process. (pp. 804-805)

As the reader can see this appears remarkably close to the Blancks' view. However, Kernberg does not seem to hold to the view that affects and drives pursue their own line of development. Furthermore, he holds to the idea that affects organize drives and that affects grow into drives, making them inseparable. Not only does he hold to the idea that affect laiden units of internalized object relations organize drive but "...the overall psychic structures of ego, superego, and id..." (p. 85, Kernberg 1975). Thus it becomes clear from this that there are some major differences between Kenrberg and the Blancks.

Theory Construction Highlights 1973 to 1984

This era of theory formulation concludes with a fairly wide acceptance of drive and affect serving as major motivational systems. Both drives are embraced as

serving the forces of human growth and development. This includes acceptance of the aggressive drive not necessarily destructive with some varied qualifications.

With the increased refinement of drive theory and the general broadening of knowledge, the concepts of fusion, neutralization and sublimation may have outlived their usefulness.

The notion of an undifferentiated phase of development has received a broader recognition and has been expanded to include, among other things, undifferentiated conceptions of affect-cognition and drive-affect. Although the assumption of an inborn undifferentiated matrix holds it's position, a few authors are either uncertain about it or disregard it altogether, but in either case accept the notion of an undifferentiated phase of development after birth.

The literature still reflects existing ambiguity between affect and drive, yet there is an acknowlegment of the importance of identifying one from the other. Furthermore, there is controversy over the force which stimulates and organizes the various development processes. Some questions that still remain unanswered

are: (1) Which theoretical construct is responsible for the overall organization of psychic development, drive or affect and (2) What is the actual relationship between drive and affect; are they unitary, integrated, separate, reciprocal or connected in still another way?

CHAPTER III

Method

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the design of this study, the subjects under investigation, and the procedure employed in this research. Also included below is a discussion of how the data was analyzed and the limitations of the findings.

Design

At this time there are no known studies testing the Blancks' position on drive and affect development, other than Mahler's and Spitz's empirical research on children. However these studies were not designed to test the Blanck's ideas on drive and affect, they were only used in support of it ex post facto. Thus, as Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch and Cook (1960) point out, when there is little knowledge about a particular subject, exploratory research is most appropriate. Thus, an exploratory survey was conducted with the purpose of clarifying the meaning of the concepts drive and affect

from a theoretical and clinical perspective in light of the Blancks' views on this subject. Furthermore, it is the intention of this study to stimulate hunches which might suggest hypotheses for future research.

Exploratory studies most often use qualitative research methods which emphasize content analysis of patterns and themes and how they might fit together in some larger configuration. The methodology applied in this exploratory study is that of a survey, utilizing a semi-structured questionaire as the principal instrument for data collection.

Subjects

There were a total of seven subjects surveyed in this study. Each subject met the criteria listed below:

1. Alumni status from the California Institute For Clinical Social Work or having completed at least one year of training from a psychoanalytic training institute.

2. Familiarity with the Blancks ideas on drive and affect.

3. Their professional degree being a minimum of a master's degree in social work or a doctorate in either psychology or social work.

4. Current employment in the practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy.

The rationale behind this criteria is that the subjects meeting these criteria will be sufficiently conversant with psychoanalytic theory and practice to be able to respond knowledgeably to the ideas and concepts under study. Further, it is assumed, due to the minimum level of training, these willing subjects are far enough along in their own professional development to be able to formulate their own ideas and rationale on the subject matter under investigation.

Sampling

As Riley (1963) indicates, "...when the researcher moves from the conceptual level to the level of operations, his first step is to find an empirical universe (or population) of cases that corresponds as closely as possible to his conceptual universe" (p. 285). Riley also states that from a complete list of cases a sampling frame is developed. Thus, in this study the list of potential subjects were non-medical psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists who are members of the following organizations: the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, the Southern California Psychoanalytic Society, the San Diego

Psychoanalytic Society, the California Institute For Clinical Social Work Alumni, and the Los Angeles Institute For Psychoanalytic Studies. The reason for the exclusion of medical psychoanalytic psychotherapists was based upon the assumption that Gertrue and Rubin Blanck, who are themselves non-medical analysts, would be more widely read by social workers and psychologists than by the medical therapists. Moreover, it is also for this reason that the subjects will be limited to the disciplines of social work and psychology.

A sampling frame was developed from these memberships. Thus the sampling frame consisted of members who met the criteria described above. The entire frame of potential subjects numbered one hundred and thirteen. Each person in the frame was approached by mail (see procedure below) and asked to participate in the study. Since the number of voluntary subjects was not large enough for a random sampling an accidental sampling was implemented.

Time of Selection

The mailing to potential subjects was done in the early part of the summer in 1985. In fact, all of the

letters to the sample were at the post office on or before July 1st 1985. There were some advantages and disadvantages to this time frame. The disadvantage was that some members of the sampling frame were away on vacation and could not respond to the research inquiry. However, the advantage was that for those who were at home, they had more time available (because some of their usual responsibilities of studying or teaching were over for the summer) and therefore had the time to participate in the survey. Thus the actual survey was conducted in July and August of 1985.

Site

The geographic area covered in this survey of non-medical therapists included all of Southern California. At first the survey was to include only the members of the non-medical psychoanalytic community of San Diego. However in order to increase the size of the sampling frame and to broaden the spectrum of this population, all of the non-medical members of the psychoanalytic community of Southern California were included.

Procedure

Data sources. The source of the data came from the Southern California Psychoanalytic Community reponse to the survey which consisted largely of how they viewed the tenets proposed by Blanck and Blanck on drives and affects. Basically, the investigator questioned psychoanalytically oriented clinicians on how they perceived, employed, applied, adapted, or rejected the views of the Blancks. Furthermore, the subjects were asked to clinically demonstrate how they utilized their view of drives and affects as it related to, (a) developmental diagnosis, (b) treatment goals, (c) therapeutic alliance, (d) support of ego functions, (e) interpretation, (f) transference, (g) resistance, and (h) termination.

Instrumentation. Lofland (1971), on the subject of qualitative data collection, recommends the employment of an intensive unstructured interview. The interview objective is to enlist the respondent's cooperation in order to secure a richly flowing subjective reponse of detailed information which can be qualitatively analyzed. Spardley (1979) holds a simialr view in which he advocates a "friendly conversation" in order to

establish an empathic alliance. In his words, it is important to convey the following attitude.

> I want to understand the world from your point of view. I want to know what you know in the way you know it. I want to understand the meaning of your experience, to walk in your shoes, to feel things as you feel them, to explain things as you feel them, to explain things as you explain them. (p. 34)

In light of the above, it was decided that a semi-structured interview would be most conducive to this survey. The interview was semi-structured in that an open-ended questionnaire (see Appendix C) was employed at the time of the intensive interviews with clinicians. The Interview Schedule (Appendix C) was designed by the investigator in order to survey some psychoanalytic therapist's responses to the tenets proposed by the Blancks (see Appendix B) and to understand how these therapists utilize the concepts of drive and affect in the actual practice of psychotherapy.

Administration. A mailing was sent to all of the non-medical members of the sampling frame of the various organizations mentioned earlier, which included the following:

1. A cover letter (see appendix A-1 and A-2) identifying the nature and purpose of this research, the time commitment for the participant, and an inquiry regarding their interest and availability to participate in this study.

2. Enclosures included the open ended questionnaire (see appendix C), a self-addressed, stamped postcard (see appendix D) indicating "yes" or "no" response to participating in this study and the consent form (see appendix E).

There were actually two separate mailings. This was due to the fact that the investigator was unable to obtain a mailing list of one of the analytic organizations, for their policy did not permit it. However, the administration of this organization was willing to personally send out a mailing to its members. Thus, the investigator prepared fifty-eight sealed envelopes and one unsealed envelope (for administrative review) containing all the material described above and mailed them off to the organization. The secretary of this organization put address labels on the fifty-eight pieces and sent them out immediately. In actuality, this so-called "blind mailing" was only four days behind the regular mailing. Because of the nature of this mailing there was a slight variation in the cover letter (see appendix A-2) and in the postcard (see appendix D-2). The variation was that these respondents were asked to include their name and

phone number on the postcard. The mailing carried out by the investigator was coded by using the subject's initials, assigning a list number and ending it with the last four numbers of their zip code. This code was placed alongside the name on the investigator's mailing list, on the addressed envelope and the postal card. Thus when the coded postal cards were received, they checked off against the investigator's list.

Approximately two weeks after the mailings, the potential subjects, who hadn't returned the postal card, were telephoned, asked to check the appropriate box on the postal card and put it in the mail.

When it became clear that there would not be enough affirmative responses to do a random sample, an accidental sample was decided upon. Subsequently, the investigator telephoned the affirmative respondents. During the telephone contact the researcher inquired about the potential subject's familiarity with the Blanck's position on drive and affect. If the subject seemed fairly confident about their knowledge of the Blancks writings on drive and affect, a time and place for the interview was negotiated.

Instructions to respondents. At the time of the interview, each subject was instructed, as outlined in the cover letter, that the purpose of this survey was to understand clinicians' reaction to the Blancks challenge of traditional drive and affect theory; to learn their views of these constructs and how they employ them in clinical practice.

Before the questionnaire was actually administered by the investigator, he had the subject read and sign the consent form, as well as secure some demographics (see appendix F).

Basically, the controls consisted of every subject receiving the same material and instructions. Additionally, each subject was queried about their knowledge of the Blancks views on drives and affects to insure a sophisticated response to the questions. For this very same reason the other criteria (outlined earlier) was established for the subjects.

Lastly, the instrument was pretested on five subjects who were not a part of the sampling frame, because they did not meet all of the criteria. As a result, the cover letter was modified with the statement that the questionnaire was not to be filled out, but

only included to familiarize the subject with the nature of the questions. The questionnaire itself was modified to bring greater clarity to some of the questions. In short, these modifications allowed for greater precision and relevency in the survey.

Recording method. All interviews were audio tape recorded and were reviewed shortly thereafter. At the time the tapes were reviewed some notes were made. When all the interviews were completed, the tape recorded sessions were reviewed again and analyzed.

Analysis of the Data

The data recorded from the semi-structured interview was analyzed and categorized according to the origin, nature, function, development and the relationship of drive and affect. Each of the first nine questions in the interview schedule is designed to address one of these categories. The remaining questions were formulated to evaluate how these clinicians utilize these constructs and to assess their use of them in the ongoing process of psychotherapy. Furthermore, the investigator attempted to identify recurring themes, ideas and theoretical perspectives

which might lend themselves to suggest hypotheses to be tested in future research. Particular attention was devoted to how the subjects perceive the relationship between drive and affect and how they arrive at their conclusions. The investigator summarized these findings, highlighting any similarities or differences, and providing a descriptive profile of the therapists' views according to the categories mentioned above. Particular attention was given to how the subjects' theoretical perspectives and clinical interventions are alike or different from the position of the Blancks, as well as, how subjects' views relate to current ego psychological issues, reflected in the review of the literature indicated in Chapter II.

Limitations

As noted above, the sample was limited to a small sample of psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists within a limited geographical area of Southern California, which will undoubtedly result in a regional bias. As a result, any findings cannot be offered as a generalization to all psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists from different schools of thought.

However, while there are different schools of thought in psychoanalytic theory, such as ego and self psychologies, they are all united under the aegis of psychoanalysis. The implication is that even though there are differing points of view, there are also many similarities, common concerns and conceptualizations. As an example, I cite my paper on narcissism (Mone, 1983) in which I did a comparative analysis of two differing schools of persuasion, ego psychology and self psychology. In the final analysis, it was clear that the theoretical positions were quite divergent, but the clinical approaches were similar. It could also be said, that in still other situations, theoretical positions may be alike, while the clinical interventions may be different.

Still, another point of consideration is that no psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapist is purely of one persuasion. A subscriber to one school of thought, usually holds to the tenets of that school to some degree. No two adherents of one school of thought holds all of the same beliefs.

Also noted, is that a volunteer accidental sample introduces a bias, in that, these subjects may tend to hold to a more favorable view on drive and affect than

subjects who chose not to participate in the survey. Lastly, the fact that the interviews will be conducted by the designer of this study, instead of someone who is not invested in this study, may interfere with the objectivity of the interviews.

In short, while the results of this exploratory study has its limitations, it is quite possible for the findings to be relevant and applicable to the psychoanalytic body of knowledge and to the clinical practice of social work as a whole.

CHAPTER IV

Findings

This chapter reflects the results of the survey conducted by this researcher with a sample of seven psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists in Southern California. First the demographic data on these subjects will be presented, which will be followed by how they responded to each question in the interview schedule.

The Pre-Test

As mentioned in Chapter III, there were five subjects who were part of the pre-testing of the instruments. Of these, two were interviewed by the final interview schedule used in the survey. The reason these two subjects were not included in the actual sample was that they did not meet all the criteria outlined in Chapter III. Pretest Subject X was a licensed clinical social worker who had not been in a formalized psychoanalytic training program, but had studied informally on her own. Pretest Subject Y was a

medically trained psychoanalyst.

Some of their responses are enlightening. Subject X agreed with all of the Blanks' positions as outlined in the first eight questions, while subject Y essentially agreed with all the positions except two. He does not believe that drives themselves operate harmoniously or conflictually, but that how they relate to one another is largely determined by the ego. As he put it, drives are biologically determined and press for discharge, but how they operate is dependent on the integrative force of the ego. While he also agreed with the position that drive and affect pursue their own separate lines of development, he stated he could not imagine drive without some affective component; he believes there is some affect with every drive manifestation. He further remarked that there is an affective component with drive satisfaction, implying that there would be affect with drive dissatisfaction as well. Nonetheless, he believes that it is important theoretically and practically to distinguish between drive and affect from both a theory and a practice perspective. With regard to defense, he indicated it is important to know, for example, if the patient is defending against an affect or a drive. He added, "it

is easy to blur the distinction, without a conscious effort to keep drive and affect separate, because there is a definite interchange."

With reference to how drive and affect are employed in the therapeutic process, Subject Y utilizes drive and affect in assessing developmental diagnosis, treatment goals, therapeutic alliance, supporting ego function, transference, resistance and termination. He observes that some drive gratification is necessary to enhance the therapeutic alliance, a positive transference, and ego development. He indicated that the libidinal drive functions (to be close, understood and cared for) are important in the therapeutic process of connecting with the patient. Conversely, he indicated that drive frustration retards the development of a therapeutic alliance and a positive transference.[1]

Pretest Subject X, while agreeing with the Blancks' position, had some qualifying remarks worth noting. She made the point that, at birth, the libidinal drive reigns over the aggressive drive because the neonate

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1. He qualified his position by noting that such gratifications must be commensurate with the patient's diagnosis and level of ego functioning and that it is not necessarily a prescription for all patients.

needs to connect more than to separate during its early weeks of life. She also believed that it is important to distinguish drive from affect but that it is not always easy to do so because "they cross and intersect at times." She stated that a patient's angry or hostile outburst might be serving a separating function; it is therefore crucial to understand and not to confuse drive and affect.

Regarding the clinical application of the concepts drive and affect, pre-test Subject X emphasized the need to assess the level of drive and affect development as well as how they relate to one another. Therefore, the assessment of drive and affect development would determine, in part, the treatment goals and when they were realized, it would be a signal for termination. She also felt that gratifying the patient's aggressive need to separate can foster the therapeutic alliance. In her view, it is sometimes enough for the therapist to be cognitively aware of the patient's need to separate and to utilize this awareness by not interfering. She also stressed the importance of making affect interpretations as well as drive interpretations, but did not elaborate on this.

Demographic Data

The characteristics of the seven subjects in the study sample were identified according to the following parameters: race, ethnicity, sex, age, professional discipline, years of experience beyond the professional degree, years of formal psychoanalytic training, number of hours of personal psychotherapy, and number of hours of personal analysis. Other factors under consideration were whether or not these subjects were currently involved in psychotherapy or psychoanalysis and if they were currently enrolled in a psychoanalytic program. Lastly, subjects were identified according to their designated psychoanalytic orientation. The reason these characteristics were measured was related to the assumption that they might influence the subject's response to the questions in the survey.

Race/ethnicity. All seven subjects were Caucasian. Out of these seven, five declared their ethnic background as Jewish and two did not make a specific designation.

Sex and age. Forty-four of the clinicians in the sampling frame of fifty-five were women; only eleven of the fifty-five were men. Thus, it was anticipated that

most of the sample would be made up of women; in fact the entire sample was female. The seven subjects ranged in age from thirty-seven to sixty-seven, with a mean age of forty-seven years.

Professional discipline and years of experience. The entire sample was made up of clinical social workers. Five of the seven held Ph.D.'s in clinical social work and two were M.S.W.'s. Years of experience beyond the professional degree was defined as the experience beyond the masters degree in social work. The years of experience ranged from five to twenty-six years, with the mean at fifteen years.

Formal psychoanalytic training. Formal psychoanalytic training was defined as enrollment in a psychoanalytic institute that offered certification in psychoanalytic training. Four of the seven subjects had at no time in their clinical career undertaken formal psychonanalytic training, but had attended many psychoanalytic training conferences, seminars, workshops, etc., during their clinical practice years. Two subjects had at least one year of formal psychoanalytic training while one subject had two years of training. Two of these three subjects are continuing with their formal training and are currently enrolled in

an analytic program.

Personal psychotherapy. Five out of seven subjects had undergone between fifty and two hundred hours of psychotherapy. One subject had over five-hundred hours of therapy and one subject had no experience of psychotherapy but had undergone psychoanalysis.

Personal analysis. Personal psychoanalysis was defined as at least three sessions per week on the couch with a psychoanalyst. Two subjects had never been in psychoanalysis. One subject had between one-hundred and two-hundred hours of psychoanalysis; another subject had experienced between four and six-hundred hours of analysis; three had over six-hundred hours of psychoanalysis.

Current therapy status. At the time of the research interview, four of the seven subjects were undergoing either personal psychotherapy or psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalytic orientation. The psychoanalytic orientations of the subjects were as follows: three identified themselves with a Contemporary orientation (Freudian and Post-Freudian), two as Ego Psychologists, one as a Self Psychologist and one designated herself as

Psychodynamic, which she defined to include Ego Psychology, Self Psychology and Object Relations.

Summary of Demographic Data

In summary, the subjects were white, female clinical social workers, whose mean age was 47 years and who had practiced clinically for an average of fifteen years. While only three claimed formal psychoanalytic training, all of the subjects considered themselves students of psychoanalytic theory and practice, and had undergone either psychotherapy or psychoanalysis and some had experienced both. Lastly, their psychoanalytic orientation was identified as either Contemporary (Freudian and Post-Freudian), Ego Psychology, Self Psychology or Psychodynamic.

Instrumentation

The instrument consisted of eleven questions (see appendix C) either pertaining to the drives, or drives and affects. Questions one through eight required that the respondent agree or disagree with each of the respective points in the interview schedule and give

their reasoning behind their stated position. Each of these eight questions related to one of the following variables: origin, development, nature, function and the relationship between either drives or drives and affects. The particular variable that each of these eight questions addressed will be indicated below. Question nine was designed to allow the respondent an opportunity to give her own theoretical conception of drive and affect and how they relate to one another. It was in the interest of understanding how clinicians in practice utilize their own conception of drive and affect and the relationship between them that questions ten and eleven were formulated.

Function of drives: libido and aggression. All seven of the subjects agreed with the premise that the function of libido was to connect and bind together, bringing about increasing unity, while the aggressive drive functioned to undo these connections, which was viewed as not necessarily destructive.

All of the respondents viewed the drives as a force that is omnipresent in object relations. Subject G's response rather typifies the theme expressed by all of the subjects. She said, "...I see undoing connections as positive. It allows people to connect and disconnect

in relationships." This subject also made another statement that none of the other respondents made. It was "...to change, to undo something and move onto something else. It is helpful to evaluate anew." When asked if this latter concept referred to an abstracting function as in the decision-making process, she agreed and indicated that the drives operate in helping people to connect with thoughts and separate out issues so that a decision can be reached and exercised. Subject E more specifically related the connecting and disconnecting functions of libido and aggression to the process of selective identification as described by Jacobson (1964).

Relationship between libido and aggression. All but one of the subjects agreed with the Blancks' position on this issue, that libido and aggression relate in a harmonious way of connecting and disconnecting as the need arises.[2] Subject E took the exceptional position that drives neither basically oppose nor harmoniously relate to one another, because she believed that the drives interact with one another

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2. Freud's position, on the contrary, is that libido and aggression are basically oppositional and relate in a bipolar fashion.

in an infinite number of ways. The rationale for those subjects who agreed with the Blancks position was that development is not based upon conflict and therefore the drives must relate harmoniously if development is to proceed.

Origin of drive and affect. All seven of the subjects in the sample agreed with the position that drive and affect develop out of the undifferentiated matrix.[3] Subject C's reasoning was typical of the group as a whole; the neonate's capacities are basically diffuse and undifferentiated at birth and therefore must develop out of an undifferentiated matrix.

Early relationship between drive and affect. Six out of the seven subjects agreed with the position that at first drive and affect are in an undifferentiated state.[4] Subject F took exception and qualified her answer in the following manner. She believes that drives are more evident at birth and affects develop later. She stated that the first evidence of what she

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3. A storehouse within the organism in which genetic givens have the capacity for further development (Blanck & Blanck, 1974).

4. A form in which genetic givens such as, drive-affect, ego-id, inside-outside, etc. have not yet differentiated into separate entities.

considered a genuine affect was the smiling response. Subject F further believes that the pain and distress the infant exhibits before the smiling response is a physiological response, the "building blocks of affects". In the final analysis, she agreed that drive and affect in early development are undifferentiated. Thus, all of the subjects were in agreement with the idea that drive and affect in early development are undifferentiated.

Five of six subjects, who agreed with the position as it was stated in question four, reasoned that since the infant and its psychic structures are relatively unorganized and undifferentiated, it is logical to assume that drive and affect, too are in an undifferentiated state at birth.[5]

Drive and affect development. Six of the seven subjects agree with the Blancks' position. They reasoned that since drive and affect are separate, they

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5. Subject D, while she agreed with the basic premise, was not clear about her reasoning and therefore was unable to articulate a logical reason for her agreement.

6. The concept of developmental lines (A. Freud, 1965) is the separate pathways of developmental givens which extend from immaturity to maturity, such as in object relations.

must differentiate and pursue their own lines of development.[6] Subject B, who is one of the six in agreement, elaborated even further on her reasoning. She also believes that affects are the qualitative discharges of drives and that drives are manifested quantitively. Thus, while she views drive and affect distinctively, she also sees them operating in an inseparable relationship.

Subject A could only relate to the position that drive and affect differentiate during the course of development, but did not embrace the idea that they pursued their own separate lines of development because she felt drive and affect are so interwoven they cannot possibly pursue their own lines of development. She added that she objects to the notion of separate lines of development because in her view it has not been proven.

In short, six out of the seven subjects basically agreed with the point that drive and affect differentiate during the course of development and pursue their own separate lines of development and one subject could neither totally agree nor disagree with this position.

Nature of drive and affect. Three subjects agreed with the position that drive and affect at birth are basically in an embryonic state and have the capacity for higher development without having to undergo a secondary process of being tamed, fused, neutralized or sublimated. These three subjects reasoned that drive and affect are only immature at birth and as the organism matures so do drive and affect; thus, they basically see it as a maturational process. Four subjects disagreed with this position for they still held to the belief that drive and affect could only reach higher development through the secondary process of fusion, taming, neutralization or sublimation.

Function of drive and affect. All seven respondents were in agreement with the position that drive and affect serve human growth and development. Four of these respondents were very clear in their reasoning. They basically hold to the idea that drive and affect serve as motivational life forces fostering growth and development.[7] Subject A qualified her answer

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7. The other three respondents were less clear in their reasoning and had difficulty offering an argument in support of their position, for they had an intuitive, unchallenged conviction that drives and affects definitely foster human growth and development.

with the following comment, "if there are negative results from drives, such as sadness, anger, and anxiety ...those serve to help us to be introspective in a way to motivate us to avoid the pain."

Importance of drive and affect distinction. All of the seven subjects definitely agreed with the position that it is important to maintain a distinction between drive and affect. There was also a general agreement that clarity between drive and affect allowed for greater accuracy in making a therapeutic intervention. Subject A for example, mentioned one of her patients who was very critical of her. Subject A recognized this as the patient's need to disconnect (a drive function) and separate from the therapist. In so doing, the therapist supported and interpreted the patient's aggressive drive, and not the hostile affect manifested in the criticism. This accuracy defused the hostility and allowed the patient to continue with her therapy.

Subject C had a similar response. She believes that it is very important to be clear about the concepts of drive and affect because the therapist's conception influences her interventions and the nature of her interpretations in practice. While subject D also agreed with the position mentioned above, she admitted

that she too uses drive and affect interchangeably. She further declared that if the therapist confuses drive with affect, it tends to confuse the patient. Subject F also noted that drive may be accompanied by a variety of feelings; for example, while aggression may be accompanied by hostility or rage, it may also be accompanied by the joy of self-assertion.

Additional Remarks

Question nine provided the respondents with an opportunity to add anything they may not have had an opportunity to express in the eight structured questions, to elaborate their view of the origin, nature, function, development and relationship between drive and affect. However, the subjects' responses to question nine did not reveal any new ideas. The one exception was Subject F's remarks.

She holds to the position that drives energize and motivate behavior and that they are satisfaction seeking. Affects are emotions and feelings that are learned in the context of the relationship, which is motivated by drives. Furthermore, she posits that the level of drive can regulate affect. She thinks that

drive motivates object relations and that affect arises out of those connective links. She added that drive regulates affect and that the intensity of the affect is connected to the level of drive from which it initially developed. Furthermore, it is her belief that affects also stimulate drives and that affects are less clear theoretically than drives; understanding will come from further studies in physiology.

Clinical Application of Drive and Affect

Finally, the respondents were asked to describe the application of their theoretical conceptions of drive and affect in clinical practice.

The subjects discussed eight major areas of clinical practice: diagnosis, treatment goals, therapeutic alliance, supporting ego functioning, interpretation, transference, resistance and termination. Each of these practice areas are presented separately.

Developmental diagnosis. Five of the seven subjects said that they assess the functional level of drive and affect development in the patient at the time

treatment begins. Subject D admitted that she does not consciously do this, but that this interview had stimulated her to do so in the future. Subject B also does not evaluate patients in terms of drive and affect and added that she does not think conceptually in her practice.

Two subjects who gave clinical illustrations to support their reasoning related the assessment of drives and affects to the nature of the patient's level of object relations. They assess the patient's ability to connect and disconnect in relating to the object world. Subject E, for example, recalled a thirty-two year old female patient whose affects she determined were largely undifferentiated and her drive development was not sufficiently developed to allow her to separate from her family and make other object connections.

Treatment goals. Subject A's response rather typifies the response of most of the other subjects. It is as follows: The treatment goals are commensurate with the diagnosis. "Take them (patients) where they are and see what you (I) can do to move them on." Subject B, holding to a more traditional approach, had a response that was different from all the other subjects. The goal in her view is to help the patient neutralize the

drive aggression by subsuming it under the libidinal drive. This notion holds to the idea that aggression is destructive and must be dominated by libido for it to be tamed; aggression then becomes non-destructive and promotes growth.

Therapeutic alliance. All respondents suggest that it is important for the therapist to be connected with the patient in a positive way. Although not always specifically stated, but often implied, the idea was that to do this the therapist must be "in tune" empathically with the patient.

Subject F summed up her approach as follows. She attempts to connect with the patient in a positive, affective way to stimulate the therapeutic alliance so that the patient may join the therapist and work together. Subject C believes that "being in tune" with the patient allows the alliance to develop because it forms a connection. With regard to narcissistic personality dysfunction, the therapist's awareness of the patient's narcissistic vulnerability signals the therapist to be sensitive to how the patient perceives a gesture, a behavior, a remark, etc. Subject C believes that the therapist must accept the level of the patient's affect and drive function and connect with the

patient through understanding and empathy.

Supporting or strengthening ego functions. Five subjects indicated the importance of recognizing the level of the patient's functioning, as they did in the developmental diagnosis, and attempting to stimulate a higher level of functioning via clarification and interpretation. Subject A emphasized the importance of helping the patient identify and connect with his/her affect. Subject C suggested that by giving credence to the patient's feelings and being attentive to these feelings, the therapist validates them. She believes that this intervention supports and strengthens ego functioning in the patient. Subject D suggested that helping the patient to differentiate helps to strenghten the patient's ego functioning.

Interpretation. The entire sample agreed that it is important that the interpretations be consistent with the diagnosis of the patient, which fosters more appropriate interpretation of drive and affect. Inconsistency and inappropriate interpretation can be injurious to the patient. Furthermore, the subjects do attempt to interpret the relationship between the drive and affect.

Subject F, who was quite articulate on the subject of interpretation, presented her thinking as follows. She indicated that she tends to make many interpretations of affective connections between the self and the object in the present, and the self-object unit of the past as it relates to drive and affect. As an illustration, she alluded to a borderline patient wanting to be a whole person. She and the patient explored his early connections with his mother and his current connections with women. She interpreted to him that he feels like a little boy with these women in the same way he felt with his mother, but that he is an adult now and can get his needs met by these women without having to relate in a boyish manner. She interpreted his need to connect and disconnect, as well as the loss and fear that is involved in disconnecting.

Transference. All of the subjects tended to evaluate the nature of the transference by evaluating the patient's drives and affective responses to them. Subject A used the quality of the patient's affect to determine the nature of the transference. For example, she indicated that the patient who reacts with anger when his/her needs are not met by the therapist is signaling a negative transference. Two subjects

indicated that a positive transference could be fostered in a similar way that the therapeutic alliance is encouraged, by gratifying the patient's need to connect by the demonstration of empathic understanding. Some respondents articulated the importance of differentiating hostility from the aggressive drive in order to support the developmental thrust and maintain the therapeutic alliance by minimizing the affective correlate of the drive. As one subject put it, "... the need to disconnect, simply put, is a negative transference, but not always bad because it may be developmentally appropriate to do so (separate)." She continued, aggression in the service of separation needs to be supported, if appropriate. The drive to separate is often accompanied by great anger, which may obscure the positive function of the aggressive drive. The therapist must help the patient to see that the aggressive drive fosters separation and that separation is in the service of development. In another example, Subject E indicated that one of her patients connected to her in a symbiotic fashion and that the patient's aggressive drive was malfunctioning. She said that negative affect was more apparent than the aggressive drive to separate. She concluded that "the wiring between the drive and affect was not right." The

implication here is drive and affect were not sufficiently differentiated.

Resistance. Three subjects viewed resistance as a defense against revealing painful affects related to past experiences.[8] Subject F deals with resistance largely in terms of defended affects; affects are associated with different object experiences. For example, she stated that a patient who experienced shame with regard to a particular object experience might resist talking about it. Three other subjects focused on drive manifestation and how it might be mistaken for resistance. Subject B, for example, alluded to a patient who comes late; she believes this lateness can be interpreted as an "aggressive act" (referring to hostility) or as an "autonomous act" (separation). "Because it could be either, the action needs to be understood within the proper context." Subject C raised a similar issue, by describing a situation in which she was going on vacation and a patient began moving away from the material they had been focusing on in therapy. Subject C looked upon this as adaptive to the

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8. One subject was not clear enough in her own thinking other than to say that she sees resistance as a manifestation of both drive and affect.

forthcoming separation and not as resistance, concluding that her patient needed to consolidate and pull herself together. Subject E described one of her patients whose exercise of the aggressive drive served developmental separation and not resistance. This patient declined a second hour with her therapist as a means of sustaining the fragile identity she had developed.

Termination. All seven respondents were in agreement that drive development must be sufficiently advanced for an appropriate termination to occur. An appropriate termination was believed to commence when the treatment goals were realized, but there was also the recognition that terminations do occur when this is not the case. Three therapists felt it is important to convey to their patients upon termination that while they support the termination (disconnecting), reconnecting with the therapist at some later date should not be seen as regression or failure.

The patient's drives should have developed to the extent that the patient feels reasonably comfortable with connectedness and separateness in order for the termination to be considered appropriate. Only four of the seven subjects could relate affects to the termination process. Subject C believes that it is

important that drives are organized enough to allow separation to occur and that the patient's feelings are "synchronized" with the drives. The implication is that the feelings should be appropriate to the drives, e.g. sadness and a sense of loss is appropriate affect upon separation.

Summary of Findings

There is basic agreement among the respondents on each of the following points:

a. The function of libido is to connect and bring about ever greater unities, while the function of aggression is to undo these connections and does not necessarily destroy.

b. Drives and affects originate out of the undifferentiated matrix.

c. The relationship between drive and affect at first are undifferentiated and therefore not separated from one another.

d. The qualifying function of both drive and affect is to serve human growth and development.

e. The relationship between drive and affect is sometimes blurred and consequently they are used interchangeably. Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish drive from affect in theory and practice. (It was interesting to note that while everyone basically agreed with this statement, some of the subjects in responding, at times, used drive and affect interchangeably.)

On the following two points six out of the seven subjects were in agreement, while two subjects agreed with the first premise (f) and not with the second (g).

f. Drives are not basically opposing but relate to one another in a harmonious effort of connecting and disconnecting as the need arises.

g. During the course of development drive and affect differentiate and pursue their own separate lines of development.

Regarding the nature of drive and affect, there was less agreement among the subjects. Three subjects agreed that drives and affects are in an embryonic state at birth and have a higher capacity for development, without being tamed, fused, neutralized or sublimated. Four held to the more traditional notion that drive and affect are basically primitive and need to undergo the secondary process of taming, fusion, neutralization or sublimation in order to support growth.

With respect to the use of drive and affect in the actual process of psychotherapy, all of the respondents employed the use of these concepts to some degree. However, they are not always conscious of the conceptualization process unless they are asked to think about it. Thus, they were often nebulous in their

conceptualizations. Furthermore, they are more apt to be cognizant of drive than of affect in the process of therapy, particularly as drives operate in relation to the separation-individuation process.

CHAPTER V

Discussion and Implications

Drives

The sample of seven psychoanalytically oriented clinicians agree with the Blancks' position that libido and aggression function as forces of connection and disconnection, respectively, and that the disconnecting force is not necessarily destructive. The suggestion is that, as other authors have agreed, there has been a movement away from the more narrow traditional view of drives developing only through psychosexual phases, toward an evolving view of drives which contribute to other lines of development, such as identity formation and object relations. For example, Pine (1985) in his historical review of psychoanalytic theory posits that there is an essential unity between object relations theory and "drive psychology", a term he uses to identify the two basic drives of libido and aggression. He goes on to explain that while Freud linked drive theory with the object, there was more emphasis on the special parts of the objects (through which

gratification is achieved), such as the erogenous zones, and that Fairbairn's 1941 paper emphasized the object seeking, rather than pleasure seeking, aspect of libido. Pine further asserts that this unity between drive psychology and object relations theory ties into the mainstream of psychoanalytic theory today. The notion that libido is the connecting drive and aggression is the disconnecting drive broadens the scope of utility in theory and practice. An elaboration of this theme is forthcoming.

The subjects' responses to the survey as a whole indicate how readily they see the concept of drives connecting and disconnecting fitting into understanding and explaining object relations theory, which might be more appropriately called self and object relations theory as implied by Jacobson (1964). Subject X, in the study pre-test, made a noteworthy comment regarding drives. She believes that libido, the connecting drive, is dominant and reigns over the disconnecting drive, aggression, because the neonate needs to make a greater number of connections than disconnections with mother during the first few weeks of life. She did not suggest that the aggressive drive was inactive in infancy, only that the libidinal drive was activated more. This is

also a position held by the Blancks (1979, p.39). This idea seems to make sense, but still needs further study. In a recent book review of Rene' A. Spitz: Dialogues from Infancy-Selected Papers, Shor (1985) comments on the dialogue at birth between the infant and its mother (oscillating eye and hand contacts) as suggesting the manifestation of drives or motives of connecting and also of disconnecting. Are the drives of equal strength at birth or is libido actively stronger and more dominant than aggression? Returning to the subjects' responses, they seemed more comfortable with using the term connection and disconnection (or separation) in refering to their patients' functioning and in understanding the dynamic process of the therapeutic relationship. (More will be said on this subject in the Clinical Application Section.)

Subject G, as indicated in the findings, utilized this conception of drives in assessing the decision-making capacity. Her thinking fits in with Spitz's (1965) two-step process the "semantic no" of aggression employed to differentiate perceived elements and the synthetic function of the ego pulling these elements together, which allows for the formation of the abstraction "no". Thus the ego's ability to

differentiate and synthesize is fueled by aggression and libido, respectively. Similarly, Blanck and Blanck refer to selective identification as involving libido to connect with the identifying object and to internalize the admired function in the interest of further separating and functioning more independently. The separating and independent functioning is, of course, fueled by the aggressive drive. Also, the abstracting function of the ego fueled by the drives has been demonstrated in this author's 1983 paper on narcissism, in which libido and aggression are employed in the developmental process of differentiating self and object representations with affective coloring to the point that there are internalized whole representations of differentiated self and object (Mone, 1983).

Since all of the subjects agreed with the idea that libido and aggression function in a connecting and disconnecting fashion, it is not surprising that all but one of the subjects agreed with the idea that libido and aggression basically relate harmoniously as the need for object connection or disconnection arises. Even the subject who chose neither to agree nor disagree qualified her position by stating that drives relate to one another in an infinite number of ways, which would

imply that she does view drives functioning in a harmonious effort at least to some degree.

It appears that the Blancks' position of the drives operating in concert makes a great deal of sense to modern clinicians in light of what is stated above and also in regard to Mahler's (1975) work on separation-individuation, which clearly demonstrates that, under normal development, the drives operate in a cooperative effort of disconnecting at one level and reconnecting at a higher level.

Drives and Affects

The agreement among the sample of seven that drives and affects originate out of the undifferentiated matrix, suggests that there may be basic acceptance of the concept of undifferentiated matrix within the community of psychoanalytic psychotherapists who do not necessarily identify with an ego psychology orientation. On the other hand, it is quite possible that some or all of the respondents were not clear in their own minds regarding what the ego psychologists, Hartmann and others, mean by the undifferentiated matrix (see footnote 3, p. 123). However, the reasoning behind

their response that "the neonate's capacities are basically diffuse and undifferentiated at birth and therefore must develop out of an undifferentiated matrix" seems to support the idea that they did comprehend the meaning of the construct.

Regarding the early relationship between drives and affects, there were six subjects who agreed with the position that drives and affects were at first undifferentiated but most of the respondents could not see the difference between question three and four until the investigator clarified that one dealt with **origin** and the other with **relationship.** The assumption was made by the six respondents that, since "the infant and its psychic structures are relatively unorganized and undifferentiated at birth, drive and affect too are in an undifferentiated state". This implies that they may not have comprehended the abstraction of drive-affect developing out of the undifferentiated matrix as ego-id, self-object, psychic-soma, and inside-outside are so conceptualized. It is likely that Subject F, who cannot totally agree with the position as stated, may have been the only subject who clearly understood the nature of the question. Her response was that drives are more evident at birth than affects; that affects develop

later and when they do, drives and affects are in an undifferentiated state.

Because question five (dealing with development) and eight (dealing with relationships) are so closely connected, it may be advantageous to discuss them together. With the exception of Subject A, who did not agree with the idea that drives and affects pursue their own separate lines of development, there would have been a total congruence in the responses to the two questions. The unanimous agreement that drives and affects differentiate during development lends further support to the idea that drives and affects are separate and distinct. Therefore, to use drive and affect interchangeably would blur their distinction. Thus there is a consistency in this sample's responses, in that the subjects see drives and affects eventually differentiating and therefore regard them as separate and distinct concepts. However, it was very interesting to note that despite this understanding, most of the respondents had a tendency to use them interchangeably, and many were unaware of it until it was called to their attention.

What does this mean? How is it that so many therapists (as reported in the literature review and the

findings) continue to use drive and affect interchangeably while having a cognitive awareness of their separate and distinct aspects? I believe that there are several reasons. It is important to recognize that ambiguity is an inherent part of theory contruction; Freud's contributions, although a monument to his genius, reflect a theme of drive-affect ambiguity that is still evident.

It may be this legacy of Freud's which has so permeated the literature that is still with us today. For example, Miller (1985), who has taught psychoanalysis for more than twenty years and has written several books, in a chapter on drive theory in her most recent book, Thou Shalt Not Be Aware, refers to aggression as a "feeling". The ambiguity that Freud struggled with at that time may have been fostered by, among other sources, the observation of his patients with undifferentiated drive and affect. The Blancks' (1979) view that drive and affect are at first undifferentiated and, as development proceeds, drive and affect differentiate and pursue their own lines of development, may also be pertinent to understanding why there continues to be a blurring of distinction between drive and affect. The Blancks believe that at first

affects are in a nondifferentiated state in which the infant is either in a state of dozing or "organismic distress" (a term they credit to Mahler, 1952).[9] Level two in the process of differentiation is said to be oscillations of pleasure and displeasure. Level three is the level of differentiation in which the broad spectrum of affects develop, such as anger, joy, pleasure, sadness, to name a few. This seems to suggest that affects per se are not yet developed at birth, but only states of "organismic distress" and dozing. If this assumption is correct, it would appear that affect development follows drive development, which would support the notion put forth by Subject F that affects follow the development of drives. The film "Our Amazing Newborn", from M. Hach of Case Western Reserve University, mentioned previously by Shor (1985), seems to further support the idea that affects are not immediately present at birth, but follow the development of drives. The film exhibits neonates (less than twenty-four hours old) "gently" oscillating contacts with mother by the use of their eyes and hands. At some point during development, which to the author's

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9. It should be noted that neither the Blancks' nor Mahler's suppositions are based upon direct infant observational research.

knowledge is yet to be determined, drive and affect first are undifferentiated and later differentiate and pursue separate lines of development.

Nonetheless, drive and affect differentiation are believed to occur through the ongoing maternal ministrations to the child (which are both gratifying and frustrating) and the organization of the developing ego. The Blancks place great emphasis on the ego's organization relative to, among other things, drive and affect differentiation, development, and organization. In short, it is the level of differentiating development and organization of drive and affect, along with the level of development and organization of the ego, which determines the functioning of drive and affect.

The notion of drive and affect as undifferentiated but later separating to seek their own lines of development does not negate the understanding that affects accompany drives. However, the idea that drive and affect have their own lines of development allows for a different combination of drive and affect than traditionally mentioned in the literature. As Subject F indicated, aggressive drive expression may be accompanied by anger or it may be followed by joy as in an assertive self-expression. Her position is in

agreement with Blanck and Blanck (1979), who indicate that the aggressive drive may be accompanied by the affect of love or anger. For example, parents who foster their child's separation-individuation process by encouraging him/her to leave home in order to start his/her own life would be an example of the aggressive drive accompanied by the affect of love. Also, the activation and discharge of libido may be accompanied by anger as a way of getting close in a relationship with some margin of safety. A bantering couple might be seen to demonstrate libido accompanied by anger. Once again, the idea of undifferentiated drive and affect, differentiating and following their independent lines of development, provides more options in understanding human behavior.

Still another reason for the lack of clarity in the utilization of these terms, drives and affects, may be the nature of the relationship between the two. As Subject G indicated, the relation is so close it is hard to think of them in a separate and distinct way. Pre-test Subject Y felt that, without a conscious effort to separate drive from affect, it is easy to blur the distinction because there is a definite linkage. In fact, this subject could not conceive of one without the

other. The author had assumed, prior to this investigation, that perhaps there could be drive expression without affect. However, one respondent rightly suggested that even the simple act of saying "no" can be accompanied by a good feeling, a feeling of having made a decision. Furthermore, saying "no" to someone's request is often saying "yes" to oneself and this too stirs a feeling of gratification. Some subjects were very definite in their belief that while drives and affects may be conceived as separate and distinct, they have an inseparable relationship. Subject A and C, for example, expressed the idea that drives and affects are interwoven; Subject B views affects in the more classical tradition of affects being the qualitative expression of drives. Kernberg (1982), in a recent paper, contends that affects become integrated with drives, an idea that is in opposition the concept of undifferentiation. The concept of drives as Freud originally conceived them, as primitive opposing forces needing to be tamed (fused) and sublimated, has been challenged. Giovachinni (1982) notes, "Freud did not believe there is an instinct for higher development. Primitive life strives to remain primitive."(p. 164). He also questioned the concept of drive fusion. In his words:

> It is difficult to understand how the fusion of two instincts can create states of higher integration. Instincts operate on the basis of the primary process. The fusion of two primary process elements cannot result in a secondary process structure (p. 186)

Thus if it is accepted that drives are capable of higher development, it would follow that they are not inherently primitive as Freud had theorized.

Most of the six respondents in this sample still hold to the more traditional view that drives and affects are basically primitive and that they must undergo a secondary process of change or alteration. Those three subjects who agreed with the Blancks' position, that drives and affects need not undergo this secondary process, had no demographic characteristics that set them apart from the other four subjects that held to the more traditional view. Neither age, years of experience, years of personal therapy or analysis or additional psychoanalytic training apparently differentiated these respondents. What is most interesting about this difference is that two of the four respondents who held to the more classical view of drives identified their orientation as Contemporary (Freudian and Post-Freudian), while the remaining two subjects identified with either Ego Psychology or Self

Psychology. It would appear that the subjects who aligned themselves with Contemporary or Ego Psychological orientation would be more inclined to embrace the notion that drives need not undergo a secondary process change. So why is it that these subjects still hold to the idea of fusion? Subject B, who identifies herself with a contemporary orientation, reasoned that aggression needs to be neutralized by libido. This view was also evident in her response to the clinical use of drives and affects (see p. 130 in Chapter IV). Implicit in this response is the idea that aggression is destructive yet she agreed with the position that aggression is not necessarily destructive--an apparent contradiction in reasoning. Subject E, who was also identified with a contemporary orientation, reasoned that drive is basically primitive but also agreed with the position stated in question one, which is a more benign view of drives. Thus contradictions in the reasoning of mature clinicians seem not to be uncommon. In view of the fact that Kohut, the father of self psychology, largely discarded the concepts of libido and aggression because he no longer found them useful in developing his ideas (Mone 1983), it is understandable that the only subject identifying with a self psychology orientation would not

embrace the notion put forth by ego psychology, that is, that drive need not undergo a secondary process to serve higher development. However, she too agreed with the position in question one, that libido connects and aggression disconnects. Thus all four subjects are seemingly inconsistent and contradictory in their reasoning.

Despite the fact that there was a divergence in opinion among the respondents regarding the primitive state of drives and affects, everyone agreed with the position that drives and affects served human growth and development. In fact, there was a consistency in their reasoning that drives and affects were motivational systems capable of fostering growth and development. Perhaps it is fair to say that, despite the differences in theoretical orientation, there was a tendency for this sample to lean toward a psychoanalytic developmental model.

Clinical Applications of the Concepts Drives and Affects

As mentioned in the findings, the subjects in this survey are not accustomed to conceptually thinking of drives and affects when actively engaged in the

therapeutic process. While it is not possible to make any generalized statement from this research, it has been this investigator's experience, as a student and a teacher, that very few clinicians think in conceptual terms when conducting psychotherapy.

The lack of theory-practice integration tends to burden the therapeutic process and reduces interventive accuracy. The clinician who thinks in conceptual terms as he or she practices leaves less to chance and tends to make appropriate and ameliorative interventions, furthering the process of therapy. Of course, no matter how well a therapist integrates theory with practice, he/she must have other human qualities to be able to connect with the patient and must keep an open mind to what develops during the hour to be effective.

The subjects who demonstrated conceptual clarity seemed to have a clearer understanding of their patient's dynamics. For example, those who were conceptually clear about the function and relationship of drives and affects were better able to make clinical distinctions between drives and affects in the process of therapy. More accurate interventions are commensurate with the Blancks' (1977 & 1979) position that it is important to maintain the distinction between

drives and affects, for this distinction provides opportunity for supporting developmental thrusts that might be otherwise overlooked. G. Blanck (1984) in her recent paper "The Completed Oedipus Complex" indicates further that the young oedipal child in his/her attempts to supplant the same-sex-parent may in fact be furthering his/her development in the same way he/she did at an earlier developmental level. What G. Blanck alludes to is the process of "selective identification", outlined by Jacobson (1964), in which the child takes over the function of the parent and internalizes it to function more independently. G. Blanck adds that the oedipal child's wish to take over the function of the same-sex-parent may be mistakenly interpreted as a hostile act, rather than the developmental advance of selective identification, which involves the employment of libido and aggression.

Therapist Use of Drive Function

All of the therapists in this survey actively utilized the patients' drive functions while engaging in the therapeutic process. They engaged their ego functions of differentiation and synthesis (which were

fueled by libido, the connecting drive, and aggression, the disconnecting drive)[10] in all clinical processes which were surveyed in this study. The therapist's early contacts with the patient are fueled by the connecting drive, usually accompanied by warm gentle affects so as to establish a therapeutic rapport. The therapist elicits information about the patient in order to formulate a working diagnosis. The patient's connection with the therapist is actively encouraged by the therapist's asking the appropriate questions, listening to the responses, understanding the patient's concern and recognizing it in an empathic way. To formulate a diagnostic evaluation, a process similiar to what Spitz (1965) describes in the abstracting process necessary for the formation and activation of the semantic "no" is utilized (see p. 60). This is a never ending process which is characteristic of clinical practice. With regard to the therapeutic alliance, for example, the subjects very often activate the connecting drive in their attempts to foster the alliance, through listening, understanding, empathy, recognition, and demonstrating an overall interest in the patient's well

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10. In the interest of clarity and simplicity, the author will refer to libido as the "connnecting drive" and aggression as the "disconnecting drive".

being. It was also apparent in the therapist's attempt to establish a positive transference. This is accomplished in much the same way that the clinician established the therapeutic alliance--by attentive listening, understanding, being "in-tune" with the patient's thoughts and feelings, supporting the patient's efforts and recognizing his/her accomplishments, along with expressed interest in the patient's welfare. To illustrate, Subject F indicated that she attempts to connect with her patients in a positive affective manner in order to elicit a cooperative working effort from her patient. Subject C believes that in order for a therapeutic alliance to develop she must connect with the patient by being "in tune" or sensitive to what is going on with the patient. In other words, the therapist is encouraging the connecting drive by the expression of understanding and empathy.

In the interest of strenghtening her patient's ego function, Subject A supported the patient's disconnecting drive followed by the connecting drive to help the patient sort out her affects from the drive functions. In the literature, this process might be referred to as the therapist "lending her ego" to the

patient. It is a process of helping the patient strengthen her ego by the therapist's efforts to stimulate the patient's connecting and disconnecting drives in relation to affects.

With reference to transference, some of the respondents indicated that the gratification (through recognition, respect, and understanding) of the patient's drive to connect or disconnect with the therapist was a way of fostering a positive transference. Conversely, the frustration of the patient's drive to connect or disconnect with the therapist is believed to create a negative transference.

Finally, with regard to termination, a few of the respondents emphasized the need to recognize and respect the patient's drive to disconnect, either by reducing the sessions, pulling back from the session or interrupting the process altogether, temporarily or permanently. The therapeutic stance overall was to foster the patient's drive function in the interest of the patient's growth and development, even if it meant an interruption to therapy. This idea is also embraced by Sanville (1982). In her article "Partings and Impartings" she emphasizes that while the therapist is

available for the patient to connect, the therapist must also be ready to allow diconnection when the patient expresses the need to experiment with his/her newly advanced autonomy.

It is important to note that the therapist's attempts to connect with the patient (in the interest of the therapeutic process) need not be accompanied by "love", nor does disconnecting have to be linked with "anger or rejection." Many of the clinical illustrations in this survey support this notion.

In short, the understanding of the nature , function, development, and relationship of drives and affects is very important to the process and accuracy of interventions according to modern conceptions of therapeutic goals. This research supports this thesis and has illustrated through clinical examples how it might refine clinical social work practice.

In the final analysis, while not all the subjects were conceptually clear, they expressed a value system which is reflective overall of their having moved from Freud's original positions to more contemporary psychoanalytic thinking.

Interview Process: Possible Limitations and Biases

There was a greater clarity among the subjects regarding drive theory, particularly as it related to the aggressive drive, than regarding the affects. They focused on separating out the drive from the affects of anger, hostility and rage. There was generally less familiarity with affect theory, but this is not surprising because the development of affect theory has lagged behind drive theory. However, there was a tendency to view hostility or rage as not being conducive to human growth and development.

The emphasis on drives, particularly the aggressive drive as it relates to anger and hostility, has been an interest of the researcher. More specifically, the researcher had observed, over the years, that many patients with separation-individuation problems have a lot of difficulty in saying "no". It seemed that the difficulty had to do with angry and hostile affects which were not sufficiently differentiated from the disconnecting drive. Consequently, the patients would often exclaimed that they couldn't say "no" because it would hurt the person to whom "no" was being said. On further exploration, the author observed that these

patients were afraid of anger, which had not been sufficiently differentiated from the disconnecting drive. In other words, in the event that they did activate the disconnecting drive it would usually be accompanied by anger or hostility. It became the researcher's belief that if drive and affect was sufficiently differentiated it would be possible to have drive expression without an accompanying affect. It was with this predilection that the researcher created the instrument for this study. This undoubtably influenced how the questions were formulated and the manner in which they were verbalized during the interviews. That is to say, the researcher's belief may have had an influence on the nature of the responses from the subjects.

Furthermore, the fact that all of the subjects were professional women may have influenced the results of the study in the direction of emphasizing the disconnecting drive. The women in this sample are not typical of the women in our society. As mentioned earlier, five of them hold Ph.D.s. The two who had the Masters degrees were also involved in a post-graduate training program. Furthermore, all of the respondents were in professional clinical practice. Four of the

subjects were unmarried and self-supporting. Of the three subjects who were married, at least two, and maybe all three, were earning enough money to be self-supporting. Thus, it would be fair to say that these women were successful in their practice and functioned independently. These women appear to be part of the cadre of women that Sanville refers to as the women who have tried to free themselves from the biology and the culture which have interfered with their self-assertiveness and directness (Shor and Sanville, 1978). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that these subjects are particularly sensitive to the issues of separation and it may have influenced their responses, particularly with respect to the disconnecting drive. Their responses were very heavily weighted in the direction of helping the patient separate from objects, even from the therapist. This sensitivity may be related to their own struggles as women in a society which only recently began tolerating womens' self-assertions (Shor and Sanville, 1978). The emphasis on disconnecting or separating suggests a possible unconscious concern with regard to over-connecting to the point of merger. Shor and Sanville (1978) indicate that there has been a greater tendency in our culture for the girl child to connect and that it is normally

fostered by the maternal object, while the converse is true for the boy child. In short, women have been culturally conditioned to emphasize connectedness. Thus the subjects in this study may need to emphasize the disconnecting drive to counter the strong tendency to connect. It is also interesting to note that the women's movement began with an undifferentiated linkage between separation and hostility, but as the rights of women began to be recognized and exercised the linkage between hostility and separation deminished and differentiation could be developed. Finally the emphasis on separateness and self-direction is also reflective of an overall cultural movement which counters the more societally submissive style of the past.

One other point worth noting is that the focus on drive may have had some bearing on why the subjects did not have more to say about affects. However, it seems more plausible that it is related to the fact that the psychoanalytic theory of affect still lags far behind the theory of drives and that more research is needed to better understand affect development.

Implications For Further Research

A replication of this survey using a much broader psychoanalytic sample might shed some further light on current views of the nature, function and relationship of drives and affects as they relate to theory and practice. Furthermore, the author would suggest that the sample be expanded to include subjects who have completed a psychoanalytic program either in psychotherapy or psychoanalysis and medically trained analysts. Opening up the research to the medical community would not only broaden the population base, but also provide input from another discipline. This could expand the findings and make it possible to draw some general conclusions that were not possible in this limited survey sample. Furthermore, it would be important to include academicians in the survey in order to compare their responses to clinicians. Since academicians generally teach theory and practice, it is assumed that they would be more consciously aware of the relationship between theory and practice than clinicians and that their responses would be different. Thus such a study of comparing the responses between these two groups would help to shed further light on this subject. It might also be interesting, with a large

enough sample, to include clinical supervisors in order to determine if there are any differences among the three different groups. A further consideration would be to study a sample which included men and women, which would help to determine if there is a systematic difference in the responses according to gender.

Not enough is known about the differentiating process of drives and affects. For example, when and how does it begin? Is the organizing process of drives and affects a simultaneous process or do drives organize before affects, as Subject F suggested in her responses? Do drives equally influence the organization of affects in the same way affects influence the organization of drives? Could it be that drives and affects, although conceptually distinct, are impossible to separate operationally because they are so well integrated with one another, as Kernberg (1982) indicated? More definitive answers to these questions are to be found in infant research in which criteria for identifying drives and affects are developed so that the course of drive and affect development can be charted.

Along this same train of thought, it would be of benefit to investigate G. Blanck's (1984) hypothesis about the oedipal child's employing selective

identification as a means of supplanting the parent of the same sex, which she posits is not hostility but a developmental drive thrust toward further individuation.

Lastly, the question of whether clinicians who think and practice conceptually make more accurate and appropriate interventions is also worthy of further investigation. This investigation was not designed to systematically test effectiveness or accuracy.

Summary

The surveyed sample of psychoanalytically oriented clinicians in this study tend to practice according to the following model of the origin, nature, function, development and relationship of drives and affects: that drives and affects are inseparable (undifferentiated) some time after birth, but in the course of normal development separate, become distinct and follow individual lines of development. If the notion of undifferentiated drive-affect is supported by infant observation and clinical experience, then it might be said that affect is a derivative of drive, but it must also be said that drive is a derivative of affect.

While drive and affect are very closely related to one another, especially with respect to their origin, they pursue separate lines of development, and are eventually separate and distinct. However, there is a definite linkage between them when one or the other is activated. Prior to this study, the investigator was leaning toward the idea that there could be drive expression without an accompanying affect, but with further thought and review of the findings, there is a strong basis for agreeing with pre-test Subject Y's remark that drive without affect is inconceivable. It maybe more the case that the nature of the accompanying affects, which are determined by their own organization as well as the organization of drive and ego, are qualitatively different and may be so subtle they go unnoticed. To reiterate, drives and affects are undifferentiated some time after birth. As development proceeds, differentiation commences and advances to the point of separation and distinction; drive and affect do not go through a process of metamorphosis and become one as Kernberg (1982) has suggested. Slightly more than half the sample still believe that the basic character of drive and affect is primitive, needing to be tamed, but almost an equal number of the surveyed clinicians believe that drive and affect in their infancy do not

need "taming" but do need the organizing influence of the ego to advance to higher levels of development. While drive and affect are distinctly separate from one another, affects do pursue drive aims, as in the affect of love accompanying the drive to connect in object relations. Conversely, drives pursue affect motives, as in pain seeking to undo object connection. Researchers, such as Mahler, Bergman, Pine, Spitz and others tend to support the hypothesis of inborn drives and affects which are cultivated by the ministrations of the care-taking-object. The subjects of this survey do not appear to be convinced that drives organize affects nor that affects organize drives. Since they are such an integral part of one another at birth, it would seem that the reciprocal stimulation between them and among the other mental apparatuses (particularly ego), as well as the stimulation and frustration from the outside environment, which organize drives, affects, cognition, and other mental structures.

While this investigation has provided some ideas to ponder, only continued study and research can extend the findings of this and prior studies and propose new questions for consideration.

APPENDIX A-1

Letter to Therapist

Dear Therapist:

I am a doctoral candidate at the California Institute for Clinical Social Work and currently involved in the dissertation process. The focus of my research is on the psychoanalytic concepts of drive, affect and the nature of their relationship. These constructs are being studied in light of the ideas posited in the Blancks most recent writing's (1977, 1979, and 1984) in which they suggest a shift in theory formation.

The major purpose of this study is to survey psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists' reaction to the Blancks' challenge of traditional drive and affect theory, and their alternative views.

With your permission, I would appreciate approximately one hour of your time in an interview to ask you about your understanding and approach to the theoretical points and questions indicated in the enclosures. These questions are only to familiarize you with the kind of questions I will be asking you during the interview and therefore do not require a written response.

Also enclosed in this letter is a consent form and a self-addressed stamped postal card. Would you kindly check the appropriate box and drop the card in the mail. If you indicated that you are interested and have the time to participate in this research, I will telephone your office to set up a time and location, at your convenience, for the interview.

Please accept my thanks for your consideration and response.

Sincerely,

Louis C. Mone, L.C.S.W.

APPENDIX A-2

Letter to Therapist

Dear Therapist:

I am a doctoral candidate at the California Institute for Clinical Social Work and currently involved in the dissertation process. The focus of my research is on the psychoanalytic concepts of drive, affect and the nature of their relationship. These constructs are being studied in light of the ideas posited in the Blancks most recent writing's (1977, 1979, 1984) in which they suggest a shift in theory formation.

The major purpose of this study is to survey psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapists' reaction to the Blancks' challenge of traditional drive and affect theory, and their alternative views.

With your permission, I would appreciate approximately 60 to 90 minutes of your time in an interview to ask you about your understanding and approach to the theoretical points and questions indicated in the enclosures. These questions are only to familiarize you with the kind of questions I will be asking you during the interview and therefore do not require a written response.

Also enclosed in this letter is consent form and a self-addressed stamped postal card. Would you kindly check the appropriate box, write in your name, phone number, and drop the card in the mail. If you indicated that you are interested and have the time to participate in this research, I will telephone your office to set up a time and location, at your convenience, for the interview.

Please accept my thanks for your consideration and response.

Sincerely,

Louis C. Mone, L.C.S.W.

APPENDIX B

The Blanck's Contributions

Blanck and Blanck (1977 & 1979) and G. Blanck (1984) argue in favor of a revision of drive theory and of the importance of drive affect differentiation. Listed below are some of the main points that they address in their argument. Some of these points are direct quotes taken from their 1979 book Ego Psychology II.

1. Freud (1940) defined libido as the force which connects and binds together, bringing about ever greater unities, and aggression as a force which undoes these connections and thereby destroys. The Blancks agree with this premise, with the modification that aggression, in undoing connections, does not necessarily destroy.

2. Freud's position regarding the relationship between drives was that they basically oppose one another, while the Blanks hold to the idea that the drives primarily relate in a cooperative effort.

3. The Blanck's hold to the traditional ego psychological position that drives and affects develop out of the undifferentiated matrix.

4. The Blanck's also hold to the ego psychological position that drive and affect at first are in an undifferentiated state.

5. The Blancks posit that drive and affect differentiate during the course of development and pursue their separate lines of development.

6. According to Freud, drives and affects are basically primitive. The Blancks believe that drives and affects are undeveloped in their infancy but have the capacity for higher development; they do not need, therefore, to be tamed, fused, neutralized or sublimated.

7. Drive and affect serve human growth and development.

8. The Blancks contend that the aggressive drive is sometimes considered in an affective and behavioral way as hostility or rage, and believe that to use drive and affect interchangeably blurs an important distinction both from a theory and practice level.

APPENDIX C

Interview Schedule

Point 1. Freud (1940) defined libido as the force which connects and binds together, bringing about ever greater unities, and aggression as a force which undoes these connections and thereby destroys. The Blancks agree with this premise, with the modification that aggression, in undoing, connections, does not necessarily destroy.

Question 1. Do you agree or disagree with the Blanck's position? Please state your reasoning.

Point 2. Freud's position regarding the relationship between drives was that they basically oppose one another, while the Blancks hold to the idea that the drives primarily relate in a harmonious effort of connecting and disconnecting as the need arises.

Question 2. Do you agree or disagree with the Blancks position? Please state your reasoning.

Point 3. The Blanck's hold to the traditional ego psychological position that drives and affects develop out of the undifferentiated matrix.

Question 3. Do you agree or disagree with this position? Please state your reasoning.

Point 4. The Blancks also hold to the ego psychological position that drives and affects at first are in an undifferentiated state.

Question 4. Do you agree or disagree with this position? Please state your reasoning.

Point 5. The Blancks posit that drives and affects differentiate during the course of development and pursue their own separate lines of development.

Question 5. Do you agree or disagree with this position? Please state your reasoning.

Point 6. Drives and affects, according to Freud, are basically primitive. The Blancks posit that drives and affects are not basically primitive, but only in an embryonic state at birth and have the capacity for higher development; they do not need, therefore, to be tamed, fused, neutralized or sublimated.

Question 6. Do you agree or disagree with the Blancks position? Please state your reasoning.

Point 7. Drives and affects serve human growth and development.

Question 7. Do you agree or disagree with this position? Please state your reasoning.

Point 8. The Blanks contend that the aggressive drive is sometimes considered in an affective and behavioral way as hostility or rage, and believe that to use drive and affect interchangeably blurs an important distinction both from a theory and practice level.

Question 8. Do you agree or disagree with this position. Please state your reasoning.

Question 9. What is your conception of drives and affects, and how do you view the nature of their relationship in the context of psychoanalytic theory today?

Question 10. In terms of your own view of the origin, nature, function and development of drives, affects and of their relationship, would you illustrate how you apply these concepts with your patients in the actual process of psychoanalytic psychotherapy as it relates to:

a. the developmental diagnosis.

b. treatment goals.

c. the therapeutic alliance.

d. supporting or strengthening ego functioning.

e. interpretation.

f. the positive and negative transference.

g. resistance.

h. termination of therapy.

Question 11. Are there any other remarks you wish to make regarding the subject of drive and affect as it relates to the process and outcome of the therapy?

APPENDIX D-1

Postal Card

FRONT

STAMP

Louis C. Mone, LCSW
8950 Villa La Jolla Drive
Suite 1171B
La Jolla, CA 92037

BACK

PLEASE CHECK ONE OF THE FOLLOWING

I am interested and have the time to participate in this research. ( )

I am interested but not available to participate in this research at this time. ( )

I am not interested in participating in this research. ( )

APPENDIX D-2

Postal Card

FRONT

STAMP

Louis C. Mone, LCSW
8950 Villa La Jolla Drive
Suite 1171B
La Jolla, CA 92037

BACK

PLEASE CHECK ONE OF THE FOLLOWING

I am interested and have the time to participate in this research. ( )

I am interested but not available to participate in this research at this time. ( )

I am not interested in participating in this research. ( )

If you have checked 1 or 2 please print below.

_____ (___)_____
Name Area Code & Phone #

APPENDIX E

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE FOR CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK

Informed Content Form

I,_____, hereby willingly consent to participate in the research project entitled "Interpretation and Application of Drive and Affect Theory in Clinical Practice". The procedures of this study have been approved by the dissertation committee of Louis C. Mone, M.S.W., chaired by Dee Barlow, Ph.D.

I understand the procedure to be as follows:

1. Completion of an Informed Consent Form by the therapist, whose signature appears below.

2. Completion of an audiotaped one to one-half hour interview by the therapist, whose signature appears below.

3. All information will be held in strictest confidence, and your anonymity will be protected by the following methods:
   (a) The investigator, Louis C. Mone, is the only person who will review the results of the taped interview.
   (b) The taped interview will be erased and the written materials destroyed as soon as the study is completed or by December 1st 1985, whichever is sooner.
   (c) Your name will not be used in any way.
   (d) The presentation of this material in report or publication will exclude the identification of your participation in this study.

The following individuals will be available for consultation if any concerns arise as a result of your participation in the study or procedure:

Louis C. Mone, M.S.W.
8950 Villa La Jolla Dr.
Suite 1171B
La Jolla, Ca. 92037
(619) 452-8692

Rosemary C. Lukton, D.S.W.
Dean, C.I.C.S.W.
2009 Hopkins St.
Berkely, Ca. 94707
(415) 528-8422

I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.

Date:_____Signature_____
(Therapist)

APPENDIX F

Demographic Data

Race/Ethnicity _____

Sex _____

Age _____

Professional Discipline _____

Years of experience beyond professional degree _____

Years of formal psychoanalytic training _____

Number of hours of personal psychotherapy _____

Number of hours of personal analysis _____

Are you currently in therapy or analysis _____

Are you currently enrolled in an analytic program _____

Psychoanalytic orientation: _____

- Classical _____
- Contemporary _____
- Ego Psychology _____
- Self Psychology _____
- Kleinian _____
- British Object Relation _____
- Other(Identify) _____

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